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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The oil industry is becoming increasingly competitive and with the rising nationalisation of 
resources, international oil companies are struggling to secure access to new oil and gas 
reserves. Statoil faces challenging tasks as it seeks to move from a protected home market to 
the extremely competitive international arena. Its ambitious internationalisation strategy relies 
heavily on getting access to new oil and gas reserves and large investments in new and 
leading technology. However, Statoil needs to consider different growth alternatives to 
increase its international competitiveness. In this paper, we recommend the proposed merger 
with Norsk Hydro to be the most politically feasible alternative. Nevertheless, we question 
whether this will give Statoil sufficient international strength required for the fiercely 
competitive international arena. Consequently, Statoil might have to consider other growth 
alternatives even after the merger or adapt its business model to better fit the needs and 
requirements of the industry today.  
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PART 1: INTRODUCTION  
 
CHAPTER 1: SUBJECT PROPOSITION 
 
INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT  
When choosing the subject for our thesis, our first criterion was to write about something that 
we are interested in. We have discussed the subject of mergers and acquisitions in several 
classes, and have found this field of business strategy particularly interesting. Thus, we were 
happy when Statoil announced its merger with Hydro in December last year. This provided us 
with a topic of great current interest, while simultaneously allowing us to have an 
international perspective on our thesis. Moreover, we saw this as a great opportunity to learn 
more about the global petroleum industry.   
 
PURPOSE OF THE THESIS 
The purpose of this thesis is to discuss how Statoil can increase its international 
competitiveness and realize its international growth ambitions in the most effective manner. 
After all, this is the main rationale behind the announced merger with Norsk Hydro. However, 
we question if the merger with Hydro in fact is the best response to the challenges the 
company is currently facing in the industry. Consequently, we will evaluate other strategic 
alternatives on equal terms with this particular merger, and consider which would be the most 
beneficial for Statoil in its pursuit for increased international growth.  
 
To reach a conclusion and provide a recommendation we will first analyze Statoil´s external 
environment by using the PESTEL and Porter’s five forces framework. With this we aim to 
identify the main industry trends and drivers of change, as well as the competitive forces 
shaping the industry. Then, we will apply Dunning's OLI framework to see whether Statoil 
fulfils the criteria to successfully undertake foreign direct investments. The aim of these 
analyses is to identify the critical success factors in the industry, and obtain a better 
understanding of Statoil´s current strategic position. Further, with the resource based view and 
the VRIO framework, we will perform an internal analysis of Statoil to identify the resources 
and competences it currently possesses that can generate competitive advantage, and also 
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reveal the ones  it currently lacks to better compete internationally. The aim is to match the 
internal strengths and weaknesses of the company with the external opportunities and threats. 
Finally, we will evaluate how Statoil could increase its international competitiveness in the 
best manner, by discussing four different strategic alternatives of pursuing an international 
strategy, namely: (1) internal development, (2) horizontal and (3) vertical merger and (4) 
strategic alliance. We will discuss the benefits and drawbacks of each expansion mode and 
evaluate to what degree they can provide Statoil with the resources and competences it 
currently lacks. Our conclusion and recommendation will be based on our own findings and 
personal judgement. 
 
Figure 1: Structure of our thesis 
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PROBLEM SCOPE 
Our goal is to give a recommendation on how Statoil can increase its international 
competitiveness, given its current strategic position in the market. Consequently, the main 
focus will be on Statoil´s international operations. Moreover, we have chosen to concentrate 
on its upstream activities of the value chain, namely exploration and production of oil and gas. 
We will evaluate Statoil´s strategic alternatives for increased international growth according 
to the same set of given criteria. However, as Statoil already has announced its intention to 
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merge with the oil and gas division of Hydro more emphasis will be put on evaluating this 
alternative.  
 
As the oil and gas industry, or the petroleum industry, is often referred to as the oil industry 
we will use these terms interchangeably throughout our paper. Moreover, this also applies to 
the term (natural) resources which are sometimes used instead of oil and gas reserves. Also, as 
the industry is truly global we have chosen to perform the analyses on a more general basis, 
even if some of the theories are intended to evaluate the attractiveness between different 
locations. Overall, we have tried to look at the collected information objectively and have 
used various sources to observe different points of views. Nonetheless, all our analysis will be 
conducted with Statoil´s “interests” in mind, as we are trying to answer how Statoil can 
increase its international competitiveness. As a result, we have deliberately not discussed the 
interest of the Norwegian state and the like in detail. Moreover, as we would like for anyone 
interested to read our thesis, we have chosen to keep it relatively simple when it comes to 
both the political and economic points of view. This way, it remains comprehensible even for 
those without any prior knowledge. Moreover, as we will use a number of abbreviations 
throughout the paper, we have added a glossary to the appendix for further explanations. 
 
LIMITATIONS AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Our main limitation has been to collect non-official information about Statoil and its intended 
merger with Hydro.  At the time this paper is written, the merger process is not completed and 
consequently the merger process is very confidential due to economic and legal concerns. 
Moreover, as the effect of the merger is yet to be shown in the future it has been difficult to 
foresee the all-embracing benefits and drawbacks of such a solution. We had little prior 
knowledge of the oil industry before we started to write this thesis, and can not guarantee that 
all of our analysis provides a complete or correct picture of all the forces shaping and 
influencing the industry.  
 
We would like to thank our advisor Christine Meyer for her invaluable insight in the field of 
mergers and acquisitions and advise in the choice of strategic theories. Moreover, we are 
extremely thankful to Eirik Wærness, Runar Tjersland and David Nunn in Statoil and Norsk 
Hydro that has taken the time to let us interview them. Even though they could not provide us 
with confidential material or information, their first hand knowledge about the businesses and 
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the industry was very helpful to us. We would also like to thank Hans Henrik Ramm for his 
assistance, providing us with a different and more critical view on the merger. Information 
collected through these interviews has been implemented with our best intentions, and we 
take full responsibility for possible misinterpretations. 
 
 
CHAPTER 2: METHODS USED TO OBTAIN DATA 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to look at the research methods used to obtain data for this 
thesis. We have chosen to base our analysis on qualitative research as we believe this is the 
most suitable research method for our paper. Through qualitative research we can collect, 
analyse and interpret data in a subjective by using various methods of collecting information. 
If we were to use quantitative data we would be more restricted as the analysis is statistical 
and based on numbers and measurements1.  
 
After the relevant literature on the theory part was analysed, the first step was to analyse the 
global oil industry to see how the current trends and challenges affects the companies in 
operation. Next, we gathered information on Statoil in order to understand its current strategic 
position in the industry. Finally, we searched for data that could provide us with information 
on the proposed merger between Statoil and Hydro, and other strategic alternatives that Statoil 
could pursue to better compete internationally.  
 
We have collected secondary data from various sources such as: 
 Newspapers and articles. To obtain background information and news on the merger, 
and compare different points of view, articles from various Norwegian and 
international newspapers were scanned and analysed in the period of December 2006 
to June 2007. This provided us with a good understanding of the rationale for the 
merger and the possible consequences. 
 
 Companies’ annual reports. The annual reports of Statoil and Hydro were used to 
obtain company-specific information, but also information on current trends in the 
industry.  
 
                                                 
1 Bryman, A. (2005). Social Research Methods, 2nd edition, Oxford University Press. 
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 Companies’ websites. The websites of Statoil and Hydro were used to gather specific 
information on the companies’ products and services, as well as goals and strategies.  
 
 Market and industry reports (International Energy Agency, USB Investment Research, 
Morgan Stanley Research, Datamonitor, HSBC and other). These reports provided us 
with valuable information on the global oil industry, market trends and changes, and 
information on the various actors in the industry.  
 
 Official statements/reports (Proposition to the Storting, Merger Plan, OECD etc.) 
These papers gave solid information on the merger process from the companies’ point 
of view, but also the authority’s views on the matter.  
 
To collect primary data for our thesis we chose to use semi-structured interviews as this 
encourages two-way communication and the purpose was to obtain general information on 
specific issues. We performed interviews with two employees in Statoil and one employee in 
Hydro. We have also interviewed one independent oil consultant to obtain a more external 
point of view of the matter. These are the names and positions of the people we interviewed: 
 Eirik Wærness, Director of Group Planning and Analysis, Statoil 
 Runar Tjersland, Senior Vice President, Corporate Strategy, Statoil 
 David Nunn, Senior Vice President,  Portfolio Strategy, Norsk Hydro 
 Hans Henrik Ramm, Independent petroleum consultant 
 
The interviews provided us with valuable insight into Statoil and Hydro’s operations, the 
current challenges in the industry and the rationale for the merger. We used the information 
from these interviews to fill in the gaps in our analysis and to get an insider view. To be more 
critical towards the information on the companies and the merger, we also interviewed the 
external oil analyst who provided us with a more pessimistic view on the merger. We 
performed two of the interviews in person and two over the telephone as it was difficult to 
meet in person. All interviews apart from one were recorded on a tape recorder to be able to 
proof check the information obtained afterwards. All interviews except the first initial contact 
with Statoil were deliberately conducted at a late stage in our writing process, as we wanted to 
take advantage of gaining additional insight into topics that was unclear or unavailable 
through other sources of information. 
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PART 2: PRESENTATION OF STATOIL
                                                
 
 
Statoil ASA was established as a wholly state-owned company in 1972, and is today a fully 
integrated oil and gas company with considerable international activity. The company was 
listed on the stock exchange and partially privatised in 2001, and the state currently owns 70.9 
percent of the company. Statoil is today represented in 35 locations worldwide with its head 
office situated in Stavanger, Norway, and employs around 25 000 people. As an integrated oil 
company, Statoil manages the whole value chain; from exploration and development of oil 
and gas fields to operations of production platforms and retailing of gas and oil products. As 
the company mainly focuses on exploration and recovery, most of its income is derived from 
its upstream activities. The company has been very profitable in recent years, mainly as a 
result of high oil and gas prices.  The company experienced a record profit of NOK 40.6 
billion in 2006, compared to NOK 30.7 billion in 20052. 
 
Statoil enjoys a dominant position on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NCS), where it is the 
largest operator. Combined Statoil controls 60 percent of the domestic oil and gas production. 
Its total production in 2006 was 1 135 000 barrels of oil equivalent (boe) per day, which 
corresponds to between five and six times Norway’s oil consumption3. As a result, only Iran 
and Saudi Arabia’s national oil companies (NOCs) trade more crude oil than Statoil, making 
the company the world’s third largest exporter of crude oil. However, as the fields on the NCS 
are maturing and the company is struggling to replace its reserves, its future production and 
position is threatened. Nonetheless, Statoil aims to maintain an equity production of one 
million boe per day from the NCS after 20104.  
 
Today, Statoil’s international production accounts for 16 percent of its total production. 
However, the company seeks to increase its international presence and competitiveness, and 
subsequently aims for an annual long-term growth of 2-4 percent from 2007-20105. 
According to the company’s annual report, Statoil will focus on building up an international 
portfolio and seek new partnerships in resource rich regions. Furthermore, it aspires to be 
 
2 Proposition to the Storting (2007). Merger between Statoil and Hydro’s petroleum business, Press release, 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, No. 52/07, 30.03.07. 
3 Proposition to the Storting (2007). Merger between Statoil and Hydro’s petroleum business, Press release, 
Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, No. 52/07, 30.03.07. 
4 Statoil (2006), Annual report, available at 
<http://www.statoil.com/INF/SVG03636.NSF?OpenDatabase&lang=en&app=2006year>, 30.04.07 
5 HSBC (2007). Company report, Statoil, HSBC Global Research, 14.03.07 
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acknowledged as a project developer with first-class expertise and technology. It also wants to 
increase value creation in manufacturing and marketing through improvements to the 
business, integration and world-class operations6. The company’s announcement of the 
planned merger with Norsk Hydro´s oil and gas division in December 2006 is also a result 
from the company’s wish to enhance international growth.   
 
Figure 2: Snorre platform7
 
                                                 
6 Statoil (2006), Annual report, available at 
<http://www.statoil.com/INF/SVG03636.NSF?OpenDatabase&lang=en&app=2006year>, 30.04.07 
7 Snorre Platform <http://www.ptil.no/NR/rdonlyres/F9608E69-81D1-440A-9BEF-
7C088C766733/7305/snorre_a550x375.jpg>,19.06.07. 
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 PART 3: THE GLOBAL OIL & GAS INDUSTRY 
 
CHAPTER 1: DEFINITION 
 
The international oil and gas industry can be defined to include all companies that are 
involved in the oil and gas production value chain; from the owners of the resources to 
operators, drillers, equipment manufacturers, facility constructors, service providers and 
engineering companies. Nonetheless, in this paper we will focus on the integrated oil and gas 
sector, meaning companies that engage in the exploration and production of oil and gas, as 
well as at least one other major activity in oil refining, marketing or transportation8. However, 
for the purpose of this report our analysis will be based on their upstream activities, that is 
mainly exploration and production. 
 
Figure 3: The oil and gas value chain9
 
 
CHAPTER 2: INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 
 
The traditional global integrated oil and gas companies can further be classified into three 
different segments: the international, the national and the independents.  
 
THE INTERNATIONAL OIL COMPANIES 
The international oil companies (IOCs) are often referred to as the “majors”. They consist of 
companies like ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, BP, Chevron, Eni, ConocoPhillips and Total. 
They are characterized by having extensive skills and easy access to capital. Moreover, they 
                                                 
8 ResearchandMarket, Global Integrated Oil & Gas, available at 
<http://www.researchandmarkets.com/reports/340664/global_integrated_oil_and_gas.htm>, 01.03.07 
9 TNO, Full value chain Gas market simulation, available at <http://www.tno.nl/downloads%5C308beno.pdf>, 
15.06.07 
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are capable of taking on significant investment risks, nonetheless in the pursuit of high 
returns. Normally, they manage a portfolio of large projects all over the world and promote 
technology development very actively.  
 
THE NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES 
National Oil Companies (NOCs) are in most cases both owners and operators of fields in their 
home countries, like for example Saudi-Aramco (Saudi Arabia) and PDVSA (Venezuela). 
However, they are becoming increasingly international. This is typically to diversify 
investment risks or to secure supplies to meet the needs of their fast growing economies, 
which is important for companies in net-importer countries like China and India. These 
companies have become today’s major resource holders, and together they control more than 
90 percent of the proven global reserves.  Moreover, they represent about 70 percent of 
worldwide oil and gas consumption10. The NOCs often manage their resources in a more 
long-term perspective compared to the private companies that are more eager to capture 
shorter-term profits. Moreover, the majority tends to be followers of new technologies rather 
than developers.  
 
THE INDEPENDENTS 
The independents are smaller, private companies often specialising in smaller scale projects. 
They typically focus on specific geographical areas or types of reservoir. As they do not have 
the same financial strength as the majors, they are often skilled at managing older reservoirs 
and normally engage in projects offering rapid returns. Consequently, they are often 
innovative in developing new types of reservoirs and in leveraging their local knowledge.  
 
                                                 
10 UBS Investment Research (2006). Oil Companies, Major- Global Analyzer,  UBS Limited, 05.12.06. 
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Figure 4: Global integrated oil companies by market capitalization and by region (2006)11
 
  
 
CHAPTER 3: OPEC 
 
OPEC plays an important role in the global oil industry as the majority of the remaining 
reserves are located in OPEC regions. OPEC stands for Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries, and is an intergovernmental organization dedicated to the stability and prosperity 
of the petroleum market. OPEC membership is open to any country that is a substantial 
exporter of oil and which shares the ideals of the organization. OPEC has 12 countries as 
members12, which currently supply more than 40 percent13 of the world’s oil and control 
about 79 percent of the world’s total proven crude oil reserves14. 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: RECENT HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENTS  
 
In the past 50 years, the driving forces in the global oil and gas industry have changed 
dramatically. There have been shifts in the power structure of oil companies and the industry 
has experienced a wave of consolidation. In the 1950s and 1960s, the international majors 
dominated and had close to unrestricted access to oil and gas resources. Only 2-3 percent of 
the resources were maintained by national governments. However, this changed dramatically 
in the 1970s when members of OPEC began a wave of nationalisation of natural resources. 
                                                 
11 UBS Investment Research (2006). Oil Companies, Major- Global Analyzer,  UBS Limited, 05.12.06. 
 
13 Investopedia. The Industry handbook-Oil Services Industry, available at  
<http://www.investopedia.com/features/industryhandbook/oil_services.asp>, 15.04.07 
14 OPEC (2005). OPEC’s share of World Crude Oil Reserves, available from 
<http://www.opec.org/home/PowerPoint/Reserves/OPEC%20share.htm>, 15.05.07 
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Hence, the IOCs lost much of their direct access to resources, and consequently, the power 
shifted to the oil-producing countries and their national oil companies. Moreover, the 
competitive structure of the industry changed with the threat of new competition from 
emerging markets such as China and India. Today, 84 percent of the resource base is in the 
hands of the national companies and governments and only 16 percent are available to 
IOCs15. Still, NOCs have for years turned to IOCs for capital, expertise and technology by 
entering into production sharing agreements (PSA) with the international oil companies. 
However, this is today also changing as the NOCs have accumulated large cash deposits and 
invest heavily in technology development themselves. Hence for the future, it is expected that 
the IOCs will have to develop new business models to work in partnership with NOCs16.  
 
Nevertheless, due to the increasing competition and change in the power structure, the oil and 
gas industry has in recent years experienced a wave of mergers and acquisitions. Most of the 
initial M&As within the industry were horizontal mergers among the majors; such as Exxon 
and Mobile, BP and Amoco and Chevron and Texaco. The main motive behind these mergers 
was the need to reduce costs and remain profitable in times of low oil prices by restructuring 
their upstream production and refining activities17. As the oil prices recovered however, the 
mergers continued, but more emphasis was put on benefiting from other types of synergy 
effects such as combining complementary assets and increasing market power. However, in 
the past few years, there has been an increase in the number of vertical mergers, involving 
deals of the upstream production of oil such as ConocoPhillips purchase of Burlington 
reserves and ChevronTexaco´s acquisition of Uncoal18. The main drivers behind these were 
industry cost inflation, maturing fields and increased expenditures on health and safety. 
Nonetheless, as the power balance is expected to shift further in favour of NOCs over the 
coming decade, the main motive behind mergers today are securing access to scarce 
resources. Also, gaining the required size and financial strength to take on larger-scale 
projects that can offer sufficient returns have become a critical success factor in the industry 
today19.  
                                                 
15 Nunn, D. Senior Vice President, Portfolio Strategy, Norsk Hydro. Personal interview, 20.05.07. 
16 Huseyinov, T. (2005). Global Politician Oil Wars: US Companies against China, Russia and India, available 
at <http://www.globalpolitician.com/articleshow.asp?ID=1480&cid=7>, 18.06.07 
17 Nuebecker, L. and  Stadler, M. (2003).  In Hunt for Size-Merger Formation in the Oil Industry, in Kolodziej 
A. and Wojchiech, N. (2006). M&A as a way to create value-case of Norsk Hydro ASA, Master thesis, NHH. 
18 Sweeney, P. (2006). M&A looks Hot, Energy Hotter Still, Financial Executive, in Kolodziej A. and 
Wojchiech, N. (2006). M&A as a way to create value-case of Norsk Hydro ASA, Master thesis, NHH. 
19 Toal, B. A. (1999). ‘The Land of Giants’. Oil and Gas Investor;  in Hosaka, S. (2004) “Japanese Business 
Stategy in the International Oil Industry, The Florida State University. 
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 PART 4: THEORY AND FRAMEWORKS
                                                
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
There are both external and internal inducements for a firm to pursue internationalisation. The 
external inducements are related to forces in a firm’s external environment, which can lead to 
new growth opportunities, but can also come in the form of threats. New opportunities arise as 
firms can exploit differences between countries and geographical regions and achieve 
economies of scale in broadening the size of the markets they serve. Another benefit could be 
the stabilisation of earnings across markets as economic growth cycles fluctuate between 
countries. A threat, on the other hand, could be a new competitor on the market weakening the 
position of the existing firm. Consequently, these external inducements can lead to expansion 
that is either offensive or defensive in nature. The internal inducements on the other hand are 
conditions within the firm itself, which encourage internationalisation. Most often, internal 
inducements arise from a firm’s desire to better exploit and employ its resources and 
competences. However, a firm’s resources and competences might not match the needs and 
requirements of the market. It is important with a match between the firm’s resources and 
competences and the markets to enhance the competitive advantage of a firm20.  
   
The mix of internal and external inducements and obstacles a firm faces will influence 
whether a firm chooses to expand into international markets, and how the possible expansion 
will take place. A firm that wants to exploit an attractive international growth opportunity, but 
lacks the sufficient resources and capabilities to do so may proceed through a strategic 
alliance, or a merger and acquisition. On the other hand a firm may choose to address an 
external threat by leveraging its resources and capabilities on its own and expand through 
internal development. Eventually, it is the combination of external and internal inducements 
which influence the firm’s internationalisation decision and provide the basis for its success21. 
 
 
20 Penrose, E. (1959). The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, London: Basil Blackwell in Collis, D. J. and 
Montgomery, C. A. (2005). Corporate Strategy: a Resource-bases Approach, 2nd edition, Boston, Mass: 
McGraw-Hill/Irwin. 
21 Collis, D. J. and Montgomery, C. A. (2005). Corporate Strategy: a Resource-based Approach, 2nd edition, 
Boston, Mass: McGraw-Hill/Irwin. 
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Consequently, it is crucial to have a strong understanding of both the external and internal 
environment of a firm. As illustrated in the figure below, the internal environment, or the micro-
environment consists of the labour, capital, materials and equipment used in an organisation. The 
external environment on the other hand is often referred to as the macro-environment, and includes 
the customers, suppliers, and competitors and other institutions and environmental forces that have 
an impact on the company’s ability to achieve its objectives22. By matching the internal strengths 
and weaknesses of a firm with the external market opportunities and threats, the company is able to 
create a competitive advantage23. 
 
 
Figure 5: The business environment of a firm24
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
22 Johnson, G., Scholes, K. and Whittington, R. (2005). Exploring Corporate Strategy, 7th edition. Harlow, US: 
Financial Times Prentice Hall. 
23 Collis, D. J. and Montgomery, C. A. (2005). Corporate Strategy: a Resource-bases Approach, 2nd edition, 
Boston, Mass: McGraw-Hill/Irwin. 
24 Management Modern, Business Environment, available at 
<http://telecollege.dcccd.edu/mgmt1374/book_contents/1overview/business_environment/bus_envior.htm>,12.06.07 
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CHAPTER 2: THE PESTEL FRAMEWORK 
 
This section aims to analyse the external environment of a firm by applying the PESTEL 
framework. This model divides the macro-environmental forces into the following six 
categories: political, economic, social, technological, environmental and legal. The 
framework seeks to evaluate how these external forces affect the firm. Furthermore, it assists 
companies in the selection of attractive markets and the appropriate entry mode. Hence, 
countries are often compared along the dimensions that are identified in the PESTEL 
framework before the industry-specific conditions are evaluated. As the macro-environmental 
forces changes over time, it is important to understand the key drivers of change and the 
impact they have on particular industries, markets and companies. The key drivers of change 
will be different according to various industries and also vary from nation to nation. Hence, 
this framework should be used to analyse the current and future impact of environmental 
factors, which may be different from their past impact. Moreover, when there are high levels 
of uncertainty about future changes in the environment, evaluating different scenarios may be 
a useful approach. It can sometimes be hard to differentiate under which category a force 
belongs. Thus, the main emphasis should be put on the forces that are most likely to be the 
drivers of change and that have the most severe impact on the external environment of a 
company25.  
 
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
The political environment in which a firm operates has a major impact on its operations and 
profitability, and is mainly influenced by the political forces in an industry or country. The 
political forces refer to political trends, governmental policies and interventions, and political 
risks26. Governmental policies and regulations on taxation and foreign trade affect companies 
by offering incentives for foreign investments or on the other hand, disincentives to engage in 
foreign production27. Other governmental interventions in the market are most likely to occur 
in areas that affects certain political objectives such as employment, regional development, 
                                                 
25 Johnson, G., Scholes, K. and Whittington, R. (2005). Exploring Corporate Strategy, 7th edition. Harlow, US: 
Financial Times Prentice Hall. 
26 O’Conor, D. (2000). Business planning. Broadstairs, UK: Scitech Educational., available at 
<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/jonhh/Doc?id=10040407>, 05.04.07. 
27 Johnson, G., Scholes, K. and Whittington, R. (2005). Exploring Corporate Strategy, 7th edition. Harlow, US: 
Financial Times Prentice Hall. 
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access to national resources, and culture28. Also, the political stability and type of government 
are political factors that determine the attractiveness of a particular market. Hence, the choice 
of entry mode is dependent on whether the foreign market’s economy is a market economy or 
a centrally planned socialist economy29. Political and social events that can have an impact on 
the security and profitability of a firm are considered to be political risks.  It is important that 
a firm is aware of the degree of political risks in a country before entering. Key types of 
political risks include30:  
¾ Sovereign risks which arise from the policies and decisions of host governments, 
including changes in tax laws, restrictions on expatriate employment and regulations 
on foreign trade.  
¾ The lack of consistent legislation and effective polices, which can lead to corruption 
and contractual and financial difficulties for companies in operation.   
¾ International risks that are linked to developments in the international political 
economy. 
¾ Security risks relating to wars, civil unrest, violence and crime, diplomatic relations, 
trade treaties and economic sanctions. 
 
 
ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
The economic environment both at the local and international level has a significant impact on 
a company’s activities in the market place and the size of a potential market. Examples of 
economic forces are currency rates, raw material prices, interest rates, and inflation rates31. The 
fluctuation of a country’s currency, interest and inflations rates can considerably affect a 
company’s revenues32. Moreover, GDP figures, unemployment rates, labour cost, stock market 
values and business cycles are other examples of economical forces33. The size of the economy 
measured in terms of its gross domestic product per capita (GDP), is an important determinant 
                                                 
28 Porter, M. E. (1998). Competitive strategy: techniques for analyzing industries and competitors : with a new 
introduction, New York: Free Press.  
29 Root, R. (1998) Entry Strategies for International Markets – revised and expanded, San Francisco, US: Jossey-
Bass.  
30 Johnson, G., Scholes, K. and Whittington, R. (2005). Exploring Corporate Strategy, 7th edition. Harlow, US: 
Financial Times Prentice Hall. 
31 Mind Tools, PEST analysis, available at <http://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newTMC_09.htm>, 
15.04.07. 
32 Johnson, G., Scholes, K. and Whittington, R. (2005). Exploring Corporate Strategy, 7th edition. Harlow, US: 
Financial Times Prentice Hall. 
33 O’Conor, D. (2000). Business planning. Broadstairs, UK: Scitech Educational., available at 
<http://site.ebrary.com/lib/jonhh/Doc?id=10040407>, 05.04.07 
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when firms calculate the potential size of a market. Moreover, the GDP of a country also 
influence the choice of entry mode, as smaller market favours entry modes that need low sales 
volumes to break-even and demands a low degree of control. This is also the case when a 
company is only focusing on a smaller segment of a larger market34. Another economic factor 
to consider is the population’s disposable income as it influences a firm’s strategic decisions on 
whether or not the potential customers will have the purchasing power to buy the firm’s 
product offerings35. Moreover, in order to successfully compete on the local market, it is 
important to establish good relationships with local distribution channels and suppliers. This is 
particularly important, when the total sales are too low to justify a separate distribution 
channel. Other issues to consider for a company going global are the need for local sales people 
and services, adjustment of prices and products to fit local needs, as well as transportation time 
and costs. Transportation costs can be very high if the product needs to be delivered in a short 
time or if the product is of great value and requires special delivery methods36. 
 
SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 
Social forces can be defined as the ways in which businesses are influenced by changes in 
society. Hence, most social forces can also be classified either as political or economical, but 
mostly relate to the cultural forces of an environment. An important social force is the cultural 
distance between the home and host country of a firm and refers to the differences in cultural 
norms, values, language, and religion. This will affect whether a firm will enter a particular 
market and also how they will enter37. The impacts of cultural forces have previously been 
vastly underestimated, however more and more firms understand the importance of 
considering cultural differences when operating in foreign markets. Moreover, changes in the 
population demographics, income distribution, lifestyle changes, levels of education and 
gender equality are other examples of social forces38. Demographic changes such as the 
ageing of the baby boomers affect companies to a great extent, by reducing their working 
                                                 
34 Root, R. (1998). Entry Strategies for International Markets – revised and expanded, San Francisco, US: 
Jossey-Bass.  
35 Johnson, G., Scholes, K. and Whittington, R. (2005). Exploring Corporate Strategy, 7th edition. Harlow, US: 
Financial Times Prentice Hall. 
36 Porter, M. E. (1998). Competitive strategy: techniques for analyzing industries and competitors: with a new 
introduction, New York: Free Press.  
37 Johnson, G., Scholes, K. and Whittington, R. (2005). Exploring Corporate Strategy, 7th edition. Harlow, US: 
Financial Times Prentice Hall. 
38 Mind Tools, PEST analysis, available at <http://www.mindtools.com/pages/article/newTMC_09.htm>, 
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population. Moreover due to changes in lifestyles and differences in consumer preferences 
across countries, companies might have to adapt their products and services accordingly39. 
 
TECHNOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT 
The infrastructure of national markets will also be an important factor in assessing the 
attractiveness of markets. Infrastructure refers to the availability of roads, electricity, 
telecommunications, railroads, water supply, and so on. The availability of roads and railroads 
for instance, determines the choice of entry mode, as high transportation costs make it 
difficult for exported products to compete with the local products. This is especially the case 
for exporting companies with large geographical distances between the two countries in trade. 
Infrastructure is mainly funded through governmental investments; however, there is today an 
increasing trend towards privatisation of infrastructure throughout the world. Existing 
infrastructure is generally better in industrial developed countries like Norway, the United 
States, and Japan in comparison to developing countries40. Generally, national markets with 
good existing infrastructure are more attractive for firms. Moreover, the availability of 
necessary local resources such as appropriately skilled labour and technology are key factors 
in deciding what markets to enter and entry modes to pursue. The availability of new and 
emerging technology depends on governments´ spending on R&D and focus on technological 
efforts41.   
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENT  
Environmental issues refer to the matters related to environmental protection laws, waste 
disposal, energy consumption and emission of greenhouses gases. In recent years 
environmental governance has become increasingly important and huge resources are put in 
place to ensure effective and efficient environmental control. More and more companies adapt 
environmentally friendly practises and try to act in a manner which is sustainable for the 
environment. This applies however mainly to producing companies. Moreover, customers are 
                                                 
39 Johnson, G., Scholes, K. and Whittington, R. (2005). Exploring Corporate Strategy, 7th edition. Harlow, US: 
Financial Times Prentice Hall. 
40 Kessides, I. (2004). Reforming Infrastructure : Privatization, Regulation, and Competition. Washington, USA: 
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demanding that companies use environmentally friendly packaging and invest in energy 
saving transportation methods. Consequently, it is important for a firm to consider the 
governmental regulations concerning environmental issues before entering a new market42. 
 
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
Legal forces refer to governmental regulations and policies that affect the entry of foreign 
companies. Examples of legal forces can be restrictive import policies such as tariffs, quotas 
and other trade barriers. The purpose of tariffs is to protect a country’s own production from 
foreign companies by making the foreign products more expensive. Quotas, on the other 
hand, are restrictions in quantities of a certain product that are allowed to be exported to a 
country and this puts a limit on the amount of products a firm can sell abroad43. Hence, these 
barriers to trade are important factors in a firm’s decision on whether to produce locally or to 
export. Furthermore, a company entering a foreign market has to consider the local 
competition law, the employment law, consumer protection laws as well as environmental 
laws and health and safety restrictions. Local competition laws can obstruct the entry of 
companies with monopoly power, or prevent anti-competitive behaviour among existing 
companies. Moreover, employment laws can favour the employment of local workers, and 
consumer protection laws can force companies to modify their product according to the local 
markets44.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
42 Johnson, G., Scholes, K. and Whittington, R. (2005). Exploring Corporate Strategy, 7th edition. Harlow, US: 
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Figure 6: Forces influencing the external environment of a firm 
 
 
 
 
The PESTEL framework is a useful tool for evaluating the external environment of a firm and 
to see how the forces influence the decisions and performances of firms. Nonetheless, given 
the vast number and range of external forces, and the pace at which they change, it is almost 
impossible for a firm to get a whole picture of its external environment. Even when put into a 
systematic framework like PESTEL, such extensive environmental analysis is likely to be 
very costly and time consuming. Hence, it might be necessary to also evaluate a firm’s 
environment from an industry-based view to get a more accurate and realistic picture. 
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CHAPTER 3: PORTER’S FIVE FORCES FRAMEWORK  
 
After having analysed how the external forces affect the business environment of a firm, the 
next step is to look at the industry environment, which is formed by a firm’s relationships 
with its customers, suppliers and competitors. In order to determine the competitive 
structure and the profitability potential of an industry, the widely used and influential 
analytical framework Porter’s Five Forces will be helpful. According to this model the 
competitive structure of an industry is shaped by the interplay of five forces: threat of new 
entrants, threat of substitutes, bargaining power of buyers, bargaining power of suppliers 
and rivalry among existing competitors 45. 
 
Figure 7: Porter´s five forces 
 
 
Together, the strength of these forces determine the profitability of an industry, and hence its 
attractiveness. Consequently, stronger forces are associated with a more challenging business 
environment. Moreover, this framework identifies the relevant industry opportunities and 
threats, which enables firms to match these with their resources and capabilities, and hence 
gain a competitive advantage. The strength of each of the five competitive forces is again 
determined by a number of variables, which will be discussed further in the following 
sections46.  
                                                 
45 Porter, M. E., (1998). Competitive Strategy: Techniques for analysing industries and Competitors, Free press, 
New York.  
46 Peng, M. W. (2006). Global Strategy, International student edition, South-Western, Thomson Corporation. 
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THREAT OF NEW ENTRANTS 
The threat of new entrants is the risk that new firms will enter the industry. New entrants are 
motivated to enter attractive industries where returns on capital exceed its cost of capital. 
Their presence may force down prices and put pressure on profits as they bring in new 
production capacity. Analysing the threat of new entrants involves determining the barriers to 
entry and the expected competitive reactions from the current industry participants47.  
 
Barriers to entry refer to the costs and other requirements needed to enter the market, which 
protects the incumbent companies. In addition, the established companies may react with 
competitive tactics such as price wars and collusions in order to prevent entry from the new 
entrants. Entry barriers are unique to each industry and can take on a variety of forms. The 
most common entry barrier is the degree to which incumbent firms enjoy economies of scale, 
which refers to the reduced unit costs by increasing the quantity of production. New entrants 
are not likely to be able to match the costs of existing firms; hence they cannot compete with 
the prices in the industry. Often, there are also large initial capital requirements in physical 
facilities, production equipment and inventories which may deter entry of new competitors. 
Moreover, if the incumbent firms have well-established brand names and are able to 
differentiate their products, this might increase the customer loyalty. Consequently, it will be 
extremely difficult for new entrants to capture market shares. Similarly, if switching costs are 
high, a new entrant must either offer a higher quality product or considerably lower prices on 
its product to attract customers48. Other entry barriers are the existence of patents protecting a 
firm’s technology and processes. Likewise, the know-how in developing new products and 
services are embedded knowledge which firms have accumulated over time and is extremely 
difficult for newcomers to duplicate. Finally, incumbent firms often enjoy favourable access 
to inputs and distribution channels which may be difficult for new companies to obtain49.  
 
THREAT OF SUBSTITUTES 
Substitutes are products that can fulfil a similar need and perform the same function as the 
products or services in the industry. Consequently, the size of the threat will contribute in 
                                                 
47 Peng, M. W. (2006). Global Strategy, International student edition, South-Western, Thomson Corporation. 
48 Collis, D. J. and Montgomery, C. A. (2005). Corporate Strategy: a Resource-bases Approach, 2nd edition, 
Boston,Mass: McGraw-Hill/Irwin. 
49 Peng, M. W. (2006). Global Strategy, International student edition, South-Western, Thomson Corporation. 
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determining the degree of rivalry in an industry. The presence of substitute products can lower 
the attractiveness and profitability of an industry, as it is more difficult for incumbent firms to 
raise prices if there are available substitutes. There are two main determinants which decide 
whether there is a threat of substitutes in an industry. The first determinant looks at the 
performance of the alternative products in the industry. A substitute will be a threat if its 
quality and function is superior to existing products. Secondly, substitutes pose a threat if the 
switching costs are low, as it will make it easier for customers to replace the existing product. 
However, in some cases, customers may be reluctant to switching to another product if they 
are accustomed to using a specific product in a certain way. Overall, the threat of substitutes 
makes it necessary for firms to look at the external environment outside of the focal industry. 
This may lead firms to enhance customer value and loyalty by offering higher quality 
products and services at lower prices to reduce the attractiveness of substitutes50. 
 
BARGAINING POWER OF BUYERS 
Buyers are the customers of the industry. They are responsible for the demand and have the 
potential to put downward pressure on prices. The prices in an industry are determined by the 
interaction of seller and buyer and which of the two parties that are able to capture the most 
value, depends on their relative bargaining power. Whether or not the buyer is able to squeeze 
the supplier’s margins depends on its relative bargaining power. Thus, strong bargaining 
power of buyers will lead to more intensive rivalry in the market. Conversely, if the buyers 
have weak bargaining power, the suppliers of industry are in the position to negotiate good 
deals and terms. The bargaining power of buyers is enhanced if there are few dominant buyers 
and many sellers in an industry, and they purchase a large portion of the total industry output. 
Hence, the buyer becomes a very important customer that the suppliers cannot afford to loose. 
Moreover, buyers can increase their bargaining power if products are standardised and 
undifferentiated or do not add value, as it enables them to easily switch suppliers. Besides, if 
buyers have full information on prices, they can use this to their advantage. Lastly, buyers can 
use their bargaining power by threatening to vertically integrate backwards into the supplier’s 
industry51. 
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BARGAINING POWER OF SUPPLIERS 
Suppliers are the businesses that provide the labour, raw materials, equipment, transportation 
and financial services to firms in the industry. The cost of these inputs can have a significant 
effect on the company’s profitability. Suppliers can use their bargaining power over 
participants in an industry by raising prices or reducing quality of goods and services. Thus, 
powerful suppliers can therefore reduce the profitability of an industry where the firms 
themselves are unable to recover the costs, by increases in its own prices. Hence, the stronger 
the bargaining power of suppliers the more intense rivalry in an industry. Conversely, if the 
bargaining power of the suppliers is weak then the firm might be in the position to negotiate 
favourable terms. Generally, the suppliers are powerful if the industry is dominated by few 
large suppliers, and there are many buyers. Furthermore, if suppliers provide unique, 
differentiated and highly valued products or services, and the focal firm is not a key customer, 
they can exert strong bargain power over buyers. Moreover, if suppliers have created high 
switching costs of their products and services they can enhance their bargaining power. 
Finally, suppliers are powerful if they are able to vertically integrate forward and become a 
rival of the focal firms in the industry, in addition to being a supplier52. 
 
DEGREE OF RIVALRY 
Rivalry among competitors is usually the strongest of the five forces. The degree of rivalry 
varies from industry to industry, however companies in every industry producing the same or 
similar goods compete against each other. Consequently, they strive to gain sustainable 
competitive advantages to increase their competitiveness. Because companies within an 
industry are mutually dependent, the actions taken by one competitor are likely to have an 
effect on the other players in the market, which often leads to competitive retaliation. 
Moreover, intense rivalry is often indicated by price wars, high rates of innovation, and 
expensive marketing. All these actions are taken by firms trying to increase their market share 
and profitability53.  
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There are many structural determinants of the degree of rivalry. Firstly, the number and 
relative size of competitors affect the intensity of the rivalry. The more firms of equal size 
competing in a market, the more pressure to keep prices low. Conversely, if the industry is 
dominated by a single firm or a small group of leading firms, price competition may be 
restrained and limit the degree of rivalry. Another determinant is the growth potential of the 
industry. In high growth industries, firms try to use their resources effectively to serve a large 
market, rather than trying to steal customers from their competitors. However, slow industry 
growth rates encourage firms to engage in price competition to maintain their market shares. 
Moreover, high levels of fixed costs in an industry can also lead to increased rivalry as firms 
try to maximise their productive capacity to achieve economies of scale. Hence, this creates 
excess capacity in an industry, and as a result firms are forced to cut prices to reduce 
inventories. Moreover, high exit barriers due to the large capital investments in specialised 
equipment and the protection of employees may lead firms to continue operating in an 
industry with low profits. Additionally, the rivalry intensifies when there is low degree of 
product differentiation, and there are low switching costs.  The diversity of competitors can 
also affects the degree of rivalry in an industry as competitors that sharply differ in their 
objectives, usually compete more aggressively to defend their position54.  
 
Porter’s five forces framework is limited by its static nature as it views the industry structure 
as constant and externally determined. The model assumes that the level of competition is 
driven by the industry structure and that companies are constrained by it. In reality, however, 
competition is a dynamic process and firms can continuously change the industry structure 
through creating new technologies, substitute products and distribution channels or engage in 
collusive behaviour55. 
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CHAPTER 4: DUNNING’S OLI PARADIGM 
 
THE EVOLUTION OF THE THEORY  
The core theory in the area of international business deals with the analysis of the 
multinational enterprise (MNE). The conceptual framework most often used when attempting 
to explain the extent and pattern of foreign investment is referred to as the OLI paradigm, 
originally proposed by John Dunning in 1977. It was originally seen as a theory, combining 
different types of economic theories of international production. However, in the late 1980s 
Dunning adopted the term “eclectic paradigm” and proposed that other theories were partial 
explanations for internal production focusing on particular issues. The OLI paradigm on the 
other hand seeks to look at the broader picture. It explains why there is international 
production, where the production would take place and how and why multinational firms can 
earn better profits than national producers56.  
 
The OLI framework suggests that three conditions need to present in order for a firm to 
undertake foreign direct investment; namely ownership advantage, location advantage and 
internalisation advantage. It is the organization of these sets of conditions that either 
encourage or discourage a firm from undertaking foreign activities and becoming an MNE, 
instead of pursuing an alternative route. According to Dunning, a firm that consists of 
ownership advantages, but has no internalisation or locational advantages will be better off by 
licensing its international production. Further, firms that have both ownership and 
internalisation advantages, should not engage in foreign production if there are no advantages 
of being localised in the particular country, but rather serve the foreign markets through 
exports. Only those firms that can achieve ownership, internalisation and locational 
advantages should engage in foreign direct investment57. 
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Figure 8: Conditions to undertake FDI 
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OWNERSHIP ADVANTAGE 
The ownership advantage addresses why firms want to go abroad and may arise either from 
the firm’s privileged ownership of or access to a set of income-generating assets58. Such 
advantages are the main asset for most firms and are often referred to as firm-specific 
advantages. This is because they provide firms with a market position or cost advantage, 
specific to that firm which can benefit them relative to competitors. Hence, it is of major 
importance to develop and protect these advantages as competitors might try to copy them59. 
Moreover, as there are higher costs associated with operating in a foreign location, a company 
can use its firm-specific advantages to offset this, either by generating higher revenues and/or 
lower their costs. The added costs of operating abroad occur due to the differences in culture, 
institutions, and language between the home and host country. Moreover there are increased 
costs relating to communication and transportation when operating at a distance60.  
 
There are, according to Dunning, three types of ownership-specific advantages: standard 
ownership advantages, benefits derived from belonging to a large organization and benefits of 
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being a multinational enterprise61. Moreover, the eclectic paradigm states that the significance 
of each of these advantages and the configuration between them is likely to be context 
specific. Thus, they will probably vary across firms, industries, countries and regions62. 
 
The standard ownership advantages  
 
The standard ownership advantage refers to benefits a firm may have compared to other firms 
in specific locations. These advantages are mainly related to the size and position of the 
established firm, which in some cases imply monopoly power. Furthermore, product 
diversification and exclusive access to technology, patents and certain markets as well as the 
use of input factors like labour, finance, information and natural resources are examples of 
other standard ownership advantages63. An ownership advantage could also be something 
intangible, like a trademark, reputation, human capital or know-how. In general, MNEs are 
associated with a higher ratio of intangible assets than other firms. This can be explained by 
the fact that such intangible assets are often embedded in a firm and can more easily and less 
costly be transferred among affiliates of a single firm rather than between different firms64.  
  
Benefits of belonging to a large organization 
 
The benefits derived from belonging to a large organization are mainly economies of scale in 
production, purchasing, and marketing. Other benefits involve access to cheaper input factors 
like human capital, raw materials, equipment and capital. Moreover, a large organisation will 
typically possess more financial resources that can be invested in R&D to follow up the pace 
of technological development65.  
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Benefits of being an MNE 
   
A multinational company is also in a better position to take advantage of different factor 
endowments and factor prices. The MNE can use their expertise from the domestic market in 
managing production, sales and marketing to get access to new markets.  There are certain 
industries where there are more multinational companies than others. These industries are 
often characterized by knowledge-based companies with high marketing costs and product 
differentiation. As such resources are mainly based on the embedded knowledge within a 
firm; it is easier and more efficient to transfer knowledge from a parent company to its 
affiliates than capital goods. Moreover, the parent company can also obtain knowledge about 
local conditions from their international affiliates. Another advantage derived from being 
multinational is the possibility to exploit tax differences between the various countries. An 
MNE can to a certain extent canalize surpluses from high-tax countries to low-tax countries, 
to reduce the total taxes paid. Further, multinational companies will be able to diversify its 
investments geographically in order to spread risk66.  
 
LOCATION ADVANTAGE 
Location advantage refers to where a company will locate its international production. This 
implies that there must be an incentive for a firm to engage in foreign production rather than 
producing at home and then exporting to the foreign markets. A multinational firm will 
typically engage in foreign production when they find it in their best interest to combine their 
ownership advantages and certain internalisation gains with production in another country. An 
MNE decides where to locate its foreign operations by comparing each country’s 
attractiveness according to country specific advantages such as; economic, socio-cultural, and 
political factors. However, firms need to take into consideration that these external factors 
change over time and must adapt accordingly67.  
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Economic factors 
 
The main economic factors relates the quantities and qualities of the factors of production, 
size and scope of the market, costs of transport and telecommunications, access to skilled 
labour, taxes and the existence of barriers to trade. Through access to abundant and cheaper 
factors of production the MNE can increase efficiency, achieve economies of scale and earn 
higher profits. The location advantages can also originate from greater proximity to final 
markets. In many industries where there are high production volumes, transportation costs are 
of importance. The goods typically have to be produced by people with specific skills with 
specially designed production equipment. Thus, firms that have high transportation costs will 
typically try to locate close to their markets. These goods are usually not very capital 
intensive in terms of advanced technology and well-educated labour. Hence, in more 
knowledge and technology-based industries, transportation costs are of less relevance68.  
 
Socio-cultural factors 
 
Socio-cultural factors refer to the geographical distance between the home and host country as 
well as the cultural distance. This implies that the firm must take into consideration the 
differences in language, culture, and institutions before establishing in a foreign market. It is 
very important that firms obtain knowledge about the foreign markets before they enter so 
that they can adapt their product offering to fit the local needs, and become familiar with local 
business customs. Moreover, in countries which lack consistent and efficient legislation, it is 
extremely important for the firms to act in a socially responsible manner.  
 
Political factors 
 
Political factors relate to the government policies that affect inward FDI flows, international 
production, and intra-firm trade. These include governmental intervention, taxation policies, 
trade barriers, and political stability. Many countries try to attract foreign investment by 
creating incentives through favourable taxes and tariffs. The main reasons for governments to 
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attract FDI are the spillover effects from transferring resources and technology to the host 
country. Firms are also attracted to countries with low taxes on income, given that such 
polices are stable. Moreover tariffs may play an important role, but the effects of tariff 
policies might have two sides. Firstly, as high import tariffs make it expensive for foreign 
firms to supply a market through exports, they are motivated to engage in direct investment. 
On the other hand, having production in a high tariff country can lead to high production costs 
if the raw materials and inputs have to be imported at high prices69. 
Moreover, certain locations simply possess geographical features that are difficult for others 
to match such as a large endowment of natural resources. Additionally, location-specific 
advantages can arise from clustering of economic activities, in which firms can take 
advantage from knowledge spillovers among closely located firms and a pool of specialised 
suppliers and buyers located in the region. 
The choice of where a firm should locate its foreign investment location depends on a 
complex calculation that includes economic, socio-cultural and political factors. A typical 
example of an attractive market for a multinational enterprise would be a growing, high 
income market, with low production costs, and good access to factors scarce in the home 
country. Moreover, the country should be politically stable, have an attractive investment 
climate and be culturally and geographically close to the home country70. 
 
 
INTERNALISATION 
The internalisation gains are related to how activities organised within a firm can be more 
effectively managed than if coordinated through the market. When choosing how to penetrate 
a new market, a firm has several entry mode options ranging from exporting to wholly owned 
subsidiaries. Although a firm may enjoy an ownership advantage in a production process, and 
prefer to produce abroad due to favourable taxation polices and lower input costs, it is still not 
obvious that a firm should set up a foreign subsidiary. An alternative would be to engage in a 
licensing agreement with a foreign firm in the host country.  
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Generally, an MNE will choose to internalise when it is beneficial for them to exploit their 
advantages internally rather than through transactions in the market. This will be dependent 
on the specific characteristics of the assets being transferred and the costs of transferring it71. 
As mentioned earlier, knowledge-based assets such as patents, know-how and reputation can 
be used as a joint input in a number of activities across affiliates. Hence these assets are often 
easier and less costly to transfer within a firm rather than through the market. Furthermore, 
due to the non-excludability of such knowledge-based assets, a firm may not want to share 
these assets with another firm, in fear of partner opportunism. We could also discuss other 
issues associated with licensing, and favouring internalising such as informational 
asymmetries and principal-agent problem72. Nonetheless, these theories are beyond the scope 
of this thesis. As a rule however, if other firms can easily get access to the ownership 
advantage of a firm, the firms would be better off with licensing.  
 
What is more is that a multinational company will, per definition, have value-adding activities 
in more than one location. This implies that there must be reasons, such as cost efficiencies, 
for these activities to be coordinated through one company rather than through the market. 
Furthermore, the OLI paradigm predicts that horizontally and vertically integrated firms 
should organise their activities internally rather than in the market, whenever external markets 
are nonexistent or imperfect. Hence, the internalization argument of the OLI paradigm 
explains why MNEs are integrated businesses, producing in several countries, and allowing 
them to ship goods, services and intangible assets among their affiliates73.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Through the OLI paradigm, Dunning aims to explain why multinational enterprises engage in 
international production, by looking at the interaction between the three components 
ownership advantage, locational advantage and internalisation advantage. First of all, the 
ownership advantage implies that firms undertake foreign investments to exploit its firm-
specific advantage in other markets, which again allows them to overcome the transaction 
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costs associated with operating abroad. Secondly, the location advantage suggests that firms 
choose where to establish its international activities by evaluating the attractiveness of each 
location according to economic, socio-cultural and political factors. Finally, the internalisation 
advantage considers whether firms should internalise their activities within the firm or 
execute them on the market. A firm’s choice of entry mode is dependent on the relative 
benefits and costs of each mode. To conclude, a firm that is able to simultaneously combine 
these ownership, location and internalisation advantages, should engage in foreign direct 
investment rather than undertaking other modes of entry in new markets74.  
 
Since the OLI paradigm was originally introduced it has been challenged from many 
directions. The theory is in a general form, and has only limited ability to predict and explain 
particular kinds of international production and the behaviour of individual firms. 
Nevertheless, the OLI-paradigm still remains a useful general framework for explaining and 
analyzing the economic rationale for international production and the organizational issues 
related to the activities of an MNE75. 
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CHAPTER 5: THE RESOURCE BASED VIEW 
 
The resource-based view has emerged in response to the limitations of the industry-based 
view, and is today one of the three leading perspectives on strategy. While the industry-based 
view focuses on the degree of rivalry among firms within an industry, the resource based view 
addresses why firms are different and how firms can generate a sustainable competitive 
advantage. The industry-based view focuses on the external opportunities and threats, while 
the resource-based view concentrates on the internal strengths and weaknesses76. 
Nevertheless, the resource-based approach stresses the importance of analysing the external 
environment and the firm’s competitive environment before evaluating which resources the 
firm currently possesses and which resources it lacks to achieve a sustainable competitive 
advantage. 
 
The resource-based view suggests that firms differ in fundamental ways because each firm 
possesses a unique bundle of resources and competences. A resource can be anything which is 
considered to be a strength or weakness of a given firm which has the potential to generate 
competitive advantage77. Resources can be defined as the tangible and intangible assets firms 
use to implement its strategies. Tangible resources are assets that are observable and more 
easily quantified. Typically, an organisation’s tangible resources can be divided into three 
broad categories78:   
¾ Physical resources refer to the firm’s plants, offices, equipment, geographical 
locations, and access to raw materials and distribution channels. The nature of these 
resources, such as the age, condition, capacity and location of each resource, will 
determine how useful they are. 
¾ Financial resources are the capital, cash, debtors and creditors. The value of these 
resources is dependent on the ability to generate internal funds and raise external 
capital. 
¾ Technological resources and capabilities are related to the skills and assets that 
generate innovative products and services supported by patents, trademarks, 
copyrights, and trade secrets.  
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 The intangible resources are per definition harder to observe and more difficult to quantify. 
Yet intangible resources are more likely than tangible resources to be a source of competitive 
advantage as it is internally developed over time and cannot easily be imitated. These 
resources can also be broken into three broad categories:  
¾ Human resources refer to the people in an organisation and their skills and knowledge 
which are embedded in the firm. In knowledge-based economies people do genuinely 
become the most valuable asset.  
¾ Intellectual capital is an important aspect of the intangible resource of an organisation. 
This includes patents, brands, business systems and customer databases. Intellectual 
capital is likely to be an important asset of many organisations. 
¾ Reputational resources refer to a firm’s capabilities to develop and leverage its 
reputation as a reliable provider of goods/services, an attractive employer, and a 
socially responsible corporate citizen. The value of this intangible resource is often 
referred to as “goodwill”, when businesses are sold.  
 
A firm also possesses organizational capabilities which are neither intangible nor tangible 
assets, but complex combinations of assets, people, processes and structures that firms utilize 
to transform inputs into outputs. Nonetheless, although the distinction between tangible and 
intangible resources might in some cases be unclear, it is usually the combination of both 
tangible and intangible capabilities that generates a competitive advantage. However, if all 
firms had identical bundles of resources, then all firms could pursue the same strategy, and 
hence the basis for competitive advantage would disappear79. Still, individual resources may 
not yield a competitive advantage. It is the activities and processes through which resources 
are deployed that generate competitive advantage. This is often referred to as the firm’s core 
competences or capabilities which are difficult for other firms to copy or obtain80. The 
distinction between resources and competencies is important. Resources can be acquired in 
the market, while competencies are internally developed through the use of the acquired 
resources81. Even so, resources and competences will be used interchangeably in this paper. 
                                                 
79 Barney, J. (1991). Firm Resources and Sustained Competitive Advantage, Journal of Management, No. 17, pp. 
99-120. 
80 Johnson, G., Scholes, K. & Whittington, R. (2005). Exploring Corporate Strategy, 7th edition. Harlow, US: 
Financial Times Prentice Hall. 
81 Calcagno, M. (undated). The Evolution of the Competitive Advantage Concept in Strategic Management 
Studies, Ca’Fooscari University, available at 
<http://www.bbk.ac.uk/manop/research/wpapers/mandocs/calcagno99-02.PDF>, 15.04.07. 
40 
Nonetheless, as resources can be seen as the ultimate source of value creation both within and 
across businesses, the process of identifying, building and deploying valuable resources are 
critical aspects of both corporate and competitive strategy82.  
 
THE VRIO FRAMEWORK 
According to the resource-based view competitive advantage is likely to be generated and 
sustained if the firms have distinctive or unique resources and competences that competitors 
cannot easily imitate. Competitive advantage is generally defined as the ability to earn above-
average returns for a particular industry on the firm’s investments83. According to Barney a 
firm is considered to have a competitive advantage when it implements a value creating 
strategy not simultaneously being put into practice by any existing or potential competitors84. 
In an intensely competitive world, firms will constantly seek to destroy competitors’ superior 
resources and capabilities through poaching, imitation, replication or substitution. Hence, 
achieving sustainable competitive advantage is dependent on the firm’s ability to preserve its 
superior resources and competences85.  
 
According to Barney a firm needs to have valuable, rare, non-imitable and organisational 
resources in order to generate competitive advantage86. These four criteria developed into the 
VRIO framework are based on two important assumptions. The first assumption is resource 
heterogeneity which means that all firms, even those within the same industry, have a 
different and unique combination of resources and competences which distinguish them from 
their competitors. The second assumption is resource immobility which explains that the 
resources and competences that are unique to one firm cannot easily be transferred to another 
firm87. 
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Figure 9: The VRIO framework 
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The question of Value  
 
Having resources that are different from other firms is by itself not sufficient to create 
competitive advantage. The resources must add value to a company, as only value-adding 
resources can lead to competitive advantage. Non-value adding resources can even possibly 
lead to a competitive disadvantage88. It is however, difficult for companies to identify and 
evaluate their own resources, and assessing whether they can be a source of sustainable 
competitive advantage. Generally, a resource is considered to be valuable if it helps the 
company meet an external threat or exploit an opportunity, and incorporates any of the four 
common competitive foundations of efficiency, quality, customer responsiveness, and 
innovation. Efficiency relates to the necessary amount of input a firm uses for any unit of 
output, and if a firm is a more efficient producer of goods or services than its competitors, 
then it has an advantage. Innovation refers to the creation of new products or services or new 
ways of producing or delivering goods or services. Product innovation can be advantageous to 
companies as it can allow a first-mover advantage and create lock-in effects in the market. 
Process innovation generally influences efficiency in production or delivery and leads to 
decreased production and transportation costs. Moreover, quality is the perception that the 
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good or service performs exceptionally well, while customer responsiveness simply refers to 
meeting the needs of the customer in a satisfactory way89.  
 
According to Collis and Montgomery the value of a firm’s resources lies in the complex 
intersection between components of the firm and its competitive environment. Hence, value is 
created through the interaction between demand, scarcity and appropriability. This means that 
a resource adds value to a firm when it is demanded by the customer, when it cannot be 
copied by competitors, and when the generated profits are captured by the firm. Thus, an 
important determinant of a valuable resource is whether it fulfils a customer’s need better than 
those of their competitors at a price the customer is willing to pay. However, as prices, 
competitive offerings and customer’s preferences change over time, a firm must constantly re-
evaluate their customers’ “willingness to pay” and the degree to which their resources meet 
current and future needs90. Moreover, due to the changes in the competitive landscape, 
resources and capabilities that previously added value may become obsolete91.  
 
The question of Rarity 
 
Simply possessing valuable resources may not lead to competitive advantage; the resources 
also have to be rare. A resource is rare simply if it is not commonly possessed by other firms. 
If a resource is abundantly available, then any competitor could acquire it and consequently 
replicate the firm’s competitive advantage. Furthermore to be a source of sustainable 
competitive advantage, the rarity of the resource must persist over time92. Rare competences 
can be based on years of experience in for example, brand management or building 
relationships with key customers, or perhaps the way in which the company is structured. 
Resources can also be rare if they by nature have limited availability. Moreover, rarity may 
depend on who owns the competence and how easily transferable it is. Some competences are 
context-specific and not transferable because they are only of value if used in a particular 
organisation. It might also be the case that the costs involved in transferring competences 
from one organisation to another are too high. In all of these cases, a resource or competence 
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can be considered rare. Nonetheless, there is always the possibility that a competitor could 
find new ways of competing dependent on a different resource or competence base. 
Furthermore, a resource or competence can be rare if it is embedded in one or few individuals 
in a firm. This is however, a fragile foundation for a competitive advantage, as these 
individuals may leave the company. However, more durable advantages may be found in the 
organisation’s competences related to recruiting, training, motivating and rewarding these rare 
individuals in order to ensure that they stay within the organization. Also rare competences 
may be embedded in the culture, which potentially attracts people to work for that particular 
organisation, or that the organisation has a secured preferred access to customers or suppliers. 
Whilst rarity of strategic resources and competences may provide the basis of a competitive 
advantage, there are dangers of redundancy as rare capabilities may become obsolete and 
conversely damage the company93. 
 
Non-imitable 
 
Thirdly, in order for resources to provide a competitive advantage it also needs to be non-
imitable. A resource is non-imitable and non-substitutable if it is difficult for another firm to 
imitate or substitute something else in its place. A firm can for example create and sustain the 
ability to meet particular needs of a specific customer group in a superior manner than its 
competitors, and in ways that are difficult to imitate. Imitating a firm’s tangible resources can 
be relatively easy. However imitating a firm’s intangible resources such as tacit knowledge, 
corporate culture, managerial talents and customer relationships is much more challenging 
and often impossible94. Thus, firms put great effort into keeping these intangible assets 
embedded in the organisation and increasing their complexity to make them more difficult for 
competitors to replicate. Nevertheless, almost any resource can be imitated with enough time 
and money. Even patents that seek to protect an invention from imitation are only valid for a 
limited period of time. Hence, when analysing the imitability of a resource, it is important to 
compare the time it will take for competitors to imitate or substitute the resource with the 
useful life of the resource95.  
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 Firms can imitate in two ways either by direct duplication or substitution. Direct duplication is 
the most difficult, as it requires an exact match of the organizational components of another 
firm. Gaining full access to another firm’s resources and capabilities is close to impossible 
unless the competitor acquires the focal firm. Substitution, on the other hand is relatively less 
demanding, as it does not require a firm to completely match the other firm’s resources and 
capabilities. However, this is still not a simple task and in some cases, there are simply no 
substitutes available96.  
 
The resource-based approach suggests four underlying factors for why imitation is so 
difficult: time compression diseconomies, path dependencies, casual ambiguity, and economic 
deterrence. The first reason why imitation is so difficult is time compression diseconomies, 
which refer to a competitor’s inability to rapidly and successfully acquire the resources and 
capabilities that another firm has developed over time97. A second barrier to imitation is path 
dependencies. A process is path-dependent when events earlier in its development have 
significant effects on following events98. This historic path by which competences have been 
developed in a firm is often difficult to determine and thus again hard to imitate. Casual 
ambiguity is the third obstacle, which relates to the difficulties in identifying the causes and 
effects that initially formed the competitive advantage. This does not just apply to 
competitors, but even people working within a firm often have a hard time determining the 
casual determinants of its success. Moreover, casually ambiguous resources are often are 
embedded in complex social structures and interactions in the organisation. They may even 
depend on the personality of a few special individuals. Consequently, competitors often fail in 
their efforts to first identify and then imitate another firm’s resources and capabilities99. The 
last source of inimitability is economic deterrence. This occurs when a market leader’s 
competitors have the capability to replicate its resources but are hesitant to do so, because of 
limited market size and large capital investments. Moreover, as such resources involve sunk 
costs and cannot be reused in a given market; the incumbent firm will aggressively fight any 
competitor that attempts to replicate its resources. Faced with such a threat, potential imitators 
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may choose not to imitate the resource when the market is too small to profitably support two 
large competing firms100.  
 
Resources may be even more difficult to replicate when there are multiple barriers to 
imitations, such as both casual ambiguity and path dependencies. Furthermore, imitating a 
bundle of resources, such as internally consistent strategies can be particularly difficult to 
imitate and even challenging for the firm itself to reproduce. Nonetheless, imitability is not 
necessarily a question of either or, but rather a matter of degree of imitability, which is 
dependent on time and complexity. Moreover, achieving sustained competitive advantage also 
involves avoiding the risk of substitution. Even if a firm possesses resources and competences 
that are all of the above, there may still be the risk from substitution, either by another firm 
finding a substitute for the firm’s resource or by finding new ways of using the resource. 
Hence, the characteristics discussed above do not necessarily prevent imitation or 
substantiation, but make it more difficult and uncertain101. 
 
 
The question of Organization  
 
Even valuable, rare, and non-inimitable resources and competences may not generate 
sustained competitive advantage, if the resources are not properly organized. A resource is 
organized if the firm is able to use it to its full potential. Hence, the question is how firms 
should be organised to realise the full potential of its resources and competences102. There are 
several components within a firm that are important to the question of organization. Such 
components are often referred to as complementary assets as they themselves do not fully 
carry out an activity, but rather complement and support the value-adding activities of the 
firm. The resource-based approach implies that it is not just a few resources and capabilities 
that enable a firm to gain a competitive advantage, but rather the bundle of many 
organizational attributes which generates such advantage103. Moreover, social complexity is 
another dimension of the organisation and refers to the socially complex ways of organisation 
in many firms. A multinational company provides a good example of social complexity, 
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having to coordinate their resources across borders. In such companies, it is often the invisible 
relationships between people and not the formal structures in the organisation that add 
value104.  
 
To conclude, building on the two assumptions of resource heterogeneity and immobility, the 
VRIO framework suggests three significant lessons. First of all, firms achieve sustainable 
competitive advantage by possessing valuable, rare, non-imitable, and properly organised 
resources and competences that are difficult for competitors to match. Therefore, the most 
important strategic goal for a firm is to identify, develop and leverage such resources to their 
full potential105. Next, imitation is unlikely to be a successful strategy as a firm that 
completely replicates another firm’s resources and capabilities can at best achieve competitive 
parity and not competitive advantage. Nonetheless, a firm in such a position would in any 
matter be better off developing and leveraging its own unique resources and competences106. 
Finally, a competitive advantage is not sustainable in the long run. In today’s globally 
competitive world, a firm’s main objective is how to sustain its competitive advantage for as 
long as possible. Yet, in the long run all advantages will erode, and hence it is vital that firms 
develop strategic foresight that enables them to anticipate future needs and build up resources 
and competences for future competition107.  
 
As illustrated in figure 10 below, a firm’s choice of how to internationalise will depend on the 
external and internal inducements discussed in all of the theories above. From the external 
analysis of the macro-environment (PESTEL), and the industry environment (Porter’s five 
forces) we have identified the external forces which affects the environment in which a firms 
operates, and the competitive forces that shaped the industry. Next, the OLI framework 
suggests that there are three conditions that must be present in order for a company to engage 
in foreign production. Finally, we have applied the resource based view to analyse the internal 
environment of firms to see why they differ and how firms can generate a sustainable 
competitive advantage. The external analysis focuses on identifying the external opportunities 
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and threats that affect firms, while the internal analysis concentrates on the internal strengths 
and weaknesses of firms108.  
 
 
Figure 10: Forces influencing the strategic alternatives for internationalisation 
 
 
 
PESTEL-analysis of the external 
business environment 
• Political factors 
• Economic factors 
• Social factors 
• Technological factors 
• Environmental factors 
• Legal factors  
 
Resource-based 
considerations on firm-
specific resources 
• Value 
• Rarity 
• Imitability 
• Organization 
 
Dunning’s OLI paradigm 
on internationall 
production 
• Ownership 
advantage 
• Location advantage 
• Internalisation 
advantage 
 
 
Strategic 
alternatives for 
internationalisation 
 
 
Industry-based considerations on 
the degree of competitiveness 
• Rivalry among firms 
• Threat of new entrants 
• Threat of Substitutes  
• Bargaining power of 
suppliers 
• Bargaining power of buyers 
 
 
                                                 
108 Peng, M. W. (2006). Global Strategy, International student edition, South-Western, Thomson Corporation. 
48 
 
CHAPTER 6: STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Many firms cannot reach their desired growth rate purely through organic growth and thus 
grow through non-organic modes of expansion. Expansion within an industry as well as 
across industries usually begins from the core and proceeds along the three dimensions: 
horizontal, geographical and vertical integration. 
 
Figure 11: Dimensions of expansion109
 
Geography 
 
Horizontal 
Vertical 
 
The scope of any firm can be represented along these three dimensions. To begin with most 
firms pursue expansion within their original industry, by increasing the scale of output to 
achieve economies of scale and increase market share. This can be done either through 
vertical integration in order to gain more control over the upstream or downstream activities 
of the value chain, or through horizontal integration, by expanding along the same level of he 
value chain. A third alternative is to integrate geographically and hence gain access to new 
markets, and this might also come as a result of the latter two. In most cases, firms pursue 
such expansion strategies proactively in order to increase their market size and enhance their 
competitiveness. However, the same strategies can also be implemented reactively, to defend 
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a firm’s position as competitors move to exploit scope advantages110. For the purpose of this 
paper, we want to see whether expansion along the horizontal or vertical dimension can lead 
to increased geographical expansion. This will apply for all of the expansion modes discussed 
below. 
 
Horizontal integration 
 
Horizontal integration refers to expansion of activities along the same level of the value chain. 
This may be achieved through internal growth or external growth by joining forces with a 
firm selling similar products or services. A firm may also expand horizontally into unrelated 
businesses. The main goal of horizontal integration is to strengthen a company’s position 
relative to competitors and increase market share. This can be done either by increasing the 
product range of a firm to better meet the expectation of customers, or by combining the core 
activities of two firms and hence increase their scale of operations. Consequently, economies 
of scale occur, as the average unit costs of production decreases by spreading the fixed costs 
over larger quantities of production. Horizontal integration may also lead to economies of 
scope, achieved by sharing common resources such as R&D and marketing, in the production 
or sales of products. Moreover, another motive behind horizontal expansion can be the 
elimination of a strong competitor, which will reduce the competition in the industry, or 
increased bargaining power of suppliers and customers111. Hence, a horizontally integrated 
company enjoys the benefits of increased market power and hence stronger influence on 
prices and supply in a particular market. However, if the competition in an industry is 
significantly reduced as a result of a horizontal integration, anti-trust issues may arise. Apart 
from legal issues, other drawbacks related to this dimensions of expansion are whether the 
anticipated economic gains will actually be realised. Firms have a tendency to overestimate 
the horizontal scope between their products, and hence the expected synergies might not be 
realisable. In order to deal with this problem, it is important that firms make an explicit 
horizontal strategy on how to realise the potential synergies as they will not occur 
instinctively112. 
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Vertical integration 
 
A vertical integration involves expansion upstream or downstream the value chain in product-
related activities. By integrating vertically, companies can improve their coordination of value 
chain activities, as they can integrate the sourcing and production with the marketing and 
sales of their products. A vertical integration can be pursued in two ways, either through a 
backward integration, in which a company expands upstream and integrates with a supplier. 
The main rationale of this would be to secure access to supplies and materials. Moreover, it 
improves the ability to differentiate the product offering by having increased control over 
inputs. Conversely, in a forward integration, a company integrates with its customer in order 
to better serve its final consumers and have increased control over distribution channels. A 
vertical integration can either be in the form of a market-extension, where the two companies 
sell the same products in different markets or a product-extension, in which the companies 
sell different, but related products in the same market. Vertical integration offers several 
benefits. The main reason behind a vertical integration is to expand a company’s business by 
offering a wider range of products or developing a broader level of core competences. 
Moreover, a vertical expansion may increase the entry barriers in the industry for potential 
competitors if the firm gains sole access to a resource. Also, high taxes and regulations on 
market transactions make it more cost efficient to organise several value chain activities 
within a single firm. Besides, firms vertically integrate to protect themselves from powerful 
suppliers or customers, and hence seek to increase their bargaining power. Moreover a 
vertical integration is appropriate when there are strategic similarities between vertically 
related activities in the value chain, and there are large production quantities so that the firm 
can benefit from economies of scale. Firms can also reduce transportation costs if vertical 
integration results in closer geographic proximity of markets. However, this dimension of 
expansion also has several drawbacks which may counteract any potential gains. If a firm 
decides to integrate forward, it might also need to increase its upstream capacity to ensure 
sufficient supply from the increased demand from its downstream operations. Also, if a firm 
integrates backward, the lack of competition among suppliers may lead to potentially higher 
costs due to lower efficiencies. Lastly, this type of expansion is not desired when the product 
is a common available commodity and the core competencies between the value chain 
activities are very different113. A vertical integration can also change the industry structure, by 
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removing a supplier or customer from the market. Consequently, anti-competitive issues may 
arise as their enhanced market power may prevent the entry of new businesses114.  
 
Whether a firm chooses to expand along the horizontal or vertical dimension, it still faces 
several alternatives in what expansion mode to pursue, ranging from internal development, 
mergers and acquisitions, or strategic alliances. None of these alternatives assures an easy 
expansion, and choosing among them involves several trade-offs. Hence, firms need to 
carefully evaluate each alternative against its needs and requirements for the specific 
competitive situation115.  
 
INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT  
First of all, most firms grow organically through internal development. This means that 
companies grow as they incrementally develop and leverage their corporate resources to 
increase their output and sales. There are however both benefits and drawbacks with this 
mode of expansion. 
 
Benefits 
 
Internal development allows for learning within the firm itself. Moreover, the incremental 
decision-making approach accommodates the constantly changing environmental conditions. 
Consequently, internal development involves less risk as decisions can be taken over a longer 
period of time, and not instantly as with other modes of expansion. In addition to being the 
only way of expansion in certain cases, it is also the easiest way of transferring corporate 
resources into a new business area. This is because the company’s employees understand the 
company’s culture and embedded tacit knowledge, and can directly deploy those resources in 
a new context and shape the business from its inception. Thus, when firm wants to leverage 
an organizational resource or intangible asset, the preferred mode of expansion is internal 
development. Furthermore, internal development permits firms to take advantage of positive 
externalities from the development process, involving the accumulated learning and 
experience as the company grows. This tacit know-how can become an important resource in 
                                                 
114 No author, Vertical merger, available at  <http://law.jrank.org/pages/11082/Vertical-Merger.html>, 03.05.07 
115 Collis, D. J. and Montgomery, C. A. (2005). Corporate Strategy: a Resource-bases Approach, 2nd edition, 
Boston,Mass: McGraw-Hill/Irwin. 
52 
the firm’s pursuit for further growth. Moreover, through growing internally and leveraging 
existing recourses, a firm is also committed to creating an environment for intrapreneurship, 
in which the creativity of individuals is highly appreciated116.  
 
Drawbacks 
 
On the other side, internal development has some limitations. First of all, it does not allow a 
firm to quickly acquire the necessary resources it does not possess, which is possible with 
other modes of expansion. A firm which is in the phase of developing its own resources is 
very fragile to external competition and can increase rivalry in an industry through the 
addition of new capacity. Furthermore, unlike other expansion modes where firms have the 
possibility of cancelling the agreement or even selling off the acquired company if it fails, 
investment in an unsuccessful internal development project is very difficult to recover117.  
 
 
MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
Mergers and acquisitions are a major mode of expansion along all the three dimensions 
horizontal, vertical and geographical. Although there is a clear distinction between a merger 
and an acquisition, the two terms are often used interchangeably. A merger occurs when two 
firms decide to join forces and combine their assets, operations and management to create a 
new legal entity. On the other hand, an acquisition is the transfer of control of assets, 
operations, and management from the target firm to the acquiring firm, in which the former 
becomes a part of the latter118. The main difference between the two is that mergers involve a 
much higher degree of cooperation and integration between the partners than with 
acquisitions.  
 
Often, mergers take place between firms of relatively equal size, while in acquisitions the 
acquiring firm is usually larger. Nonetheless, some acquisitions are referred to as hostile 
takeovers, meaning that the acquisition is made despite the resistance of the target company. 
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In fact, many of the so called merger-of-equals turn out to be an acquisition. Even if two 
partners are considered to be equal, most of the mergers are per definition an acquisition, in 
which one company takes control over the other119. However, to avoid the negative 
connotations of an acquisition, the merging firms often claim that it is a merger of equals, 
even if it is technically an acquisition. Thus, the two terms are often used interchangeably. 
However; in order to classify whether the combination is a merger or acquisition, the relative 
size of the companies and the friendliness of their intentions needs to be taken into account120.  
To begin with, we will include a discussion on the benefits and drawback of M&As.  
 
Benefits  
 
There are many different motives underlying a decision to use mergers and acquisition as a 
mode of expansion. The main argument is that M&As will create synergies which enable the 
company to achieve its strategic goals in a more efficient and less costly manner. Sirower 
defines synergy as follows: “Synergy is the increase in competitiveness and resulting cash 
flows beyond what the two companies are expected to accomplish independently”121. In other 
words, the term synergy refers to the increased effectiveness and performance produced as a 
result of the combined actions of two firms.  
 
Merging with or acquiring an existing firm allows a company to obtain instant access to 
resources and competences it does not possess on its own. This is particularly important 
where the necessary resources and competences that are required for competitive advantage 
within an industry are difficult to develop internally or imitate from competitors122. Hence, 
the combination of the firm’s resources and competences are expected to result in revenue 
enhancement and cost reductions, and improve the scale and quality of their operations. The 
firms use their complement resources in joint efforts, such as the development of new 
technology. They can also achieve economies of scale by combining their production 
capacities, and hence mitigate the rivalry in an industry. Moreover, an M&A can also be 
motivated by increasing the size of a company and enhance and consolidate market power. 
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This can enable firms to overcome barriers to entry in new markets and increase their 
competitiveness in increasingly complex and dynamic environments with rising pressure from 
stronger global competition123. Lastly, companies that pay high taxes can merge with or 
acquire a company that have accumulated tax losses, and hence offset their revenues against 
losses and reduce tax. This also applies to companies with high debt capacity as increasing 
leverage also bring tax benefits in terms of tax-deductible interest payments124. 
 
Drawbacks  
 
Nevertheless, according to a number of studies, about two-thirds of M&As fail to realize the 
expected synergy gains125. There are several reasons for this, and problems can be identified 
both prior to and after the M&A. In the pre-acquisition phase, the most prominent problem is 
that the M&A turn out to be a very costly way of expanding. This is because the acquiring 
firm often has to pay high premiums over share price for its target. Such premiums can 
potentially offset the value created from the deal. The highest bidder of a deal either possess 
important and secretive information about the value of the target enabling them to create 
substantial gains from the M&A, or the firm is merely suffering from the “winners curse”. 
This means that a firm by mistake values the target company higher than everyone else. 
Another reason for overpaying might be that firms get carried away in the bidding process and 
winning becomes important due to managerial motives rather than for economic reasons. 
Unfortunately, there is significant evidence suggesting that such problems frequently occur126.  
 
Another obstacle to M&As is the inadequate screening of targets in the due diligence process 
and failure to achieve strategic fit among the two parties. Strategic fit relates to the effective 
matching of complementary resources and competences, and in most cases there are only a 
few resources or competences that are of actual value to the other firm. Hence the combined 
company will have to dispose of the redundant resources and this often involves significant 
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costs and valuable management time127. Although these obstacles are significant, the most 
challenging obstacles occur in the post-merger integration phase. 
 
In the post-merger integration phase, an important factor to take into consideration is the 
organizational fit between the two parties. Organizational fit refers to the similarities in 
cultures, systems and structures, between the two parties, and integrating them into one 
corporate culture is not unproblematic. Moreover, there is usually one stronger party in this 
process, and power politics determines who will get the head positions and what culture and 
system will prevail. This often leads to dissatisfaction among employees and hence sufficient 
management in this process is of utmost importance. Traditionally, the main focus has been 
on the financial and strategic matters of the M&A. Consequently, human and socio-cultural 
factors have been greatly overlooked. Recent research however, suggests that this is one of 
the main reasons why M&As fail. Consequently, more efforts should be directed at this 
matter. Moreover, in cross-border M&As, integration may be even more difficult due to the 
differences between national cultures, institutions and business systems128. 
 
The industry-based view of M&As  
 
Firms that are faced with intense rivalry may attempt to change the configuration of the five 
forces to increase competitive advantage and their profitability through M&As. For instance, 
a firm whose profitability is reduced because of the threat of new entrants may want to merge 
with another firm to increase economies of scale and hence raise the barriers to entry in the 
industry. Moreover, rivalry in an industry can be reduced if the merger leads to restricted 
access to suppliers and distribution channels, or enhances the bargaining power of the firm 
over suppliers and buyers. Further, a firm in a mature industry experiencing downward 
pressure on prices due to overcapacity can merge with another firm to reduce capacity and 
hence also price competition. Thus, mergers can alter the configuration of the five forces, and 
hence change the structure of competition in an industry. However, as such mergers often 
trigger a number of subsequent mergers; the competition may become so reduced that anti-
trust authorities have to intervene129.  
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The resource-based view of M&As  
 
The resource-based view suggests that M&As is a good way of filling the gap between a 
firm’s current endowment of resources and competences, and the desired endowment. A firm 
can either seek to obtain supplementary resources to get more of the resources it already has, 
or attain complementary resources which can be combined effectively with its current 
resources. Also, as many of a firm’s resources often are embedded within the organisation, it 
is difficult to get access to them by other means. However, the resource-based view of 
mergers addresses the potential challenges regarding valuation, negotiation and organizational 
integration during the merger process. M&As offer an opportunity to exchange otherwise 
non-tradable resources, however this poses certain implications as the markets are imperfect 
with few buyers and sellers. Due to the heterogeneity of both buyers and sellers, there is a low 
degree of transparency in such transactions; hence a given bundle of resources and 
competences will have different values to different buyers. The value of a certain target 
depends on the potential fit and expected synergies between the buyer’s resources and those 
of the target. Moreover, the implication of how to measure the costs involved in this process 
and how a buyer will pay for the target influence the valuation. Hence, prospective buyers 
evaluating targets often limit their search to fit certain criteria in order to simplify this 
process130.  
 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCES 
Strategic alliance is another alternative that firms have in their expansion strategies. Alliances 
intend to capture the benefits of internal development and M&A while avoiding the 
drawbacks of both. Strategic alliances can be defined as “voluntary agreements between firms 
involving exchanging, sharing or developing products, technologies, or services131”. In other 
words, a strategic alliance describes cooperation where two or more firms share resources and 
activities to pursue a strategy as a means of achieving the same objectives. Strategic alliances 
can be seen as a compromise between pure market transactions and complete ownership 
solutions. It can take on a variety of forms, ranging from non-equity based contractual 
agreements such as R&D contracts, turnkey projects and licensing to equity-based contractual 
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agreements such as joint ventures. Contractual agreements that do not involve equity require a 
lower level of commitment and are often limited in scope and duration. Equity-based 
alliances, on the other hand involve a higher level of commitment as it involves strategic 
investment and cross-shareholding132.   
 
Benefits 
 
The main motives behind strategic alliances are cost and risk reduction, technology sharing, 
product development, and gaining access to complementary assets and capabilities. In a 
fiercely competitive environment firms are increasingly concerned with finding partners that 
possess complementary resources and competences needed to achieve competitive advantage. 
By pooling their resources the firms can easier and more efficiently achieve their objectives. 
Moreover, co-specialisation allows each firm to concentrate on the activities that best match 
their competences. Furthermore, a strategic alliance allows the firms to only select the 
resources and competences that they need, and hence they can avoid dealing with redundant 
resources, as is the case with M&As. Firms typically engage in strategic alliances when they 
want to get access to new markets and need the local knowledge and expertise in distribution, 
marketing and customer support. Strategic alliances are also common between firms in 
different parts of the value chain. This allows for technology sharing and learning, and co-
development of products and services. Furthermore, the need for critical mass to reduce costs 
and improve customer offering is another determinant for engaging in an alliance with either 
competitors or providers of complementary products133.  
 
Properly structured strategic alliances can be a less expensive alternative to mergers and 
acquisitions, as it does not involve a full integration of the two companies but rather 
cooperation on certain business areas. The success of a strategic alliance is dependent on how 
well firms develop and leverage soft relational capabilities, such as inter-firm relationships 
relative to the hard assets such as technology and capital. It is of the essence that the alliance 
is based on trust and confidence between the partners, as a purely contractual agreement can 
more easily lead to breach of contract from either of the parties. Another critical success 
factor is to minimise the market overlap between the two partners to avoid conflicting 
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interests. Moreover, it is important that the strategic alliance have a degree of autonomy with 
strong leadership and commitment from the two partners. Further, the firms must account for 
the differences in management styles and corporate cultures and create a new common style 
and culture for the sole purpose of the strategic alliance134.  
 
Drawbacks 
 
Despite the potential benefits, strategic alliances are also associated with a number of 
drawbacks. The most prominent challenges are related to the issues of control and leadership. 
There is often a power struggle between the two parties, regarding who will contribute the 
most and who will determine the strategy for the alliance. Moreover, there is always 
uncertainty involved in a strategic alliance, and there is a risk that the alliance may not turn 
out as planned. Firstly, partners may have hidden agendas or diverging interests which are not 
obvious when two parties initially enter into an agreement. There may be the risk that one of 
the parties walks out on the deal bringing with them valuable resources and competences 
without having given anything in return. Moreover, if one of the parties becomes more 
powerful, it might change the terms of deal and take over the weaker party. Firms also risk 
becoming too dependent on their partners, creating serious problems when the alliance ends 
or if a partner forms a relationship with another partner. Hence the potential for rivalry and 
partner opportunism is a big threat to a strategic alliance135.  
 
A legal structure of an alliance can be useful in addressing these issues and setting the terms 
of the deal. There is however limitations as to what can be achieved through legal means. The 
best solution would be to find a partner with closely aligned business interest to set a common 
strategy. Hence, knowing and understanding the motivations and incentives of all partners are 
critical success factors for any strategic alliance136. 
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PART 5: EXTERNAL & INTERNAL ANALYSIS OF 
STATOIL 
 
 
CHAPTER 1: THE PESTEL FRAMEWORK 
 
The PESTEL framework aims to evaluate the business environment in which Statoil operates 
by analyzing the constantly changing external factors that influence the company. We will 
focus on the forces we believe will have the largest impact on the company today. It is crucial 
to understand the external environment in which Statoil operates, in order to match the firm’s 
strengths and weaknesses with the market opportunities and threats, and hence increase their 
international competitiveness. As the oil industry is a truly global one, we will discuss the 
main trends and drivers of change on an international level and not on a country-by-country 
basis. 
 
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
The political environment will have a large impact on Statoil’s opportunities for international 
growth and investment choices as it operates under demanding political conditions 
worldwide. These forces will especially determine its chances of getting access to resources 
and establish relationships with host governments and NOCs. We will mainly discuss the 
latest political trends, the current major political risks and the role of OPEC.  
 
Political trends 
 
The control of oil and gas resources is becoming increasingly political. Due to the large profit 
potential of the industry countries want to have control of its own resources. Hence, resource-
holding nations have nationalized most of their oil fields and are becoming increasingly 
powerful. This empowerment completely changes the rules of game in the industry. 
Governments have the authority to distribute operator ships or licences as they prefer. Thus, 
getting access to the resources is becoming more difficult for IOCs as resource holders will in 
most cases favour their own NOCs and license the exploration to them. Consequently, IOCs 
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are forced to undertake other, more complex projects, which often require new technology 
and larger capital investments. Moreover, the increased costs and larger risks involved in such 
projects can lead to project delays and other difficulties. Nonetheless, the NOCs are currently 
not in the possession of sufficient technology or capacity to complete the projects needed to 
cover the world oil supplies. As a result, the IOCs are valuable partners as they have access to 
markets and technology. Some analysts even expect that the major oil companies will 
transform into becoming service providers of expertise and advanced exploration technology 
to the state owned NOCs in the future137. These changes will have a major impact on the 
traditional oil companies. 
 
Political risks 
 
Political events that affect the security and profitability of firms are considered to be political 
risks. The key political risks in the petroleum industry arise from sovereign risk referring to 
the policies and decisions of host governments or conversely, the absence of effective 
regulation and governmental intervention. Moreover, wars and local conflicts are part of the 
political risks oil companies are facing. 
 
High levels of political risks in recent years have led to increased difficulties for oil 
companies. Political instability in areas such as the Middle East affects the production, supply 
and consequently the oil prices in the industry. Moreover, the violent conflicts associated with 
the extraction of crude oil in Nigeria also had negative effects on the total global oil supply138. 
In Russia, the lack of consistent and effective legislation has led to serious difficulties in 
terms of contractual and financial agreements for oil exploration companies. The oil industry 
is also especially exposed to corruption. The explanation for this is that the majority of the 
proven oil reserves are under the control of states where there is a lack of efficient laws and 
regulation, and authoritarian regimes prevail. Often, the revenues from oil are captured by 
private interests and public officials who often require briberies to allow oil companies to 
explore for oil139. This poses challenging ethical dilemmas for the oil companies. 
Nonetheless, there are efforts being made to improve the transparency of the sector.   
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 There are also political risks involved in host governments altering the fiscal terms for foreign 
oil companies. As there is a tendency for host governments to want increased control of their 
resources, they tighten their fiscal terms and increase taxes imposed on foreign firms. Host 
governments suddenly changing the terms the companies are currently operating under further 
increases political uncertainty. This is currently happening in Venezuela as the control of 
resources is being transferred to the national government at the expense of oil companies 
currently in operation140.  Clearly these political risks have negative effects on the total global 
oil industry.  
 
The role of OPEC  
 
OPEC plays an important role in the political arena of the oil industry as they supply more 
than 40 percent of the world’s oil and they possess about 79 percent of the world’s total 
proven crude oil reserves. Their mission is to coordinate the oil production and supply of the 
member countries through the allocation of quotas, in which each member’s quota is 
determined on the basis of its oil reserves. Such output quotas can have a major impact on the 
energy markets141. Nonetheless, each member state maintains control of its own production 
capacity, which can be developed according to the objective of their national oil industry142. 
OPEC aims to ensure the stabilisation of oil prices, and is willing to take action if the price of 
oil decreases, by reducing their supply. OPEC has already reduced production from the 
Middle East to support high prices. Nevertheless, the IOC’s restricted access to resources will 
most likely lead to an increased demand for resource holding oil. Thus, OPEC might not have 
to cut their supplies for a long period of time to maintain a high price level143.  
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ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
The macroeconomic trends influence the performance of the industry and will also affect 
Statoil’s activities in the market. We believe that the most important economical forces that 
will influence the industry consist of the oil price level determined by demand and supply, 
and production costs including taxes, interests and inflation rates etc. These economic factors 
will largely affect the profit potential of the oil companies and help estimate the potential size 
of the market.  
 
The drivers of petroleum prices 
 
A major issue in the global oil and gas markets is the influence of the oil and gas prices. As 
with every other commodity the prices of oil and gas fluctuate over time as a result of changes 
in the demand and supply. Still potentially volatile, prices have currently reached their highest 
levels since the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s, resulting in strong growth for the global oil and 
gas market144.  
 
The recent escalation of gas and oil prices seems to be caused by demand exceeding 
supply145. Historically, demand for petroleum has been more stable than the supply of 
petroleum. Demand is influenced by many factors such as political instability, the availability 
of energy substitutes, petroleum prices, economic growth and weather conditions. 
Consequently, the consumption pattern varies significantly around the world. The demand for 
oil and gas has recently increased despite the high levels of the oil price. This is largely due to 
increased demand from emerging economies, such as China and India. More than 62 percent 
of the increase in world primary energy demand between 2000 and 2030 will come from 
developing countries, particularly Asia. This mainly results from their rapid economic and 
population growth, industrialisation and urbanisation146. Moreover, the demand for 
transportation fuel has been stable in traditional markets, and this trend is likely to continue, 
as it will be difficult to substitute other sources of energy as transportation fuel in the near 
future147.  
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Supply, on the other hand fluctuates more than demand, and is mainly influenced by access to 
resources, production costs, weather conditions, government polices and geopolitical risks. In 
recent years, the global supply of petroleum products has been restricted, as access to 
resources has become more difficult due to the increased control by the national resource 
holders. Moreover, maturing oil and gas reserves in combination with more technically 
challenging and costly production have had a negative effect on supply. Further, geopolitical 
problems in many oil and gas producing regions, notably the Middle East and Russia have 
also led to unstable supplies. Consequently, production has declined in key markets148. Also, 
climate changes and damages caused by natural disasters have affected the supply of oil and 
gas149.  
 
As evident from the graph below, the percentage growth in the oil price has increased 
significantly during the three last years. In 2006 however, the rise in the oil price slowed 
down resulting from a reduction in world growth rates and less political tension150. Prices are, 
however expected to stabilize, but remain high, due to the problems on the supply side and 
OPEC´s willingness to defend the prices with production cuts151. 
 
Figure 12: Oil price growth (%)152
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 Industry cost inflation 
 
Although oil prices have been record high in the past few years, many of the integrated oil 
companies have struggled with lower profitability. Even if the industry has experienced 
record earnings, increasing costs inflation offsets much of the earnings. According to industry 
estimates, the inflation of the two last years has possibly added 50 percent to capital costs of 
projects153. The initial capital investment required to develop fields are extremely high and as 
production is becoming increasingly technically demanding, these costs are rising even 
more154. There are also higher project costs related to shortage of skilled labour resulting in 
higher wages. Furthermore, expenditures associated with the extensive legislative 
requirements regarding emissions, groundwater contamination, prevention of wastage and 
drilling permits are threatening margins155. Moreover, the companies operating in the industry 
are imposed with higher taxes, as host governments and resource owners are becoming more 
eager to maximize their own profits. In addition, the international oil companies have had 
limited major exploration success, driving the reserve replacement rates down and hence 
production.   
 
Consequently, even if the net income of oil companies are currently increasing due to the high 
levels of oil prices, the future profitability of the industry is threatened as a result of increased 
cost inflation. The oil companies are concerned that if oil prices stop rising or even fall, the 
increased costs will further pressure their margins156. Hence, due to the inflationary pressures 
in the industry, oil prices well above historical levels are now required for the continued 
profitability of many international oil companies157. 
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SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 
We have defined social forces as the ways in which companies in the industry are influenced 
by changes in the society. We believe that the most important social forces that shape and 
change the global oil industry are demographic changes, changes in the income distribution 
and lifestyles, levels of education, in addition to a growing concern for the environment. 
 
Firstly, the current changes in demographics due to the ageing of the baby boomers will affect 
oil companies, as a significant portion of their workforce will soon be retiring. Moreover, the 
industry seems to be less attractive among young people as many of the oil companies have a 
bad image of being greedy and unethical. As a result, securing access to skilled human capital 
has become increasingly challenging and there is currently a war for talent within the 
industry.  Secondly, there is a growing demand for petroleum due to a general increase of the 
world’s population, and strong economic growth and industrialisation in emerging markets. 
Moreover, improvements in the living standards in emerging economies have increased their 
energy consumption even further158. These factors have lead to significantly higher CO2 
emissions, and consequently an increased concern for the environment. The growing concern 
and pressure for the protection of the environment, affects the oil companies, as people 
demand products that use less energy in order to reduce the CO2 emissions. Moreover, there is 
a wider range of stakeholders for oil companies to consider when operating around the world, 
such as NGOs, host governments, and other communities. It has become necessary for oil 
companies to develop long-term relationships and positively contribute to the development of 
local communities159.  
 
Developing countries that are dependent on petroleum as their main source of revenue are 
also among the most economically troubled and environmentally damaged countries in the 
world. Statistics show that incentives to create wealth through good policies and institutions 
may diminish because of the relatively effortless ability to generate wealth from its natural 
resources. Consequently, local governments might underestimate the value of educating its 
people and getting access to skilled labour in these areas are challenging160. This underlines 
                                                 
158 IEA, (Undated). 30 Key Energy Trends in the IEA & Worldwide, available at 
<http://www.iea.org/textbase/nppdf/free/2005/energy_trends.pdf> , 20.04.07 
159 Ling, A. (2004). Our experience in Energy: Social & Environmental Issues Count, Goldman Sachs 
Investment Research. 16.06.04. 
160 Karl, T.L., (1997).  The Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States, University of California Press, 
available at <http://ww1.transparency.org/integrity_pact/dnld/tiq-sept2003.pdf 23.05.07>, 01.06.07. 
66 
the importance of oil companies to be socially committed and engage in development projects 
in the countries they operate in.  
 
TECHNOLOGICAL ENVIRONMENT 
The technological environment and infrastructure have a major impact on the profitability of 
the global oil companies. First of all, as international oil companies are driven towards more 
challenging locations to find reserves, the know how to exploit those reserves profitably is 
becoming increasingly important161. Consequently, in order to increase exploration success 
rates, enhance oil recovery rates and reduce costs oil companies need to constantly develop 
new technology and learn how to use it more effectively162. Secondly, with increasing 
demand from emerging markets, this calls for large developments of infrastructure in order to 
profitably serve the global customers. Finally, technological progress is necessary in order to 
improve the security and safety of oil and gas assets. 
 
Spending on R&D in technology  
 
Traditionally governments from OECD countries with a natural resource base like Canada, 
Norway, and the United States have invested the most in R&D of technology for the 
petroleum industry. As these countries’ national resources are depleting and most of the 
remaining conventional resources and future production potential are in non-OECD countries, 
they will become more dependent on the OPEC countries in the future. Consequently, they 
have a common interest in developing worldwide technology that can assure a reliable supply 
of oil and gas at a reasonable price in the years to come. Today, the service providers and 
equipment manufacturers are the leading developers of new technology; however they 
cooperate closely with the major oil and gas companies. The leading IOCs are still the most 
active in applying innovative concepts; however R&D investments among NOCs are 
growing. Also, smaller local companies are increasingly contributing to the technology 
development by leveraging their local knowledge. Still, it is likely that 90 percent of the R&D 
in the upstream activities of the oil and gas sector will be undertaken by OECD countries. 
Nevertheless, governments play a vital role in the development and implementation of 
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technologies, and in encouraging continued cooperation between the technology developers in 
OECD countries and the major resource holders. This is important to build a bridge between 
the global oil industry and the governments of both OECD and non-OECD countries to 
protect the interests of all stakeholders, and promote a stable technological environment163. 
 
Necessary investment in infrastructure  
 
Due to increased demand, the transportation of oil and gas around the world is expected to 
increase enormously. This will demand major investments in the production and distribution 
capacity and require more cost effective technologies. Due to the uneven geographical 
distribution of oil, it has for many years been traded and transported all around the world. 
Trade of gas trade on the other hand, has traditionally been more regional as it is much more 
difficult and costly to transport. Nevertheless, as the largest share of increased demand for gas 
comes from China and India and other emerging economies, it will have to be transported in 
greater volumes and over larger distances. Consequently, new technology is needed to 
provide more cost-effective solutions. Infrastructure for long-distance sea transport in the 
form of liquefied natural gas (LNG) has been around for a while. However, it has mainly been 
implemented in South Korea and Japan, where they lack the resources themselves and have 
been dependent on importing. However LNG value chains are expected to become the new 
solution for transporting gas all around the world164. Accordingly, substantial investments in 
the infrastructure of LNG are needed to secure the future supplies, mainly in developing 
countries165. This has implications for oil companies in the developed part of the world that 
have not yet had to deal with this issue as the resources have been so close to the market. 
Nevertheless, oil companies have to adapt to the changes in the environment, and many are 
currently undertaking investments in LNG infrastructure.  
 
Security and safety 
 
As oil and gas assets often are located in remote places, they are vulnerable to potential 
terrorist attacks. Hence, there is a need to implement more traditional access control and 
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security measures on more sites. Another aspect of safety requiring technological 
development is resistance to natural hazards to minimize damages to the oil production. The 
recent hurricane Katrina in the US is a good illustration of how devastating effect such a 
natural disaster can have on the oil production and hence the global supply.  However, this is 
an area where government support is critical, as it requires skills and expertise that are often 
to be found within government institutions. Nevertheless, even if such threats are generally 
beyond the control of private companies, joint efforts by industry and governments are needed 
to create a more secure and safe technological environment for the oil and gas industry166. 
 
ENVIRONMENTAL ENVIRONMENT 
Environmental matters refer to issues concerning the protection of the environment. The most 
important elements for the oil and gas industry are efforts to reduce the emission of 
greenhouse gases and the development of renewable sources of energy. 
 
Increasing pressure for being environmentally friendly 
 
Oil and gas exploration and production have the potential to cause severe damage to the 
environment. Moreover, increased energy consumption has resulted in larger emissions of 
greenhouse gases, which fuels global warming. Hence there is increasing concern to protect 
the environment, and oil and gas companies are under the pressure to be environmentally 
committed. Pressures come from various stakeholders such as environmental and human 
rights activists, but also banks and insurance companies, who are concerned with avoiding the 
risks and costs of potential environmental lawsuits167. The most challenging areas of 
environmental damages are the CO2 emissions from production, discharges to water, solid and 
other wastes, and contamination of land and groundwater. The industry actors are well aware 
of these challenges and efforts are put in place in developing new technologies to address 
these issues. The oil and gas companies focus on reducing greenhouse emission from their 
operations through the development and implementation of advanced technologies that are not 
only cleaner, but also energy saving. Specific company activities include energy efficiency, 
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development of renewable sources of energy, and capturing and storing of CO2. Further 
research on fuel cell technology and advanced fuels, the reduction and elimination of venting 
and flaring and enhanced use of natural gas are other efforts that are put in place168.  
Environmental sensitivity is however, still not fully embedded in every aspect of oil and gas 
production. Hence, this is an area requiring continuing partnerships between the public, 
governments, environmental organizations and the industry for further progress.  
 
LEGAL ENVIRONMENT 
Legal forces refer to the regulations and policies that governments impose on oil and gas 
companies. These can either take the form of barriers to trade or international laws concerning 
environmental standards and the protection of human rights. Moreover, an oil company must 
adapt to the local competition laws and the licensing rules in the countries it operates.  
  
Barriers to trade  
 
There are very few visible barriers to trade in the industry and oil and gas is in theory traded 
freely across borders. Nonetheless, there are several hidden barriers and distortions to trade, 
often imposed by governments to protect their indigenous energy industries. National 
protectionism is a large obstacle to trade, and is often the case when one or more companies 
in that particular industry is profitable and provides regular incomes in the form of dividends 
to state budgets. Such hidden barriers are usually covered up as environmental taxes or 
subsidies on certain products that needs protection169. Consequently, the barriers will differ 
largely between countries. 
 
International laws and regulations on environmental standards 
 
Traditionally, the regulation of resource exploitation has been the responsibility of local 
governments and international standards and treaties have been limited. This comes 
historically from the view that the regulation of onshore resource exploitation falls within the 
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domestic jurisdiction of states.  Thus, the standards, guidelines and best operating practices 
developed by oil industry associations and nongovernmental and intergovernmental 
organizations (NGOs and IGOs) constitute the major efforts to achieve uniform standards and 
operating practices across the globe.  In the absence of adequate and enforced environmental 
laws in emerging economies, there are strong pressures for oil companies to voluntarily adopt 
“best practices” in emerging economies.  These refer to environmental practices that can 
reduce the negative impacts of oil exploration and production. Moreover, governments 
themselves may require the execution of good environmental practices as a condition for 
granting development approval, even if these practices are not required by legislation.  Even 
so, efforts are being made to implement more international standards. The requirement to 
limit the countries’ emissions of CO2 by 20 percent by 2020, as determined by the Kyoto 
Protocol has forced some countries to cut their demand for oil. Also, current non-binding 
standards and guidelines have the potential to be transformed into enforced laws in the 
future170.  
 
International laws on human rights 
 
As the oil industry is a highly lucrative industry, there are unfortunately several incidents of 
violation of human rights. The lack of laws in this area makes it very difficult for oil 
companies to operate in countries where this takes place. This is especially true in the African 
oil producing countries, where oil production can cause devastating damage to the 
environment and take away the source of income for the people living there. Moreover, the 
wealth generated from oil in these areas is often used to fund military activities and provide 
income for the civilian elite. Hence oil companies have a responsibility to compensate the 
people living in an area where production of oil takes place for the damage incurred. Ideally, 
oil companies should only produce in countries where the oil revenues are spent by 
democratically elected and transparent political institutions171. However, as there are no 
uniform laws on human rights principles and practices, it requires oil companies to be 
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ethically and socially committed, and stay out of the countries, where serious violations of 
human rights occur172.  
 
Competition law 
 
Competition in the energy sector, particularly in the petroleum industry, is vitally important to 
the health of the world’s economies. Antitrust enforcement has an important role to play in 
preserving competition in the oil industry and protecting the consumer. Consumers have 
experienced significant price increases in gasoline and home heating oil in the past year, and 
domestic refineries have had to carry a large increase in the price of crude oil. The antitrust 
enforcement authorities’ responsibility is to prevent anticompetitive behaviour and collusive 
activities. The goal is to prevent the activities that are likely to notably reduce competition, 
and hence create higher prices. Antitrust enforcement authorities have in recent years been 
particularly active in investigating petroleum mergers due to the ongoing trend of 
consolidation and concentration in this industry. The anti-trust authorities such as the SEC in 
the US and the European Commission in the EU are perhaps the most significant barriers to 
large-scale mergers as they prevent companies from abusing their dominant position. Further, 
antitrust authorities have looked into whether OPEC and its members could be liable under 
antitrust laws. The oil industry is unique among commercially important global industries as   
a large share of the petroleum reserves is owned and regulated by sovereign nation-states. 
These states regard crude oil as their primary and perhaps only natural resource and want tight 
control over how that resource is exploited. As the anti-trust laws that are applicable to 
domestic and foreign private companies cannot be enforced on these sovereign nations, it is 
extremely difficult to apply competitive principles in the global oil industry. Hence no 
country’s anti-trust regulation authorities have the power to make a final decision to antitrust 
issues taken under sovereign capacity173.  
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Licensing rules 
 
Licensing involves the process of governments identifying the potential investment 
opportunities in their national territory, and their offering to the qualified oil companies 
through a bidding process. The term licensing in this context refers to the grant of a title or 
right to explore and produce oil in the particular territory. The process of granting oil and gas 
licenses varies across countries, particularly between the OECD countries and non-OECD 
countries. In the OECD areas, licensing usually involves a formal system with transparent 
criteria, while in other areas there are more informal systems and less specific conditions for 
licensing174. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that one company gets a 100 percent of a license in a 
production field, and the rules of the bidding process differ between countries. In countries 
such as Angola and Nigeria, the government would typically put together a consortium of 
various companies, in which the companies bid for a share of the percentage made available 
to foreign firms. In Russia, the governments have an auction process, where the highest bidder 
for a share of the license sets the price terms for the remaining shares. On the other hand, in 
Norway, the government seeks to put together the group of companies themselves, and in 
countries such as the US Gulf of Mexico, the bidding process is open to full competition. This 
means that a firm can, in theory bid for 100 percent of the license, although this is unlikely as 
there are large costs and risk involved in these projects175. Therefore, oil companies have to 
adapt to whatever licensing system prevail in the particular area of interest.  
 
Below is a summary of the main forces and drivers in the external environment of the global 
oil and gas industry. It is important to remember that these forces constantly change, and 
hence companies operating in the industry must adapt accordingly.  
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Figure 13: Summary of the main drivers of change within the industry 
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CHAPTER 2: PORTER’S FIVE FORCES FRAMEWORK 
In order to determine the degree of rivalry in the oil industry, we will use Porter’s five forces 
framework, and analyse the strength of the forces shaping the industry. As this framework 
takes into account the competition among customers and suppliers as well as corporate rivals, 
it is also useful for analysing the change and the structure of the global oil industry, and to 
observe which of the forces that are most influential today. Moreover, the analysis aims to 
identify the relevant industry opportunities and threats, which enables firms to match these 
with their resources and capabilities, and hence gain a competitive advantage.   
 
THREAT OF NEW ENTRANTS 
In order to evaluate the threat of new entrants, it is important to distinguish between the threat 
from traditional integrated oil companies (IOCs), the independents, the service and equipment 
suppliers and the NOCs.  
 
The oil industry is highly attractive due to the profitability of the firms in operation. 
Nevertheless, there are significant entry barriers, which make it difficult for new firms to 
enter this industry. Firstly, due to large initial capital investments in specialised equipment 
and technology very few companies can afford to enter this industry. Moreover, as such 
investments often involve sunk costs that are difficult to retrieve if the business fails, entry is 
very risky. Hence, the economies of scale needed to cover the initial costs and remain 
profitable are substantial, which reduces the threat of new entrants. Another barrier to entry is 
the large amount of accumulated working capital necessary to engage in large and costly 
projects. Hence, it will be difficult for the new entrants to match these requirements 
instantly176. Furthermore, incumbent oil companies also have established networks of 
suppliers and distributors and have over time developed technological capabilities which are 
difficult for newcomers to get access to. Moreover, as access to resources is dependent on 
government’s licenses for exploration and extraction, existing firms in the industry are 
struggling to gain access to new resources, and thus this is even more challenging for new 
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entrants. Also, incumbent firms will have an advantage over new players as they often already 
have established relationships with host governments and can benefit from a steep learning 
curve and proven track record177. All these factors suggest that it is difficult for new 
companies to enter the industry as they face very high entry barriers. Consequently, we 
conclude that the threat of new integrated oil companies is rather low.  
 
Nevertheless, the structure of the industry is changing, and hence the traditional IOCs are 
increasingly facing new competition from independent oil companies and service providers. 
The independents are currently increasing their market share as they are becoming preferred 
partners for the national resource holders.  As they normally focus on niche segments they 
also have lower capital requirements to start production, and do not need to produce at the 
same level to achieve economies of scale. More importantly, the companies supplying the 
integrated oil companies with services and equipment are currently vertically integrating 
forward and have started to compete directly with the integrated oil companies. These 
suppliers face lower entry barriers, as they already have much of the equipment in place and 
accumulated capital to invest with. Moreover, they are seen as valuable partners to the NOCs 
as they can offer the same technology and equipment as traditional oil companies, without 
necessarily interfering with their other business areas. These factors facilitate the entry of both 
independents and suppliers as the necessary investments and risks are limited. Consequently, 
the majority of new entrants on the market today competing with the integrated oil companies 
are either service suppliers or independent oil companies focusing on niche segments178. 
Hence, we conclude that the threat of entrants with regards to suppliers and independents are 
relatively high as they face lower entry barriers than the traditional integrated oil companies.  
 
Additionally, a number of NOCs, especially from emerging markets are currently expanding 
their operations into international territory, and hence constitute a threat to the IOCs. These 
companies seek to secure access to required energy sources as part of their efforts to meet 
their domestic energy requirements. The NOCs that have been able to accumulate large 
amounts of capital due to tight resource control in recent years, have proved to be willing to 
pay more than international players for access to new reserves. Also, the emerging market 
companies introduce a new type of competition as they can use their large abundance of cheap 
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labour to build up the infrastructure in the countries they operate in and hence can produce 
more cheaply than their Western partners. As these companies also face lower barriers to 
entry, the threat of entry of such companies are increasing. 
 
To conclude, the threat of entry from traditional integrated oil companies is rather low as they 
face high barriers to entry. On, the other hand there is increasing threat of new entrants from 
the independents, service suppliers, NOCs and emerging market companies. Therefore, we 
suggest that the threat of new entrants is relatively strong and is expected to increase in the 
near future with the emergence of the new players in the industry who are able to compete on 
different terms.   
 
THREAT OF SUBSTITUTES 
Substitutes for oil in general comprise coal, nuclear energy, hydrogen, natural gas and 
renewable energy sources such as biomass, hydropower, tidal power, wind power and solar 
power. It is however important to take into consideration that oil has multiple usages, from 
petrol used in the running of vehicles, to be used for electricity and the production of 
materials. Hence, none of today’s available substitutes will completely replace oil in all its 
multiple usages. Nonetheless, since oil is a non-renewable resource, large investments are 
being made to develop alternatives that can substitute oil to a significant degree in the future. 
   
Coal is an important energy source due to its availability, secure supply and competitiveness 
and will continue to play a key role in the world energy mix. Coal will meet 22 percent of 
global energy needs by 2030, essentially the same as today. The electricity sector will be 
responsible for over 95 percent of the growth in demand, as coal remains the leading fuel for 
power generation. Coal demand will increase the most in developing Asian countries, as it is 
the fastest way for these countries to industrialise. China and India alone will be responsible 
for 68 percent of the increase in demand to 2030. Coal is however seen as a weak substitute to 
oil as it leads to high CO2 emissions and is inefficient in the production of gasoline for 
vehicles179. 
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Nuclear power can deliver energy without adding to greenhouse emission in the process, but it 
has several drawbacks as it is believed to be dangerous and there is yet no safe way to dispose 
nuclear waste. China, which today is dependent on coal, is developing long-term nuclear 
power plants programs due to the increased need for energy and restrictions on CO2 
emissions. However, such changes are time consuming and will not heavily influence the 
demand for oil in the near future180.  
 
Hydrogen produces electricity through power cells, which convert hydrogen and oxygen into 
water. As it is a constituent of water, it is non-polluting and in effect inexhaustible. Hence, 
hydrogen is anticipated to be the fuel of the future. However, it is not a heavy substitution for 
oil as it is difficult to store and transport, and requires large amounts of electricity from water 
or fossil fuels181.  
 
Natural gas is a cleaner and more environmentally friendly source of energy, and it is the 
closest substitute of oil and gasoline with regards to the transportation industry. In recent 
years, technology has allowed for the production of natural gas vehicles (NGVs), particularly 
for fuel intensive vehicles such as taxis and public buses. However, although there are certain 
disadvantages such as less trunk space, higher initial costs, and lack of refuelling 
infrastructure it will probably be applied to all types of vehicles in the near future182. 
Countries that already have natural-gas distribution grids can introduce it as a vehicle fuel 
relatively easily, but nations without such infrastructures will find them very costly to 
establish183. There are also substantial switching costs involved in changing cars for 
consumers. Nonetheless, the consumption of natural gas worldwide is expected to double by 
2030, driven mainly by power generation. Gas reserves are likely to outlast oil and can easily 
meet the projected increase in global demand184. However, although natural gas can substitute 
certain usage areas of oil it does not pose a strong threat within the next 15-20 years. 
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The development of renewable energy sources as a substitute to oil is promising, but however 
not expected to grow significantly, unless substantial governmental efforts or technological 
breakthroughs are put in place. A new report published by the IEA reveals that efforts made to 
develop sources of renewable energy actually has declined in the recent years, compared to 
investments being made in the 1980’s. Renewable energy accounted for around 13 percent of 
the world’s total primary energy supply in 2003. Unless efforts are put in place, the supply of 
renewable energy will only reach a level of 14 percent by 2030185. Biomass is by far the 
largest renewable energy source and refers to biological material (plant and animal waste), 
which can be used as bio fuel or for industrial production186. Over two-thirds of biomass is 
used for cooking and heating in developing countries. Hydropower refers to the capture of the 
energy of moving water and is the second-largest renewable source187. It is non-polluting, but 
only works where there is available running water. Wind power is projected to be the second-
largest source of renewable electricity after hydroelectricity in 2030, while solar, tide and 
wave energy each accounts for only a small part of global energy demand188. Although, 
potentially promising, these renewable sources of energy are expensive and inefficient to use, 
and hence are not expected to substitute oil in the near future.  
 
Despite efforts made to develop substitutes for oil, it is projected that the demand for oil and 
gas will continue to grow. Oil is expected to continue providing more than 90 percent of 
transport vehicles' energy requirements up till at least 2030189. Moreover, even if strict 
policies to reduce the emissions of CO2 are implemented, the projected growth in oil and gas 
consumption remains significant.  
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Figure 14: World projected energy demand over time190
 
 
 
*”Other” refers to renewable energy (biomass, wind and solar power etc) 
 
As can be seen from the figure above, conventional oil and gas is expected to dominate supply 
until 2030, even though the use of non-conventional sources is likely to grow significantly191. 
The important issue is however, not when the conventional oil production peak, but how 
much it will cost to make non-conventional hydrocarbons available or to increase the recovery 
rates of conventional hydrocarbons. This issue will determine when and to what extent the 
other sources of energy like coal, nuclear or renewable energies will substitute for oil in the 
role they play today192. Nonetheless, as the substitutes available today are not superior in 
quality and function, and require a process that is very costly and in most cases dependent on 
governmental policies or efforts, it will take many years to fully develop viable substitutes. 
Moreover, switching costs to use substitutes are high, as it requires substantial time and 
investments for consumers to change their primary source of energy. Hence, we conclude that 
the threat of substitutes is currently rather low, but will become a threat in the future. 
 
BARGAINING POWER OF BUYERS 
As most of the oil producers also are integrated downstream through owning petrol stations, 
we define the buyers to be the final consumers of oil and gas. This market is highly 
fragmented as there are millions of consumers, and they only purchase a small fraction of the 
total available market. Therefore, the have very limited bargaining power. Moreover, as oil 
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and gas is a necessity as a source of energy for electricity and transport, buyers have no 
influence on prices and must accept the prices in the market at any time. Hence, when the 
prices are high, it is the end consumers who suffer the most. The oil prices have in recent 
years reached peak levels and this is mainly due to the increased demand in combination with 
restricted supply. Demand is influenced by many factors such as the availability of energy 
substitutes, economic growth and weather conditions. Hence high oil prices in recent years 
have been largely influenced by the increased demand from emerging economies that are 
industrialising such as China and India193, and the steady demand for fuel in traditional 
markets194. This trend is likely to continue, as it will be difficult to substitute oil with other 
sources of energy for transportation fuel in the near future and this also involves large 
switching costs for the buyers195. Moreover, due to geopolitical problems in the Middle East 
and Russia together with the increasing nationalisation of resources, the global supply of 
crude oil has been restricted. Hence, this combination of excess demand over supply has 
contributed to substantially high prices in recent years196, and this places buyers in a weak 
position. Furthermore, there is no threat that buyers will vertically integrate backwards due to 
the fragmentation of the buyers and their inability to coordinate their actions. Due to all the 
above factors, we conclude that buyers in the industry are left with little bargaining power.  
 
BARGAINING POWER OF SUPPLIERS 
For the purpose of this paper, we define the main suppliers to be the resource holders 
supplying the oil producers with hydrocarbon resources. We also consider the suppliers 
providing the oil companies with services and equipment. Our aim is to determine the 
bargaining power of the suppliers relative to the integrated oil-producing companies in the 
industry.  
Earlier, when oil prices and demand were lower, IOCs had the upper hand when negotiating 
with governments controlling access to reserves. However, today countries holding vast 
reserves have gained stronger bargaining power with international oil companies that want to 
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operate on their territories197. Consequently, increased nationalisation of petroleum resources 
has made the national resource holders very powerful. Today they have complete control over 
the licensing and production of their natural resources. Hence, this forces the international 
majors and independent oil companies to cooperate with the national resource holders to 
improve or maintain their reserves and production levels. Moreover, there is a credible threat 
that resource holders may vertically integrate forward through participation in the production 
and sales of oil. This has further increased the bargaining power of suppliers of the natural 
resources. However, as the majority of the petroleum reserves are discovered in the less 
developed regions of the world, national resource holders lack the proper infrastructure and 
technology to operate the complex exploration projects on their own, and thus depend on the 
IOCs, the service suppliers and the independents to transfer their knowledge and invest in 
R&D. Yet, the resource holders will have the strongest bargaining power in deals as they 
control the access to the resources and hence demand better services for lower prices. Further, 
the tendency of producing countries to prefer the entry of independents that has no alternative 
source of oil provides the resource holders with the bargaining power to exploit better terms 
in their concessions198. These factors will threaten the profit margins of the oil companies in 
the industry and intensify competition.  
In addition, the bargaining power of suppliers is further enhanced by the increased demand for 
energy from emerging economies like China and India, which is likely to sustain the oil and 
gas price at a high level. Moreover, with fewer opportunities to discover new reserves outside 
of the OPEC countries, OPEC will surely become more powerful in controlling the supply to 
ensure a high oil price and hence profits for their members. Also, the switching costs involved 
in changing suppliers are high as the extraction process requires large investments in 
transportation and technology customised for a particular area. This further strengthens the 
bargaining power of resource holders, as they know that the oil companies are committed to 
stay in a place where they have invested heavily. To conclude, we believe that the resource 
holders in the industry have strong bargaining power and their position might be strengthened 
even further in the years to come as there will be increased competition for scarce resources.  
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There are today a large number of service and equipment suppliers in the industry, indicating 
that there is strong competition among suppliers which weaken their bargaining power. 
Furthermore as the integrated oil companies often buy large orders, suppliers need to offer 
good terms on their products and services in order not to lose a key customer. This implies 
that the suppliers in the industry have limited bargaining power over their customers. 
However, on the other hand as suppliers are the main developers of the highly-specialised 
equipment and advanced technology that oil companies use, there is a threat that they will 
vertically integrate forward. This means that the suppliers will be able to perform the same 
task as the oil companies, with the exception of market access, and hence become a rival to 
the integrated oil companies. There are several examples of this occurring in the industry 
today and, consequently these suppliers can become valuable partners for the resource holders 
as they can provide them with the technological competence without necessarily interfering 
with their other business areas199. This enhances the bargaining power of suppliers and 
increases the rivalry in the industry. As a result, although the bargaining power of services 
and equipment suppliers has up until today been rather limited, there is a strong trend towards 
stronger bargaining power in the near future. 
 
DEGREE OF RIVALRY 
The strength of the previous forces determines the degree of rivalry in the international 
petroleum industry. As the industry is considered to be highly attractive and has a large 
number of players, this implies that the industry is competitive. The industry is characterised 
by a diversity of players, the main competitors in the industry today are the international oil 
companies (IOCs), the national oil companies (NOCs), and the independents. However, the 
power structure of the industry has changed throughout the years. Traditionally, the majority 
of reserves were controlled by the IOCs and little was maintained by the national 
governments. The reason for this was that many of resource-holding countries did not have 
the money or technology to develop the infrastructure so they were dependent on the IOCs to 
produce the oil. However, today they have accumulated large cash deposits and have 
nationalised most of their oil fields to regain control. As the resource holders prefer domestic 
ownership of the resources, the power has shifted from the IOCs to the NOCs200. 
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Consequently, NOCs benefit heavily from the support of their governments in bidding 
processes201. The IOCs still have extensive skills in technology development and access to 
large financial resources; however they only control a very small fraction of the world’s 
remaining oil and gas reserves202. The pie charts below illustrate how the control or access to 
reserves has changed from the 1960s and till today.  
 
Figure 15: Changes in the control and access to natural reserves (1960-)203
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1960s Current
National Oil 
Company 
Reserves 
1% 
Soviet 
 
 
Reserves 
14% 
Full International Oil 
Company Access 
85% 
National Oil Company 
Reserves 
65% 
Limited 
International 
Access 
19% 
Full International Oil 
Company Access 
16% 
 
As evident from this graph, the NOCs control around 65 percent of the proven reserves today, 
while the IOCs, the independents and new oil companies from emerging markets have to 
compete for the remaining 16 percent. This substantially intensifies the competition for the 
reserves that are still easily accessible. Moreover, although these companies still can transfer 
valuable technology to the NOCs, the terms for obtaining licenses and operator ships are 
becoming increasingly challenging and oil companies have to be attractive as a partner to host 
governments in order to get access. This implies a strong degree of rivalry. 
 
According to UBS the best performers of the industry today, measured in terms of share price 
performance have been emerging market companies like Petrobras and Lukoil, and strong 
resource holders like Russia and Canada. The traditional IOCs on the other hand are 
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struggling to maintain their production levels and have experienced low growth rates in recent 
years. Additionally, competitive threats have also arisen from NOCs of emerging markets 
such as China and India. Traditionally the integrated oil companies have been knowledge-
driven, and resource ownership or access has been a product of that. Many of the emerging 
market companies on the other hand are resource-abundant, but lack the necessary knowledge 
and technology. Nonetheless, the quality gap is closing as the use of the oil service sector has 
made the technology more available. Moreover, by adopting and implementing industry best 
practices, emerging companies are becoming more similar to the western majors204. The 
Chinese oil companies, for instance are becoming more competitive as they apply a more 
comprehensive approach than Western companies. As they have access to a large and cheap 
labour force, they bring with them the necessary manpower to new locations to develop the 
infrastructure in the countries they explore for oil. This is their real competitive advantage 
which other oil companies are struggling to match205.  
 
Although oil prices have been high in recent years, increasing cost inflation is eroding 
companies’ margins. Moving forward, prices are expected to stabilize, leading to a slower 
industry growth206. Moreover, since there are high levels of fixed costs and high exit barriers 
this puts pressure on oil companies to stay in operation even though profits are decreasing. 
Lastly as oil is a commodity, there is low degree of product differentiation and in combination 
with low customer switching costs this intensifies the degree of rivalry207. As a result of these 
factors, we conclude that there is intense rivalry in the global oil and gas industry.  
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Figure 16: Summary of the most influential forces 
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rivalry in the industry, which is likely to become even stronger in the near future with 
decreasing access to reserves and new players competing on different terms.  
 
A question that arises is how this competitive situation affects Statoil. Statoil was established 
as fully state-owned company, and hence considered to be a NOC for many years. However, 
when the company was partly privatised in 2001 in combination with the decreasing reserves 
on the NCS, Statoil has moved more in the direction of an IOC. Today, Statoil seeks to 
increase its international presence even further and is competing on equal terms with the 
major international companies. Moving from a protected home market, Statoil has to consider 
how to deal with the strong competitive forces in the industry and how it can best compete to 
maximize its share of the profits. After all, it seems like the companies that are “stuck in the 
middle” between the natural abundant NOCs and the independents that are able to exploit 
profitable niches, may be those that will find the years ahead most difficult.  Hence, it is vital 
that Statoil focuses on what they are strongest at and consider adapting its business model to 
better fit the challenges it faces in the global oil industry. In the next section we will look into 
whether Statoil has the right conditions in place to internationalise.  
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CHAPTER 3: DUNNING’S OLI FRAMEWORK 
 
As we have discussed in theory, this framework tries to explain why there is international 
production, where the production would take place and how multinational firms can earn 
better profits than national producers in the countries in which they operate.  
 
In 2005, Statoil´ s international activities accounted for 16 percent of its total production. 
However, the company aims to reach an annual international growth of 2-4 percent from 
2007-2010208. This is a major step for the company and will involve an extensive 
internationalisation plan. Moving from a protected home market, in which they are dominant 
to the international arena will be challenging. After all, Statoil has limited international 
experience and the competition abroad is fierce. Thus, this is a useful framework for 
explaining and analyzing Statoil’s economic rationale for undertaking international 
production and the organizational issues that are related to its international activities. With 
this we aim to analyze the degree of Statoil’s ownership, location and internalisation 
advantages. 
 
OWNERSHIP 
Ownership advantages are crucial as they allow the foreign firms to overcome the advantages 
possessed by the incumbent firms, and then to compete effectively with them. According to 
Dunning, there are three main ownership advantages; standard ownership advantage, benefits 
of belonging to a large organization and benefits of being an MNE. 
 
Standard ownership advantage 
 
Statoil is the largest company in Norway and among the leading offshore operators in the 
world. However, as can be seen from the figure below, measured by market capitalization 
Statoil cannot compete in size with the largest integrated oil companies. 
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Figure 17: Integrated oil companies measured by market capitalization (USD 2006) 209
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Nonetheless, Statoil has managed to combine the benefits of both an NOC and an IOC, in a 
way that many other companies in the same position have struggled with. Statoil has been 
able to take advantage of its extensive experience and dominant position in a large domestic 
resource base with the technology and growth strategy similar to larger IOCs210. Even if the 
state is the majority holder, with a 70.9 percent stake, the Norwegian government has not used 
Statoil as a direct foreign policy tool, changed its tax laws in order to meet its budget, or 
interfered too much with its management to serve its own interests. Conversely, with the state 
participation Statoil has been encouraged to develop leading technology and a return-focused 
mentality211. Although Statoil cannot be comparable in size with the major oil companies, the 
fact that it has features of an NOC and an IOC can be an important ownership advantage 
which the company can bring with it outside the Norwegian borders. 
 
Moreover, our findings suggest that the accumulated know-how and expertise in technology 
based on experience in the North Sea is Statoil´s main ownership advantage. This know-how 
in exploring technically challenging fields, like deep waters and artic regions together with 
sophisticated techniques in increasing oil recovery rates will be an important asset for Statoil 
when expanding abroad. This is because many of the new fields to be developed are located in 
technically challenging areas in developing countries. Few countries, particularly in the 
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developing world, actually have the necessary capabilities and technology to recover these 
natural resources on their own212.  
 
Moreover, Norwegian companies are considered by many to be less greedy and dominant on 
the international arena. This might potentially provide Statoil with an advantage in going after 
new contracts and establishing relationships with host governments, which is very important 
in today’s industry. Nevertheless, it might be naïve to think that being Norwegian offers a 
competitive advantage, thus we emphasize on the fact that not being American or British 
might be more relevant. Furthermore, Statoil aims to be recognized as a socially and 
environmentally committed company, which it aspires to build up as an ownership advantage 
abroad213. The company is known for being at the forefront in developing leading ways of 
capturing and storing carbon dioxide sub-surface. This gas can be used for improved oil 
recovery, and simultaneously help to reduce climate change. Moreover, Statoil has initiated a 
comprehensive program to combat corruption and aims to support the local communities 
where it operates. However, unfortunate events in the past, such as its involvement in a 
corruption scandal in Iran a few years ago, seriously damaged its reputation. Despite this, it 
seems that the company has learned from its mistakes and is determined to correct this image. 
Together these efforts might provide Statoil with a solid reputation, which will be beneficial 
to the company when negotiating deals with host governments in the future. According to a 
study conducted by Goldman Sachs concerning social and environmental issues, Statoil 
positively stands out in several areas. Consequently, as can be illustrated in figure 18 we 
believe that this is an area, in which Statoil might enjoy an ownership advantage in the future. 
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Figure 18: Goldman Sachs social and environmental study214
 
 
 
Additionally, by owning assets both domestically and in foreign markets Statoil is better able 
to manage and coordinate cross-border activities and facilitate just-in-time delivery to various 
locations215. Another ownership advantage is Statoil’s experience in establishing value chains 
for natural gas216.  After all, the industry is threatened by delivery problems, and consequently 
many European countries are seeking to diversify their supplies of petroleum to improve the 
security of supply217. Statoil can use this threat to its advantage by seeking to develop its 
reputation as an ethical and trustworthy supplier of oil and gas.  
 
Benefits derived from belonging to a large organisation 
 
According to various industry reports, the size of companies is important in the international 
oil and gas sector. This can partly be explained by the belief that larger companies possess 
more financial, human, technological and operational strength and are in a better situation to 
pursue new growth opportunities.  More, importantly governments in resource holding nations 
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usually prefer larger companies to operate on their fields as they can take on larger and more 
complex projects and often view them as being more successful218. The Sakhalin and Qatar 
LNG development projects may serve as examples of projects where the majors seem to have 
a competitive advantage due to their size219. The ability to diversify risk is another important 
size argument. There are two levels of risk; both project-specific and country-specific, and 
both are equally important when diversifying risk. Firstly, large companies are able to take on 
several large projects simultaneously and hence spread their risk across several projects as 
some might fail and others succeed. Secondly, by also spreading investment geographically in 
several countries, companies can overcome the country-specific risks220. Furthermore, size is 
important when you are an integrated oil and gas company, as you have to master the whole 
value chain221.  
 
Nevertheless, others argue that the size effect of oil companies is overrated. According to 
Ramm, size in itself is not a determinant of success. He says that a company does not 
necessarily perform well due to its size, but rather grows large due to good performance222. 
We agree with this argument and believe that Statoil´s success will be more dependent on 
how the organisation is built up and managed. Even though Statoil is not very large compared 
to other international majors, its size still allows it to take a certain degree of operational and 
financial risk. The company has access to a large pool of skilled labour and sufficient capital 
to keep up with the technological R&D. Moreover, the company achieves economies of scale 
(EOS) in value chains both for natural gas and oil. In oil the EOS is mostly in the midstream 
and downstream activities of the value chain as it produces in smaller scale while refining at a 
large scale. In natural gas the company typically benefits from EOS in processing and in 
transportation. In general, by belonging to a large organisation Statoil can gain EOS in 
purchasing as they have increased bargaining power over suppliers and can make better deals 
by for example coordinating steel orders for several projects at the same time223.   
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Benefits of being an MNE 
 
By dispersing international production and development portfolios, a company can exploit a 
broader global presence. By strengthening its position in several areas, Statoil can better take 
advantage of the different factor endowments various locations offer, such as better access to 
natural resources and human capital while benefiting from lower production costs, different 
tax policies and the like. Statoil has expressed that a geographical dispersion of its oil and gas 
production is strategically important for developing the company’s reserves224.  Additionally, 
Statoil has advantages when expanding into new markets as it can use the experience from its 
domestic market. By being an MNE Statoil can transfer technological knowledge to new 
business locations and take advantage of local knowledge about markets and competitors. 
This will also improve its position at home in competition with other multinational 
companies. 
 
LOCATION 
To Statoil, the three most important criteria in entering new markets are the potential for 
growth, the competitive situation and the political and regulatory framework. Nonetheless, 
Statoil needs to look at the total picture that gives the highest profitability potential and rate 
the different projects accordingly225. It is expected that most of Statoil´s production growth in 
the future will come from its international divisions, as most of the worlds remaining reserves 
are located internationally. Moreover, the unit profitability of Statoil´s international assets is 
three times higher than its domestic operations given the high tax levels on domestic 
production226. Upon entering new markets, Statoil conducts a comprehensive scenario 
analysis of factors like; the geological potential, the competitive situation and access 
requirements, the stability of the political regime, as well as implications of the geographical 
and cultural distance. These factors often involves tradeoffs, however, a combination of these 
will determine the attractiveness of the location.  
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Geological Potential 
 
As Statoil is mainly a natural resource-seeking firm, the choice of where to locate its 
operations is particularly tied to foreign locations where there is geological potential to 
develop oil and gas resources227. According to current estimates, more than three-quarters of 
the world’s oil reserves are located in OPEC countries. The majority of these reserves are 
located in Middle East countries like Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates228. 
 
 
Figure 19: World oil reserves (2005)229
 
Conventional gas on the other hand is located primarily in Russia, the Former Soviet Union 
(FSU), and in Iran, Qatar and Saudi Arabia. These oil and gas resources would be easy and 
cheap for Statoil to extract, however, getting access is very challenging due to difficult 
political regimes. Nonetheless, even if the company is not given full access to these resources, 
Statoil can benefit from transferring the necessary technology and know-how related to 
reservoir management and recovery improvements to these areas230.  
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Figure 20: World proven reserves of natural gas (in trillion cubic metres)231: 
 
 
 
The limited access to conventional oil and gas resources also forces Statoil to look into other 
types of reservoirs such as deep- and arctic waters. Such environments are more easily 
accessible, as they are situated in the UK, Canada and Gulf of Mexico, however more 
technically challenging and costly to develop. Nevertheless, Statoil can take advantage of the 
situation, due to its possession of leading expertise in this field232. Actually, about one-fifth of 
the undiscovered conventional oil outside the Middle East is expected to be in offshore 
deepwater areas and another third in Arctic regions233. Consequently, taking advantage of its 
technological know-how can potentially provide Statoil with a competitive advantage in 
getting access to new reserves in these areas.  
 
Figure 21: Future global oil and gas deepwater potential234
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Access requirements and competitive situation 
 
The location choice is also largely dependent on the local requirements for getting access to 
the natural resources and Statoil´s competitive situation. This will both influence the 
company’s profitability potential and the necessary efforts to facilitate entry. It is relevant to 
distinguish between the OECD areas and the non-OECD areas.  
 
In the OECD area oil companies that want to obtain licenses need to possess a set of 
transparent criteria determined by the resource holding state in order to be accepted. This is 
often related to the solidity of the organization and its competence level. Competence in this 
case refers to the ability of a company to deliver what it promises, within the time and budget 
and with the best technology. Geological and technical skills as well as financial strength are 
also critical factors in getting access to traditional regimes and projects. In these countries 
Statoil can benefit from the experience and technological competence they have developed in 
the North Sea for more than 30 years.  Statoil documents its capabilities through its proven 
track record of completed projects and projects under development235. 
 
In the non-OECD area, where the NOCs dominate, Statoil competes through the same 
capabilities as in the OECD area. However, access requirements may largely differ between 
locations and oil companies are required to act in a manner that suits the local country’s 
culture, norms and legislation. National resource holders may prefer companies that offer 
development programs so that they over time can perform the task themselves. Thus, a 
company’s track record and competence is important, together with the ability to complete 
projects on the agreed terms. Host governments also look at the whole package of what a 
company can offer, thus it is important that the government like the business model, and how 
the company communicates and stands out. Consequently, oil companies needs to understand 
the petroleum policies in a country so that it can become a part of the host government’s 
strategy. Statoil is very eager to take part in developing the infrastructure in the countries they 
operate. This also benefits them by securing the efficiency in the project development and 
operation phase. Nonetheless, this is a sensitive area as the line between development and 
what can be interpreted as corruption can sometimes be unclear. Hence, Statoil seeks to only 
get involved in development projects which benefit the exploration and production of oil236.  
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Political stability  
 
Stable fiscal regimes and favourable taxation policies are other important factors for Statoil in 
determining where to locate its production. Today, around 80 percent of Statoil´s production 
is located in OECD areas. Given the rise of resource nationalisation this gives the company’s 
assets a greater degree of security. Then again, the disadvantage is that existing fields in these 
areas are maturing. Unfortunately, the largest remaining reserves are located in risky and 
politically instable environments237. As many of the new projects in non-OECD countries 
have higher risks, Statoil require that they yield a higher return. Paradoxically, the more 
favourable policies the host governments offer, the more instable the political environment is 
likely to be. Nonetheless, according to Statoil, political stability is more important than very 
favourable terms238.  
 
Geographical and cultural distance  
 
Since the reserves are often not located in the same regions as the markets Statoil serve, 
factors like infrastructure and the proximity to markets are important factors to consider in its 
location decisions. In theory, Statoil could build up the necessary infrastructure itself, but the 
question is whether it would be profitable or even ethical239. Consequently, it is important for 
Statoil to be close to established clusters of suppliers, customers and distributors operating in 
the oil industry. Moreover, a location near the field is regarded as an important advantage for 
the construction of enormous platforms or large models that are difficult to transport. Thus, if 
Statoil wants to attack foreign markets where location advantages are important, they have to 
move their operations to that territory240. As its current reserves are depleting Statoil needs to 
move to developing countries to increase or maintain their production levels. This can pose a 
problem as Statoil may lack the necessary knowledge of operating efficiently in countries that 
are both culturally and geographically distant.  
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Statoil has today participation shares in 17 producing fields in various countries, and search 
activities in other countries. Combined the company currently has 35 worldwide operations. 
 
Figure 22: Overview over Statoil´s international operations241  
 
 
 
INTERNALISATION 
One of the dilemmas in the oil industry today is what to internalise and what to buy in the 
market. As oil companies are integrated along the whole value chain, they naturally perform a 
variety of tasks from the extraction of oil to refining and distribution. However, what 
activities the companies choose to internalise differ also among the integrated oil companies. 
For instance Statoil buys their drilling equipment for well services in the market, which are by 
many companies regarded as part of their core competences. Moreover, Statoil used to own 
one of the world’s largest shipping companies (Statoil shipping), transporting oil from 
offshore to markets. However, that part of the business was divested some years ago and now 
they buy in services instead of having it as part of their asset base and core competence. The 
decision of what activities to coordinate internally and what to buy in the market depends on 
what is most cost efficient at different times. If the markets exist, companies might as well 
outsource some of their activities to specialise more on their core competences. Then again, 
there is a trend in the opposite direction. Some oil companies are in-sourcing more of their 
technology development, and this may reflect their wish to have greater control over the 
technology, which is becoming an increasingly important competence of oil companies242.  
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CONCLUSION 
As evident from this analysis, Statoil has the right conditions in place to undertake foreign 
investments. Moreover due to the structure of the industry and the necessity to operate where 
the resources are located, this industry is very suitable for MNEs. Statoil should use its 
experience and technological capabilities derived from its domestic operations as an 
ownership advantage when expanding to new locations, especially technically challenging oil 
and gas fields. Moreover, Statoil seek to locate in areas with good geological potential and a 
stable fiscal regime. Statoil’s choice of whether to internalise its activities or coordinate them 
through the market are dependent on the specific activity and the desired level of investment 
and control. We conclude that Statoil has ownership advantages, location advantages and 
internalisation advantages to undertake foreign production. However, further analysis is 
required to determine whether Statoil has what it takes to succeed abroad relative to its 
competitors. Consequently, we will examine Statoil’s resources and competences in more 
detail in the following chapter.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE RESOURCE BASED VIEW (VRIO) 
 
The resource based view addresses why firms are different and concentrates on a firm’s 
internal strengths and weaknesses. With this analysis we aim to identify the main resources 
and competences of Statoil and how the company can utilize these in order to generate a 
sustainable competitive advantage internationally.  
 
From the external analysis of the macro-environment (PESTEL) and the industry environment 
(Porter’s five forces) we have identified the main drivers of the industry, and the most 
influential competitive forces. We conclude that the main challenge for the global oil industry 
today is securing access to petroleum reserves due to nationalisation of resources and 
increasing power of host governments and their NOCs in non-OECD areas. Moreover, 
competition is intensifying with the entry of emerging market oil companies and the 
independents, together with service suppliers gaining a stronger foothold in the market. The 
combination of these factors has made it increasingly difficult for the traditional IOCs to 
compete in the market, and they need to adapt to these changes in order to survive. Next, we 
have applied Dunning’s OLI framework to determine what advantages Statoil has when 
expanding abroad and where and how it should pursue internationalisation.  
  
From our analysis we have identified critical success factors that oil companies in the industry 
must possess. First and foremost, oil companies need access to new oil and gas reserves to 
maintain their production levels. In order to obtain entry into new petroleum-rich regions, it is 
crucial that the company has a strong reputation and track-record of completed projects, and 
have the ability to establish good relationships with host governments. To be an attractive 
partner for the NOCs, we have identified size incorporating a large skilled workforce, 
financial and operational strength as well as strong technological competences to be critical 
success factors. These are important in order to be able to take on large and risky projects and 
provide the NOCs with the technology and infrastructure they lack. We will discuss the 
importance of these resources and competences in further detail in the following section. We 
attempt to distinguish between what Statoil currently possesses of importance that the 
company can bring with them internationally, and what kind of resources it lacks to better 
compete in the global oil industry. Consequently we will try to match the industry relevant 
opportunities and threats identified in our external analysis with Statoil´s internal strengths 
and weaknesses to gain a competitive advantage. In order for a resource to give rise to a 
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sustainable competitive advantage it has to be valuable, rare, inimitable and properly 
organized by the company. Our findings will later result in an evaluation on how Statoil can 
acquire the necessary resources and competences it currently lacks.   
 
STATOIL’S MAIN RESOURCES  
 
Natural resources 
 
As the competition for the world’s declining reserves is intensifying, gaining access to the oil 
and gas resources are becoming increasingly difficult for oil companies. In addition, efficient 
management of existing reserves is important in order to fully exploit the value of such 
resources, and hence increase a company’s profitability. 
 
Having access to oil and gas reserves is one of the most valuable resources for Statoil. After 
all, the company generates its income from the sale of oil and gas. Moreover, it is the most 
common source of energy today and is consequently extremely valuable also to the private 
end users and other industries. Nevertheless, its reserves to production rate are in decline, and 
Statoil´s reserves replacement ratio was merely 73 percent in 2006, compared to 102 percent 
in 2005 and 106 percent in 2004243. This implies that Statoil needs to concentrate its efforts 
on securing better access to new petroleum resources.  
 
From nature oil and gas reserves are rare as they are non-renewable resources. Moreover, the 
era of large oil and gas discoveries is over and the world’s oil and gas fields are maturing 
making the resources even rarer. It is difficult to locate the best resources and then acquiring 
the license for exploration. It is also becoming increasingly challenging, both technologically 
and politically to recover the oil and gas resources. Combined these factors make it even more 
difficult for Statoil to maintain or increase their production levels.  
 
Nonetheless, as there are no immediate substitutes for oil and gas, it will continue to play a 
key role in the energy supply throughout the period to 2030. Diminishing oil and gas reserves, 
however, together with intensive political and consumer pressure are encouraging companies 
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to broaden their portfolio of products and increase expenditures on sustainable sources of 
energy such as wind, solar and nuclear power. Early investment in these alternative energies 
could improve Statoil´s competitive advantage, although oil and gas will be their main source 
of income also in the years to come.    
 
Even if these oil and gas resources are valuable, rare and hard to substitute, they should also 
be properly organised within the firm to provide a sustainable competitive advantage. It is 
important for Statoil to be present in the areas with the greatest geological potential to extract 
petroleum resources. To spread risk and maximize its profit potential the company tries to 
diversify its portfolio of projects and spread its operations across several countries. Being 
physically close to the natural resources also facilitates the control and management of 
production and operation of the fields, together with the ability to take advantage of local 
networks and clustering effects. Moreover Statoil focus on organising its oil and gas resources 
in a way that will benefit all stakeholders, including the local communities where it operates. 
Nonetheless, Statoil has realized that is difficult to act alone internationally, as it is becoming 
increasingly difficult and costly to get access to the declining petroleum resources. Thus, 
many of Statoil´s projects are operated under Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs), where 
international project partners share risks and costs together with the national resource 
holders244.  
 
Although Statoil has valuable, rare, and hard to substitute natural resources to a certain extent 
in which it aims to properly organise, we do not believe that these will provide Statoil with a 
sustainable competitive advantage. After all, in theory the world’s oil and gas resources are 
available to all oil companies, and we do not think that Statoil has a competitive advantage 
over its competitors in acquiring access to these resources. Moreover, as its main focus has 
been on the now maturing fields on the NCS, its international presence has suffered from this. 
Consequently, we believe that Statoil´s access to international natural resources is currently a 
competitive disadvantage for the company.  
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Technological resources 
 
Having access to the right technology is extremely valuable within the oil industry in order to 
extract and produce more cost efficiently and increase the recovery rates of existing oil and 
gas reserves245. Statoil possesses valuable technology with which it can compete in complex 
projects requiring advanced technology. One of Statoil´s main technological advantages is its 
expertise in oil and gas exploration, drilling and production from technically challenging 
fields, such as deep offshore waters and arctic regions. Statoil has become a leading 
technology provider in these areas and was among the first companies to adopt cutting-edge 
technology like horizontal drilling, 3D seismology, and floater and sub-sea technology. The 
area in which Statoil has the least developed technology is on the LNG side. The company has 
the competence to use it, but has not yet developed the technology internally. In Norway it 
has not been necessary to develop LNG as the resources has been so close to the markets and 
pipeline transport have been the most efficient transport solution. But now as the costs are 
increasing and the production in the developed countries is decreasing, the resources must be 
transported over larger distances and for this LNG is the solution246. Thus, Statoil needs to 
develop its LNG competence and technology to be able to take advantage of this new market 
opportunity. 
 
Even if Statoil is considered to have valuable technological resources, a relevant question that 
arises is whether these also are rare, as most of the technology developed in the industry is or 
will quickly become available to all oil companies. In a typical license project with several 
partners, none of the companies, not even the operator have sole ownership of the technology 
developed for that specific project as the costs is shared by all licensees. Consequently, the 
technology itself is not rare as it is theoretically available to most of the companies in the 
industry, maybe with the exception of emerging market companies. Nevertheless, what is 
considered to be rarer is the know-how in utilising this technology to its full potential, and the 
ability to combine different technological capabilities and project management in a way that 
makes the total solution unique247. Statoil has over the years and from the experience in the 
North-Sea developed valuable and rare know-how in how to utilise exploration technology in 
technically challenging fields and to exploit the full potential of its reserves. Statoil’s strong 
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emphasis on efficient resource management and its willingness to take on technology risk has 
increased their recovery rates substantially. Statoil has been very innovative in developing 
technology on increased oil recovery techniques (IOR), and many oil companies do not use as 
sophisticated drilling equipment as Statoil and hence leave more oil in the ground. Statoil is 
also a few steps ahead of competition in developing total solutions of reducing CO2 
emissions, and the company will most likely be able to capitalize on this know-how later 
when more projects demand such a solution248. 
 
With the use of the oil service sector, the technologies developed by companies like Statoil 
have been made more available to other companies. However, Statoil’s technological know-
how, which is built on the experience from the Norwegian fields and has been developed over 
time, is more difficult to replicate, as it is dependent on both tacit and codified knowledge. 
Hence, it may not be the technology itself which is difficult to imitate, but rather the know-
how in using it most effectively.  
 
As Statoil´s technological know-how can relatively easily be transferred to new and 
technically challenging fields around the world, this should provide the company with a 
competitive advantage in locations where such expertise is required249. Nonetheless, the rate 
of technological development changes at a rapid pace, hence, Statoil needs to constantly be at 
the forefront of technological development in order to gain sustainable competitive advantage 
over its competitors. Moreover, in the future, due to the scarcity of reserves and increasing 
concern to protect the environment, we recommend continued investments in improved oil 
recovery techniques and environmentally sound technology to maintain competitiveness. To 
conclude even if Statoil does not possess technology that leads to a sustainable competitive 
advantage, it has valuable, rare, hard to imitate and well organised know-how in utilising its 
core technology which can provide the company with a current competitive advantage.  
 
Financial resources 
 
In the oil industry, it is critical that companies have access to large financial resources to 
acquire oil and gas resources that are becoming increasingly expensive to recover. Thus, 
financial strength is crucial in order to take on larger and more complex projects, and spread 
                                                 
248 Nunn, D. W. Senior Vice President, Portfolio Strategy, Norsk Hydro. Personal interview, 20.05.07. 
249 Nunn, D. W. Senior Vice President, Portfolio Strategy, Norsk Hydro. Personal interview, 20.05.07. 
 
104 
risk. It is also necessary to have sufficient capital to invest heavily in R&D to keep up with 
the technological trends in the industry. 
 
Statoil is a highly profitable company and achieved record earnings last year due to the high 
oil prices. Nonetheless, with the industry cost inflation Statoil´s margins are pressured. 
Consequently, one of Statoil´s greatest current challenges is to ensure a good balance between 
profitability and production growth. A high growth rate in production however requires large 
investments and a high future activity level. In order to realize long-term growth, it is 
essential to increase the natural reserves faster than the rate of production250. Moreover, 
Statoil has invested heavily in R&D to develop the technology necessary to commercialize its 
resources and take advantage of the upstream opportunities in the market. Establishing 
production platforms and developing the proper infrastructure in near vicinity to the natural 
resources also requires large investments. Furthermore, large financial resources are needed if 
Statoil is to gain further access to the reserves situated in Canada, the U.K., and Gulf of 
Mexico as these are more expensive to explore for due to geological complexity of the 
fields251.  
 
Statoil possesses valuable financial resources, however it does not have unlimited access and 
many of the oil majors have far larger financial strength than Statoil. Nonetheless, Statoil 
seeks to organise its financial resources in an effective manner and often engages in project 
sharing agreements to share the risks and costs of projects. Moreover, the company carefully 
organises its financial resources by investing in various projects around the world in order to 
diversify both project-specific and country-specific risks and maximise returns252.  
 
Although, Statoil has large financial resources, it lacks the financial strength to engage in 
large and risky projects on its own, and obtain access to expensive resources. Hence we 
conclude that its financial resources might in fact provide Statoil with a competitive 
disadvantage in the international setting.  
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Human resources 
 
In knowledge-based firms, such as Statoil, the human resources typically become the most 
valuable asset as they possess the know-how and skills embedded in the firm. However, 
securing access to sufficient human capital is a major challenge for Statoil and the industry in 
general.  
 
An ageing population in combination with earlier downsizing efforts of oil companies has 
resulted in a large portion of their current workforce soon retiring. Moreover, the industry 
seems to be less attractive for young people as many have a bad image of the industry and 
prefer “greener” industries. This has led to an industry wide war for talent. Also, with 
increasingly international operations finding the necessary local skills around the world is 
challenging. Consequently, it is critical for Statoil to be able to train a large number of 
professionals from many different nations. However, Statoil has a recognized trainee 
program, and invest highly in the development of its human capital. Moreover, the company 
appreciate that its employees have a good balance between work life and leisure. These social 
competences are quite valuable and rare in the industry, which we believe is highly 
appreciated among potential employees. 
 
Moreover, Statoil is a popular employer in Norway. For several years in a row both business 
and engineering students at Norwegian colleges and universities have voted Statoil the most 
desired employer in the country. This status is valuable, rare and hard-to-imitate in the current 
war for talent within the industry.  
 
As a company with typical Norwegian roots, we do not believe that its workforce is especially 
mobile. However, the company is willing to hire local knowledge where that is more 
beneficial and has also started to focus on hiring more international people. According to our 
findings Statoil has valuable organizational capabilities in recruiting, training and motivating 
its human resources. Furthermore, its strong embedded corporate values and culture are 
transferred throughout the whole organization and value chain. Statoil might however, not 
have the same ability to attract international talents. Therefore, we conclude that Statoil’s 
human resources do not lead to a sustainable competitive advantage internationally, but 
competitive parity at best. 
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Reputational resources 
 
From our previous analysis, we have identified that having a good reputation among various 
stakeholders and host governments is valuable in negotiating deals. According to our 
research, Statoil enjoys a strong reputation in several areas. The most significant relates to the 
company’s proven track record of completed projects on the NCS and the reliability of supply 
of oil and gas. Moreover, the company stands out as a frontrunner in social and environmental 
responsibility, and in some cases the company can take advantage of the country of origin 
effect and the fact that it is partly state-owned253.  
 
Even if its reputation is important and valuable to Statoil, many other companies share the 
same traits, and hence its reputation might not be rare. We question if in fact Statoil is a more 
reliable supplier than its competitors. After all, the company is experiencing several project 
delays around the world due to the increased complexity of projects. Nevertheless, compared 
to Russia’s Gazprom that has used its supply of gas as a political weapon, we believe that 
Statoil positively stands out as a more reliable supplier.  Thus, we suggest that Statoil should 
take advantage of the threat in the market regarding the security of supply and leverage its 
reputation as a reliable supplier. Moreover, due to the nature and recent changes of the 
industry Statoil has the ability to exploit several other opportunities. People are increasingly 
concerned about the need to protect the environment and Statoil is heavily engaged in 
developing more environmentally friendly solutions, which should appeal to host 
governments and the general consumers. Nonetheless, the effects of Statoil´s efforts are not 
yet documented and we do not know for sure if this in fact provides the company with an 
advantage in dealing with host governments or attracting a skilled workforce. Moreover, 
similar initiatives are undertaken by most companies in the industry and we see no 
extraordinary reasons why Statoil should gain more goodwill from this than other actors. 
Another positive contribution to Statoil’s reputation today, is its firm and uncompromising 
stand on corruption. However, this has not always been the case, and the Iran scandal in 2002 
where Statoil was found guilty of bribery, severely damaged the company’s reputation254. 
Hence, it will take some time for the company to clean up after this. Furthermore, Statoil is of 
the opinion that it might have a reputational advantage in NOC countries, as it has been a 
state-owned company for so many years, and is still largely influenced by the state. As the 
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NOCs themselves are an agent for their country’s petroleum politics, they might prefer to 
cooperate with someone that has been in the same position. In this way Statoil is different 
from the traditional IOCs, and might become a preferred partner.  Also, there is a belief that 
Norwegian companies are less “greedy and dominant”, and more neutral with regards to 
world politics than for example the Americans and the British255. Nevertheless, Norwegians 
have a tendency to overrate the advantages of being Norwegian, and hence this country of 
origin advantage and NOC foundation should not be overestimated.  
 
Reputational capabilities are difficult for other firms to imitate, as they are intangible 
resources developed over time. However, even though Statoil enjoys a reputation of being a 
reliable supplier, environmentally committed and a less greedy and dominant company, we do 
not think that its reputation alone is sufficient to provide the company with a sustainable 
competitive advantage, but rather competitive parity. 
 
 
Figure 23: Summary of Statoil´s resources 
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Conclusion 
 
The resource-based analysis of Statoil demonstrates the importance of possessing resources 
that are valuable, rare, hard to imitate, and properly organised to gain sustainable competitive 
advantage. We argue that Statoil’s leading technological know-how in extracting oil from 
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deep waters and technically challenging fields together with the increased recovery techniques 
provides them with a current competitive advantage. Moreover, according to our research the 
company’s total technological solutions for the capture and storage of CO2 will become a 
significant advantage to Statoil in the future. However, as these advantages are not inimitable 
in the long-run Statoil needs to find ways to sustain its current competitive advantages for as 
long as possible and focus on developing new superior technological know-how in other 
areas.  
 
Moreover, Statoil’s skilled workforce and strong ability to attract new human capital, together 
with its solid reputation is advantageous to the company. However these resources do not 
generate sustainable competitive advantage as they fall short in the four criteria. Nevertheless, 
these resources can at best provide the company with a competitive parity. Finally as Statoil´s 
operations have so far mainly been domestic, the international arena presents the company 
with a new set of challenges. Consequently, we conclude that Statoil possibly has a 
competitive disadvantage in the access to natural and financial resources compared to its main 
competitors, which can hamper its international growth.  
 
 
COMPETENCES STATOIL CURRENTLY NEEDS TO DEVELOP 
From our analysis and the figure 23 above it is evident that not all of Statoil’s resources 
provide the company with competitive advantage. Thus, the company must emphasize on 
addressing its weaknesses in order to better compete internationally, and seek to develop or 
acquire the resources that currently only give them competitive parity.  
 
The main weaknesses or disadvantages that we have identified are insufficient access to 
natural and financial resources. These are critical factors for success in the global oil industry, 
as companies need access to new reserves to stay in business and financial strength to take on 
large and risky projects. Moreover, the company should leverage its reputation as a reliable 
supplier of oil and gas, in addition to its dedication to being both socially and environmentally 
responsible. Even if these resources will probably not generate a sustainable competitive 
advantage, they are still crucial in developing good relationships with host governments. Also, 
being seen as an attractive employer to both national and international employees is essential 
for capturing highly skilled people. Furthermore, even though Statoil is considered to have 
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competitive advantage in its technological know-how, it is important that they are constantly 
at the forefront of developing new technology and solutions for better exploitation of the 
natural resources. Although our main focus is to evaluate how Statoil can increase its 
international competitiveness, we have decided to include a discussion on the management of 
existing resources on the NCS, as this will still be the main production base for Statoil also in 
the years to come. Consequently, we suggest that Statoil needs to focus on the following to 
better compete internationally: 
1. Improve the natural resource management on the NCS. 
2. Achieve greater size and scale effects 
a. Increase the financial strength 
b. Secure better access to skilled human capital internationally 
3. Increase the international presence and secure better access to new oil and gas 
resources. 
4. Improve its reputation and strengthen relationships with NOCs and host governments. 
5. Further develop technological competence, and find new solutions for better 
exploitation of oil and gas resources. 
 
The next step is to analyze how Statoil could develop or obtain these resources and 
competences in the best manner. Thus we will evaluate the four different strategic 
alternatives: internal development, horizontal and vertical merger and strategic alliance 
according to the five improvement criteria stated above. From this we aim to identify what we 
believe will be the best alternative to increase its international competitiveness, considering its 
current situation.  
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PART 6: STATOIL´S STRATEGIC ALTERNATIVES
                                                
 
 
CHAPTER 1: ANALYSIS 
 
The goal of this section is to evaluate the different modes of expansion Statoil could pursue to 
improve its international competitiveness. Choosing among the various alternatives involves 
trade-offs as each mode has its own benefits and costs. Consequently, we need to consider 
each alternative against Statoil´s needs and the requirement for specific resources and 
competences, as identified in the preceding section. For the purpose of this thesis we have 
proposed four different strategic alternatives, which Statoil could pursue, namely internal 
development, mergers and acquisitions, and strategic alliance. We will evaluate whether a 
horizontal or vertical integration will lead to increased expansion along the geographic 
expansion, which is the main objective for Statoil. Our recommendation will be based on the 
mode we believe will provide Statoil with the most critical and relevant resources and 
competences it currently lacks to better compete internationally. 
 
INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT 
Statoil is today a highly profitable and recognized oil company which has mainly expanded 
through organic growth and internal development. The company enjoys a strong position in 
its domestic markets, but needs to increase its international presence as reserves on the NCS 
are depleting. Hence, one option for further expansion is to continue to develop internally, 
through investing in innovative and efficient technology to facilitate a more advanced 
exploitation of oil and gas reserves256.  
 
 
256 Reuters (2007), Oil & Gas-Integrated : Overview, available at 
<http://www.investor.reuters.com/business/IndustryDmDescr.aspx?industry=OILINT&target=%2fbusiness%2fb
ussecindustry%2fbussecindfake%2fbussecindoverview&page=dmdescr>, 03.05.07. 
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Resource management on the NCS 
 
Statoil is today the largest operator on the NCS, with operatorships in 25 production fields257. 
The company directs strong efforts towards efficient management of these resources and is 
among the companies in the industry with the highest oil recovery rates258. Hence, we are 
confident that Statoil has the competence to continue to manage its domestic operations 
through internal development. Moreover, as parts of the Norwegian Continental Shelf are to a 
great extent mature, it requires a higher level of competence and efforts to keep up the 
production in the medium to long term. Some argue that diversity in the searching, extraction 
and production of oil and gas in the technically demanding areas of the NCS require a 
multiplicity of players to promote various geological models and different recovery 
techniques259. Hence, from this point of view, Statoil would through internal development 
maintain the competition and diversity on the NCS, and hence contribute to efficient resource 
management.  
 
Size and scale effects 
 
As evident from the previous analysis, the size of companies matter in this industry, as bigger 
companies are able to take on larger and riskier projects. If Statoil were to grow through 
internal development, they would not be able to increase their size in the short-term due to 
limited access to financial and human resources. Nevertheless, this size effect might be 
overrated and it is not the only determinant of a company’s success. Actually, its current size 
can be beneficial to some host governments as Statoil is considered to be less dominant and 
greedy, and will be able to adapt more quickly to changes in the environment. Hence, Statoil 
could continue to be successful even if it does not gain the significant size effect. Yet, it 
would have to find other competences to compete on, such as technological capabilities or 
expertise in certain areas.  
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International presence and access to new reserves 
 
The main disadvantage of internal development is that it does not allow Statoil to instantly get 
access to the resources they lack as is the case with other modes of expansion. Hence, Statoil 
might not have the ability to strengthen its international position alone due to the increasingly 
challenging business environment in which it operates. As of today, due to the strong 
competitive forces and emergence of new competition, Statoil´s international opportunities 
are limited. We believe that the company can continue to compete on regular commercial 
terms in OECD areas. However, as the reserves in these countries are declining, the company 
needs to improve their efforts in getting access to new reserves in non-OECD countries. This 
will be very challenging as the company’s previous internationalisation efforts have been 
seriously constrained by political factors. The recent situation in Venezuela illustrates this, 
where the president of the country is threatening to throw Statoil and other foreign oil 
companies out of the country, in the pursuit of nationalising the country’s oil resources. As 
Statoil has been present there for over 10 years and invested large amounts of money, this 
would be a devastating loss. However, as Venezuela lacks skills and competence in the 
extraction and production of oil and gas, it is dependent on foreign technology and expertise 
in this area260. Even though Statoil would like to continue as operator and owner of recourses 
also in the future, they need to consider also becoming a provider of technological expertise 
and supplier of services to the national resource owners. In fact, Statoil will most likely have 
to do both concurrently. However, they face increasingly new competition from suppliers that 
are leading technology developers and are becoming valuable partners to the resource holders.  
 
Moreover, Statoil could also leverage its expertise from deep waters and harsh weather 
conditions from the NCS, and exploit it in new and challenging geological areas. One 
opportunity is to start focusing on niche segments or search for new play types, like they have 
done in Canada with the acquisition of an oil sand company. Hence, in order to grow 
internationally organically, Statoil should focus on areas where they have technological 
advantages, such as deep- and arctic waters. These fields are mainly to be found in the U.K, 
Gulf of Mexico and Canada.  
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Although, Statoil might be able to increase its international presence to a certain extent 
through internal development, we argue whether this will be the best option to increase the 
company’s competitiveness internationally. Combining forces with another actor might give 
Statoil increased financial and operational strength in getting access to new reserves and 
taking on larger and more risky projects.  
 
Reputation and relationships with host governments and NOCs 
 
The main advantage with internal development is that it is the simplest way to transfer its 
current corporate resources, like its corporate culture and embedded tacit knowledge into new 
business areas. Thus, Statoil can use this in establishing relationships with host governments 
and better control how the company wants to be perceived by various stakeholders. This way 
it is easier for them to fully focus on being socially and environmentally responsible, in 
addition to having zero tolerance for corruption.  
 
Statoil enjoys today a solid reputation and have established good relationships with the host 
governments in most countries where they operate. However, in certain countries such as 
Nigeria and Iran with very demanding political regimes, it is extremely difficult to 
communicate and build relations261.  Also in Venezuela for example, where Statoil aims to 
keep a good dialogue with the authorities, the company’s assets can still be transferred back to 
the Venezuelan government without compensation. Nevertheless, according to Tjersland, 
Statoil might have a comparative advantage in dealing with host governments of these 
countries as they have been a state-owned company for so many years, and still today have 
large stately influence. As previously discussed, the NOCs themselves are an agent for their 
country’s petroleum politics, and they might prefer to cooperate with someone that has 
experience with what it is like to be part of a national strategy262. Further, Statoil has 
throughout the years built up a reputation of being a reliable supplier of oil and gas with a 
good track record of completed projects. However, Statoil can become even better at 
delivering the projects within the expected time and budgets. Hence, this is one way Statoil 
can improve its reputation further through internal development. Moreover, with the 
increasing concern for the environment it is very important for companies to act in a socially 
and environmentally responsible manner. This is something Statoil can capitalise on in the 
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future, as they are involved in several projects on how to reduce the emission of CO2. 
Nevertheless, as the company is relatively “new” on the international arena it still lacks 
experience in completing projects internationally and dealing with host governments in 
developing countries. Therefore, it could be beneficial for Statoil to team up with a partner 
who has more extensive experience from operations internationally and already established 
relationships with host governments. However, our analysis suggests that Statoil could 
leverage its reputation and relationships to a certain extent through internal development.  
 
Technological competences 
 
Statoil could also grow internationally through leveraging its position as a leading technology 
provider and reliable supplier of oil and gas. The company is investing heavily in R&D and is 
at the forefront of developing new technology for the oil and gas industry. Statoil can compete 
in most complex projects requiring advanced technology, and in all of Statoil´s larger 
projects, there is technology development concurrently. However, when Statoil engages in a 
licence with other partners they do not have sole ownership of the technology developed in 
the specific project as it is shared by all licences of the project. Nonetheless, as an operator, 
the company is the main driver and user of the technology development, and thus acquires the 
competence in using it which can be transferred to new projects.  This underlines the need for 
Statoil to become an operator of more projects and not just a partner263. 
 
Nonetheless, Statoil does not enjoy technological advantage in all areas. For instance, it 
currently lacks the ownership of important LNG technology, which is today considered to be 
the clearest technological advantage within the industry.  Even if this LNG technology is 
currently not yet part of Statoil’s core competence, it is currently being developed together 
with Linde in the Snøhvit project. This will be the first LNG value chain in Europe and is 
expected to start operation this autumn. Hence, with the experience from the development of 
this LNG value chain Statoil should be in a good position to compete for new LNG projects in 
the Middle East, Asia and Africa in the future264.  
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Conclusion 
 
Despite the current industry challenges we believe that Statoil could most probably pursue an 
internal development mode of expansion and be profitable also in the future.  After all having 
a good organic track record is a prerequisite for long term sustainable growth. Also, it is risky 
to mainly grow through other modes of expansion like M&As as companies often have to pay 
large premiums for their targets, and this can erode much of the value created265. However, if 
Statoil were to continue on its own it could be forced to take on a new  role as a supplier of 
technology and services rather than resource holder, as it will be increasingly challenging to 
get access to natural resources. We conclude that Statoil would survive on its own also in the 
future, but it will have to keep up with the trends in the industry and eventually adapt its 
business model to better compete. The question is rather if other strategic alternatives are 
more suitable or effective in Statoil´s pursuit of gaining stronger international bargaining 
power, especially in getting access to new markets and natural resources. 
 
HORIZONTAL MERGER 
Another alternative is to grow non-organically, through merging with or acquiring another 
company. Companies can be combined either through horizontal or vertical integration. A 
horizontal merger means that two direct competing firms within the same industry decide to 
join forces. The main goal of a horizontal merger is to strengthen the position relative to 
competitors and increase market share. As Statoil already has announced its intention to 
merge with Norsk Hydro’s petroleum business, we will use this case as a basis for analysis.  
 
The proposed merger of Statoil and Norsk Hydro was announced on December 18th 2006. The 
deal involves a merger of Hydro’s petroleum division with Statoil into one entity, based on 
the principle of a merger of equals. The new company will temporarily operate under the 
name of StatoilHydro; however a new proposed name is to be developed. The company’s 
business office will be in Stavanger, but corporate functions will be located in both Stavanger 
and Oslo. The merger can be seen as a growth-oriented response to the challenges facing the 
oil and gas industry today. Ensuring increased competitiveness internationally and long-term 
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growth on the NCS have been regarded as the main rationale behind the merger. Both 
companies failed to find enough oil and gas last year to compensate for declining production 
in the North Sea, and they strive to increase growth internationally. The government will have 
a shareholding of about 62.5 percent in the merged company, but intends to increase the state 
shareholding to 67 percent over time. Combined, the entity is expected to improve its 
production rates and reserves base. The company projects to pump 1.9 million boe daily this 
year, of which 1.6 million barrels will be in Norway. Its proven oil and gas reserves are 
estimated at 6.3 billion boe266. It is estimated that upstream activities will represent 90 percent 
of the combined company earnings, which is one of the highest numbers among the integrated 
oil companies267.  
 
Hydro can be seen as an attractive partner for Statoil as the company is one of the world’s 
largest offshore oil companies and the second biggest oil and gas operator on the NCS. Hydro 
has its main production base in Norway, but also has significant oil and gas production 
internationally in Angola, the Gulf of Mexico, Canada, Libya and Russia as well as activities 
in Iran, Brazil and Denmark. Around a half of Hydro’s exploration activities today take place 
outside Norway, and they are mainly involved in deep water exploration drilling projects, in 
which they have valuable expertise. Hydro is also an important player in the development of 
renewable energy sources, which is believed to be an important future asset for the company. 
Hydro holds a strong business position and expertise within its core activities and has 
delivered strong financial results268. However, its position is threatened by the growing power 
of suppliers and scarcity of resources. Hydro has had to cut its production-volume guidance 
several times and is struggling to replace its reserves269. Hence, Hydro’s oil division is 
currently having problems, and has become a potential take-over target.  
 
The Norwegian government considers this merger to be strategically and industrially sound as 
they believe that the two companies jointly will be able to create greater value than the two 
companies could have done separately. According to Helge Lund, the CEO of Statoil, the 
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merger is predominantly driven by the opportunities for growth and not cost synergies270. Our 
aim is to analyze whether this mode of expansion will provide Statoil with the resources and 
competences it currently lacks to better compete internationally. 
 
Resource management on the NCS 
 
The Norwegian Continental Shelf is a major source of revenue for both Statoil and Hydro, 
and will still be the main production base for both companies after the merger. Hence, how 
the proposed merger will affect the management of existing resources on the NCS has been 
debated. First of all, Statoil and Hydro’s participation on the Norwegian shelf are to a large 
extent overlapping. Statoil is involved in the same producing fields as Hydro, with the 
exception of six fields. Moreover, both companies have stakes in the same oil and gas 
transportation facilities. It is believed that the merger can increase efficiency by eliminating 
double efforts in the same fields. Also, as fewer new discoveries are expected and parts of the 
NCS are to a great extent mature, a higher level of competence and resource efforts are 
required to maintain the production in the years to come. Thus, StatoilHydro can use their 
complementary technologies and expertise together with increased financial and operational 
strength to contribute to more effective operations and thus prolong the economic life of the 
NCS271.   
 
The other side of the argument is that StatoilHydro might get a too dominant position 
domestically. The merger will result in a company with a significantly larger portfolio of 
production licences than the other licensees on the NCS. Together they will control more than 
a third of the remaining proven reserves, and have operator ship of two-thirds of the fields. 
Hence there is a fear that the combined entity may gain a too strong position domestically and 
undermine diversity on the NCS. Diversity in exploration, development and operation is 
necessary in order to promote various geological and commercial models, and various 
technical solutions regarding development and transportation. Historic numbers from the 
production on the NCS, has shown that a multiplicity of players with different technology and 
solutions led to higher recovery rates. According to Ramm it would have been wiser for 
Statoil and Hydro to operate separately on the NCS to maintain the competition and diversity. 
                                                 
270 Global Insight Daily (2006). Statoil and Norsk Hydro to Merge Oil and Gas Businesses, Global Insight 
Limited, 18.12.06. 
271 Storting proposition no, 60 (2006-2007). Merger of Statoil and Hydro’s petroleum operations, 
available at <http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/oed/aktuelt/nyheter/2007/Sammenslaingen-av-Statoil-og-olje--
og-ga.html?id=461179>, 30.03.07. 
118 
As a result of the merger, Ramm argues that StatoilHydro’s operator ships on the NCS should 
be reduced to 40 percent to maintain competition and diversity272. In fact, to reduce the 
merged company’s influence, the government might require that the company transfers some 
of its operator ships to other players. It is however questionable whether this will contribute to 
improving the resource management and increasing the value creation on the NCS. 
Nevertheless, the government will have to ensure that the merged company operates in a 
manner that will enhance the value creation on the NCS and promote diversity273.  
  
Size and scale effects  
 
The merger is the third biggest in the oil and gas industry this decade274, and by joining forces 
StatoilHydro will become the world’s largest offshore oil producer in water depths of more 
than 100 meters275. Moreover StatoilHydro will become the largest company in Norway, and 
have a market value approaching the larger integrated oil companies276. The following graph 
illustrates StatoilHydro’s market value in comparison to other leading international oil and 
gas companies per 27.03.07.  
 
Figure 24: Integrated oil companies measured by market capitalization (2007)277
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The merger is expected to lead to substantial cost-savings through more efficient management 
and the elimination of duplicate functions such as head-office, administration, IT, and R&D. 
Moreover, by combining common operations and releasing human capital, higher efficiency 
through economies of scale is projected, as well as purchasing synergies, as a larger 
organisation is likely to have stronger bargaining power over suppliers278. This could 
potentially create a problem if the new entity will squeeze the profitability of the Norwegian 
suppliers and hence decrease the incentives to develop innovative technology and solutions. 
By losing a large customer, the suppliers will have fewer, although larger contracts to bid for 
and this might put downward pressure on prices. Nevertheless, StatoilHydro has expressed its 
commitment to act in a responsible manner to maintain competition among Norwegian 
suppliers. Also, if the company achieves a successful growth rate internationally, this might 
even benefit the Norwegian suppliers by means of larger and more frequent orders279. 
Moreover, a merger is also expected to lead to increased revenues in the long term by 
implementing best practises and more effective use of scarce resources in relation to drilling 
and well activities, extraction, integrated operations, management of core areas and 
international experience. The total cost synergy potential for the combined company is 
estimated to be about NOK 4 billion per year before tax280. Nonetheless, potential cost gains 
and increased revenues may be eroded by the costs and problems associated with the 
integration of the two companies. 
 
The merger will also provide StatoilHydro with more human capital, by combining the 
company’s workforce of about 31 000 people281. This will allow them to better utilise their 
human resources in an industry which is currently suffering from a shortage of skilled labour. 
Instead of fighting for the same human capital, Statoil and Hydro can rather share knowledge 
and exchange best practises in their recruitment process. Both companies need to attract more 
human capital from abroad to gain skills and expertise from the international arena.  However, 
we question whether this merger will make StatoilHydro more attractive for international 
employees as it will still be a very traditional Norwegian-based company with large stately 
influence. Also, the two entities might loose important skilled people due to the uncertainties 
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and power struggles related to the merger process. Consequently, we question if in fact the 
combined entity will be able to produce a larger and skilled workforce. 
 
By joining forces the merged company will potentially increase their financial, technological 
and operational strength and be better able to pursue new international growth opportunities. 
Hence, the combined entity is expected to have greater ability to engage in a number of larger 
and riskier projects concurrently282. Additionally, according to Nunn, the increased market 
size of Statoil and Hydro will potentially allow them to better compete against the 
international oil majors and take a more aggressive approach in acquiring new reserves283. 
Also, the increased financial strength of the combined company is expected to allow the 
companies to continue their acquisition growth strategy, which is important for further 
international growth.  
 
Nonetheless, according to Ramm the merger is not justified from a size perspective. He says 
that Statoil and Hydro are already more than large enough to spread their risk on the NCS, 
and on an international scale, the size effect will not be significant enough to make a 
substantial difference. The paradox here is that the company is considered to be too large 
domestically, while not necessarily gaining enough size to better compete internationally. The 
optimal size of a global oil company is substantially larger than the combined size of Statoil 
and Hydro, as the industry has experienced a wave of consolidation in recent years. Moreover, 
Ramm states that size effect is overrated and not the main determinant of oil companies’ 
success. Hence, according to Ramm, the merger makes no sense from a size and 
diversification of risk point of view as 80 percent of the production takes place on the NCS284.  
 
We believe that the merger will lead to a larger company with more assets and a broader 
competence level and a better capability to take on large and complex development projects. 
Nevertheless, we do not think that the size effect alone will provide Statoil with increased 
bargaining power internationally. 
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International presence and access to new reserves 
 
According to Statoil and Hydro, their international portfolios are well fitted. The merged 
company is expected to achieve operational synergies and increase profitability by combining 
resources where both companies are represented. They will for instance combine their 
international workforce and offices in the US, Canada, Belgium, Libya, Angola and Nigeria. 
They also complement each other’s portfolios in certain areas as Statoil for instance has great 
experience in Algeria, Brazil, Mexico and Venezuela while Hydro has more experience in 
Libya, Argentina, Jamaica and Trinidad. The two companies also have complementary 
portfolios in the Gulf of Mexico, Angola, and Russia. Their combined assets in the Gulf of 
Mexico especially, are expected to lead to more efficient operations and improved 
profitability285. Together the new entity will be present in close to 40 countries, and combined 
its largest international reserves will be in Angola, Algeria, and Azerbaijan. However, even 
though the combined companies’ international operations are extensive, the operations in 
Norway will still account for 68 percent of its proven reserves286. This means that the 
operations on the NCS will still be very important for the merged company also in the future. 
 
Figure 25: StatoilHydro´s combined international operations287. 
 
Norway 68 %Nigeria 1 %
US GoM 2 %
Venezuela 2 %
Other 3 %
Algeria 7 %
Angola 9 %
Azerbaijan 6 %
Brazil 1 %
Canada 1 %
Nonetheless, as the reserves on the NCS are maturing, both companies strive to increase their 
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international growth. By combining their international production and development portfolios, 
StatoilHydro will achieve a greater geographical diversification in its production, which is 
strategically important for developing the company’s reserves in the medium to long term288.  
 
It has also been claimed that the merger will strengthen the company’s bargaining power in 
the international competition for natural resources as it is easier to promote one large 
Norwegian company, and not having to consider the possible conflicting interests of Statoil 
and Hydro. Moreover, as the state is the largest owner of both companies, it makes no sense 
to compete against itself in biddings for the same international deals. For instance, both 
companies were rejected participation in the Shtokman gas field last year, and both Statoil and 
Hydro believe that the chances for getting a new chance are greater when they join forces. 
However, some argue that what the merger really entails is that Statoil gets rid of one 
competitor, but this will not necessarily give them increased bargaining power in the pursuit 
for access to international oil and gas fields.  
  
We question if in fact the combined entity will be able to increase their international 
competitiveness as their international experiences and portfolios are so similar and will 
consequently not lead to substantial synergies. As both companies are relatively 
inexperienced on the international arena, Statoil will have to start more from scratch than if 
for instance it was to merge with an international partner. Hence, the combined entity will not 
automatically result in a more international company. 
 
Reputation and relationships with host governments and NOCs 
 
We believe that it is beneficial that the two companies have similar value systems and 
management philosophies. Both companies are committed to a sustainable financial 
development and innovative development of technology. Moreover, they put great effort into 
keeping high environmental and ethical standards by complying with the international code of 
conduct. Furthermore, both Statoil and Hydro attempt to actively support the societies in 
which they operate by engaging in local projects289. This common ground of values and 
management philosophy will ease the integration of the companies, and in addition benefit the 
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merged company, as corporate social responsibility will become an even more valuable asset 
in the future.  
 
Moreover, the merger allows StatoilHydro to use the Norwegian experience and skills as an 
entry ticket to cooperate with national oil companies in resource-rich countries. Both 
companies have experience from the deep and technologically challenging waters of Norway 
often in harsh weather conditions. This has provided them with a reputation for cutting-edge 
offshore drilling and development technology, which could give them a stronger competitive 
advantage in the pursuit of new deals as a combined company. A company with clear ties to 
the Norwegian state could more easily appeal to resource rich state-owned companies in 
Russia and the Middle East than other privately owned western companies. Eivind Reiten of 
Hydro has expressed in the media that StatoilHydro should exploit the fact that they are 
supported by the Norwegian government and promote the company as a strong Norwegian 
energy champion better positioned to pursue international growth opportunities290. However, 
as discussed throughout this paper, this country of origin factor should not be 
overemphasized. Nevertheless, due to the fact that Statoil and Hydro both are committed to 
being socially and environmentally responsible, we believe that the new company has the 
potential to improve its reputation further and consequently strengthen its relationships with 
host governments.  
 
Technological competence 
 
Their skills and experience are complementary in the sense that both companies have 
experience from operating in deep waters and technologically challenging fields on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf. By combining the companies’ technological competences and 
know-how, it has the potential to fuel a faster development and greater use of new innovative 
technology. This will further strengthen their reputation of being among the world’s leading 
technology-driven companies, which could provide them with a stronger competitive 
advantage in addressing the competition and challenges facing the oil industry today. Finally, 
by combining their resources, StatoilHydro is expected to be better equipped to meeting the 
increased demand for renewable energy sources and establish value chains for the capture and 
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storage of CO2291. Nonetheless, as the companies have the same capabilities in for example 
offshore exploration and production, the effects of combining their technology might not 
provide the company with a substantial advantage. However, by cooperating more closely in 
the development of new technology and solutions, they might benefit from this in the future.  
 
The role of the state 
 
The role of the state in this merger is not unproblematic. There are problems associated with 
such a large stately shareholding in commercialised companies, as there may be conflicting 
interests between what creates value for shareholders and what is good for the society as a 
whole. In recent years, when a potential merger between Statoil and Hydro has been 
discussed, it has met harsh oppositions from politicians as such a merger would not be in line 
with Norwegian politics. The governments has previously stated in the Soria Moria 
declaration that they want to ensure a stable activity in the Norwegian petroleum industry and 
that “a combination of state-and privately owned large and big players are crucial to achieve 
this”292. The general agreement was initially that Norway should have three oil companies, 
privately owned Saga, partly state-owned Hydro and fully state-owned Statoil. Today, they 
have melted into one company with a 62.5 percent state holding, and some fear that they have 
become too powerful. Another problem that arises is that the new company seeks to grow 
internationally, in an industry with fierce competition and in countries with high levels of 
political risk and often widespread corruption. Some are worried whether it is sensible that the 
state is so involved in the extraction of oil in countries with such demanding political regimes. 
Moreover, according to Ramm, a state-owned company makes sense when it operates within 
the domestic borders, as the state can ensure that the company acts in the best manner for the 
wealth of the nation. However, as the companies are expanding more abroad, the state will be 
more of a liability than an asset. This is because the more Statoil engages in international 
production, the fewer assets they will spend on efficient management of domestic resources. 
Hence, this weakens the argument of using the state ownership of Statoil to control the 
management of the Norwegian resources. Consequently, we foresee a continuous pressure for 
further privatisation if Statoil becomes more international. Moreover, as StatoilHydro will 
face tougher competition abroad, and need more financial resources to invest in acquisition 
targets and secure access to new reserves that are more expensive and challenging to extract, 
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they need capital. Hence, according to Ramm, it would be sensible if the state sold off some 
of their shares to infuse new capital into the company so that they could invest more heavily 
in international production. In fact, the government should have done this prior to the merger 
so that Statoil and Hydro could have pursued their international expansion as separate 
companies. By merging the two companies, Ramm does not believe that a more international 
company is born293. 
 
Conclusion 
 
By merging with Hydro, we believe that Statoil can move up to a higher division and create 
new values by taking on larger and riskier projects than before. Moreover the merger will 
provide Statoil with greater larger financial and human resources; however, we question 
whether the increased size and financial and operational strength are substantial enough when 
competing against far larger actors. For the time being, we can understand the rationale 
behind the merger as Statoil will have difficulties managing on its own in an increasingly 
more challenging environment. However, we do not believe that this merger alone can 
increase Statoil international competitiveness substantially, and hence the combined entity 
might have to engage in a strategic alliance with an international partner with more 
international experience to gain complementary competences and access to new markets. 
 
 
VERTICAL MERGER  
In a vertical merger, a company integrates upstream or downstream the value chain. There are 
many examples of oil companies adopting a vertically integrated structure. A typical 
vertically integrated oil company will be active all the way along the supply chain from 
locating crude oil deposits, drilling and extracting oil, refining it into petroleum products, to 
distributing the fuel to petrol stations, where it is sold to consumers294.  
 
In order to gain international competitiveness Statoil could engage in an upstream vertical 
merger by joining forces with a supplier. A supplier typically develops the technology and 
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provides the equipment used in the extraction and production of oil. This would provide 
Statoil with more in-house technological competence, and better coordination of the value 
chain activities295. For the purpose of this analysis we will use Aker Kværner as a potential 
candidate. The company is a leading international oil and gas engineering and construction 
group which provides construction services, technology and products to oil and gas 
companies296. However, we will not discuss the company’s operations or competences in 
detail, but only use it as an example to illustrate the main advantages and disadvantages of the 
vertical merger alternative. 
 
Resource management on the NCS  
 
The main benefits of a vertical merger would be to more effectively coordinate the value 
chain activities, and secure access to supplies and materials. This could be beneficial for the 
management of existing fields on the NCS, as Statoil could in-source more of its technology 
development and come up with technical solutions to more efficient resource management. 
Statoil’s use of new technologies developed in cooperation with Aker Kværner could extend 
the lifespan of existing oil and gas fields, while increasing safety measures and reducing the 
risks of environmental issues. Nevertheless, a vertical integration may lead to reduced 
competition among suppliers and potentially higher costs due to lower efficiencies. This 
would not be good for the other actors and the competition on the NCS. 
 
Size and scale effects 
 
Like with a horizontal merger, joining forces with a supplier like Aker Kværner could 
potentially add financial strength and human capital to Statoil. Statoil could benefit from 
gaining more technological expertise; however, we question whether the rest of the 
company’s human capital would bring any additional value to Statoil along its other value 
chain activities. Moreover, as there is really only a fraction of Aker Kværner’s operations that 
Statoil needs we do not believe that this alternative will provide Statoil with sufficient size 
and scale effects to engage in larger and more risky projects.  
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International presence and access to new reserves 
 
As most suppliers, Aker Kværner engages in worldwide projects and operations. In theory, 
Statoil could benefit from all the areas in which Aker Kværner has experience. However, 
there is a tendency of convergence between the oil producing companies and the service 
providers. Both parties can to a great extent perform the same tasks; as the main difference 
between them is the degree of integration. Service providers are typically highly competent in 
niches while oil companies have been more integrated along the whole value chain, and have 
access to markets, which suppliers lack. Hence, if Statoil was to vertically integrate with a 
supplier, like Aker Kværner there would be a large overlap of business areas and risk of 
cannibalisation in competing for the same customers. Moreover, other oil companies might 
not want to do business with a supplier who is also a competititor. Hence, since there is only a 
small part of Aker Kværner’s operations that Statoil could exploit, a full vertical integration 
could ruin the other business areas which overlap with Statoil’s. Thus, it would be very 
challenging to integrate the two companies and transfer the role that Aker Kværner plays 
today into Statoil’s operations297. A more ideal business model would be to form a strategic 
alliance with an upstream supplier to only cover a specific area in need of cooperation. This 
would also eliminate the problem of competing for the same customers298. 
 
If however, the two companies could find a solution to this problem, there could be large 
potential for Statoil to increase its international presence through this mode. In today’s fierce 
competition for access to new reserves, it is critical for oil companies to have strong 
technological competence. Statoil’s use of new innovative technologies developed in 
cooperation with Aker Kværner could be applied in the production of new oil fields in 
technically challenging areas299. Hence Statoil/Aker Kværner could use their new 
technological competences in gaining access to new reserves internationally.  
 
Reputation and relationships with host governments and NOCs 
 
As the national oil companies often lack the technology and competence in operating large 
and challenging projects, vertically integrated oil companies with strong technological 
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capabilities stand out as attractive partners. According to the company’s respective web site, 
Aker Kværner aims to be the preferred partner, and the company focuses on being a world 
class specialist in the execution of projects and in providing technology and solutions that 
provide added value to their clients300. A merged Statoil/Aker Kværner could become a 
technical developer and operational partner for the new resource-abundant NOCs301. 
Consequently, combined Statoil and Aker Kværner could increase their bargaining power 
internationally. 
 
Technological competences 
 
A vertical merger between Statoil and Aker Kværner could create a new and different 
engineering-and technology based company, combining the business of oil and gas production 
with the technology supplier industry. This would address the current changes and challenges 
in the global energy market, in which the traditional oil companies no longer are as attractive 
for the petroleum rich countries, who want national control over their resources. This 
particular problem can be illustrated by the challenges that Statoil has faced in the Shtokman 
project in Russia. As Gazprom lacks the technological competence in extracting and 
producing oil, they require a partner who could provide them with the competence they lack. 
Hence for such a project, Statoil would be more attractive if they could offer a package 
solution with both competences of an oil company and technology supplier. An example of a 
company who has succeeded in Russia is the technology supplier Halliburton. The company 
has over the years cooperated closely with oil companies in developing technology used for 
extraction and production of oil, and is now selling their services and competences to NOCs 
who wants to maintain the control of resources, but need assistance on the technological 
side302. 
 
Conclusion 
 
We believe this solution would be a good alternative to the merger, as Statoil could gain more 
control over the technology development and use this to their advantage in the new 
competition for resources, where strong technological competences has become one of the 
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most important criteria for success. The merged Statoil/Aker Kværner could still cooperate 
with Hydro on certain projects such as the Shtokman field, when increased size and financial 
strength is required and to gain more bargaining power. However, as this particular deal 
would leave a very important sector of the Norwegian economy concentrated in the hand of 
two very large companies, this could hamper competition and harm other actors in the 
petroleum industry303.   
 
STRATEGIC ALLIANCE 
Strategic alliances are also very common within the oil industry as it allows companies to 
cooperate on certain matters or in a particular project. Statoil has through the years been 
engaged in a few strategic alliances as part of their international strategy. The most 
recognized and also the first was an alliance with British Petroleum (BP) in 1990. This 
alliance lasted until 2000 and covered international exploration and production, research and 
development, and gas marketing. In this section we will look at the potential benefits and 
drawbacks of forming a strategic alliance with an international oil and gas company as an 
alternative route to the other expansion modes. 
 
Resource management on the NCS 
 
There is a concern that the more Statoil engages in international activities, the less effort will 
be directed towards the management of existing resources on the NCS. This is unlikely to be a 
major threat in the near future, as Statoil still aims to keep NCS as its main production base, 
and would rather use a strategic alliance as a way to gain more foothold internationally. 
Another issue that could affect the management of resources on the NCS is that the company 
might be forced to give away some of its resources on the NCS in exchange for resources 
abroad. This would not necessarily lead to less efficiency in the resource management on the 
NCS, but will leave Statoil with less control. However, previous experience has shown that 
more competition and a multiplicity of players are important for increased efficiency in 
resource management and increased recovery rates. Moreover, alliances have proved that 
cooperation among oil companies can lead to synergies in sharing costs and technologies, 
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which again could improve the efficiency of existing operations. Hence, we do not believe 
that a strategic alliance would have a very positive or negative effect for Statoil’s operations 
on the Norwegian Continental Shelf. 
 
Size and scale effects 
 
Traditionally, strategic alliances have been very common in the international oil industry as it 
has allowed companies to share the risks and costs involved in large and complex projects. 
Oil companies often look for partners with complementary resources either in technology or 
access to reserves and markets. The main benefit of a strategic alliance is that the two parties 
can share knowledge and learn from each other in specific areas in which they lack 
competence. Moreover, it is less costly than for example an M&A, as an alliance only covers 
cooperation on certain areas, and does not require a full integration of the two companies. The 
agreement between Statoil and BP is a typical example of a strategic alliance that has become 
increasingly widespread in the international oil arena. The two companies have in certain 
fields shared core-technology with each other, as well as risk and costs of projects304. 
 
However, after the big wave of horizontal mergers in the 1990s, the main drivers for the 
larger companies to form alliances from a risk mitigation point of view is weakened. Hence, 
according to David Nunn, the IOCs today have fewer incentives to engage in strategic 
alliances as they are large enough to take on the risks themselves. Still, the smaller and 
medium sized companies such as Statoil could benefit from such an alliance in order to gain 
more competitive strength. Nevertheless, larger IOCs still need to cooperate in the bidding 
process to obtain licenses as it is unlikely that one company gets 100 percent of a license in a 
production field. The licensing rules vary from country to country; however, oil companies 
typically have to engage in a strategic alliance to achieve the operational and financial 
strength necessary to obtain a share of a production field305. Moreover, it is beneficial for oil 
companies to obtain the largest share in projects as this usually implies operatorships with 
more control over development of the technology and the outcome of a project. Hence, there 
are still incentives for oil companies to engage in strategic alliances in this area. 
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International presence and access to new reserves 
 
The exploration alliance with BP is a good example of the potential synergies that can be 
created through an international alliance. Many of the international licenses Statoil has today 
came as a consequence from this alliance. The alliance lasted for a decade and was unrolled in 
2000 as the intentions for the alliance was largely fulfilled306. As the main goal for Statoil is 
to increase its international competitiveness, it could consider a new strategic alliance, similar 
to the one with BP. Today, Statoil is typically strong in technology, but lacks access to 
resources and markets. As the largest IOCs probably would not have any incentives to engage 
in an alliance with Statoil as they have the size, financial strength and technology required to 
engage in large and risky projects on their own, a middle-sized IOC, although larger than 
Statoil,  would be a more realistic alliance partner for Statoil. Such an alliance could provide 
them with complementary competences, international experience and instant access to new 
reserves and markets. This would again increase their production and profitability from 
international activities307. 
 
Nevertheless, strategic alliances are very challenging. Lack of aligned interests or ability to 
create synergies can result in large losses for the companies involved. The marketing alliance, 
“Alliance gas”, which Statoil formed with BP and Hydro in natural gas in the UK in 1991-92 
provides an example of an unsuccessful alliance. This alliance did not turn out as expected, as 
the companies did not have aligned incentives. BP supplied gas to this marketing alliance in 
the form of a long term contract at a set price. However, when the UK market collapsed in 
1995, this contract was “out of the market” and the alliance lost money on every unit sold. 
Consequently, BP lacked incentives to renegotiate with itself as the alternative value was a 
much lower market price. Hence, this contract became very demanding for Statoil and Hydro 
as it represented large losses. This, together with disagreements regarding other strategic 
choices led to the determination of Alliance Gas in 1996308.  
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 Reputation and relationships with host governments and NOCs 
If Statoil were to find an international partner with longer track record of completed 
international projects, this could benefit Statoil’s reputation. Moreover, Statoil could use its 
partner’s established relationships with host governments and NOCs to get access to new 
reserves. In Statoil’s case though, the most beneficial would be a market alliance, where the 
company could obtain access to new markets in return for its technology or reserves on the 
NCS. On the other hand, a strategic alliance with a partner that are less socially and 
environmentally committed and perhaps has a reputation of being greedy and dominant, could 
potentially be harmful for Statoil’s reputation. Hence, the possible gains will largely depend 
on what kind of reputation and relationships the potential partner has. 
 
Technological competences 
 
Statoil does currently not have many alliances in which the two partners share technology, 
however in the BP alliance the two companies shared core-technology. Nevertheless, the 
company cooperates closely with the supplier industry to develop new technology projects. 
They invite their supplier to become part of a project at an early stage so that they can develop 
the technology and solutions together. This has been a very successful and important part of 
Statoil’s strategy, and has lead to greater innovations in the technology development309. As 
technology is considered to be part of Statoil’s core competences, this is probably the area in 
which Statoil would contribute the most in a strategic alliance. Nevertheless, as this 
technological competence is embedded in an organisation, Statoil might be reluctant to share 
this in the fear of partner opportunism. 
 
Conclusion 
 
To conclude, strategic alliances can be extremely valuable as it is a quick way of securing 
access to the resources and competences the company lack. For Statoil this would include 
increased access to reserves and greater size and financial strength. There are however, 
disadvantages involved as both parties have to give up some of their control to cooperate. 
Moreover, there is a possibility that the two parties have conflicting interest and the outcome 
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of the alliance may only benefit one of the companies. Hence, agreeing and acting on the legal 
terms of such contracts are crucial.  
 
 
Figure 26: Summary and comparison of Statoil´s strategic alternatives 
 
 
                  Strategic 
                      Alternatives 
 
 
 
Resource/Competence 
 
 
Internal 
Development 
 
 
Horizontal 
Merger 
(e.g. Hydro) 
 
 
Vertical Merger 
(e.g. Aker 
Kværner) 
 
 
 
Strategic 
Alliance 
(e.g. BP) 
9 Increased efficiency of  
resource management 
on the NCS 
 
 
 
High 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
Medium 
 
9 Size and scale 
advantage 
 
 
 
 
Low 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
Low 
 
 
High 
9 Increased international 
presence and access 
to reserves 
 
 
Low 
 
Medium 
 
Medium 
 
High 
9 Improved reputation 
and relationships  
 
 
 
 
Medium 
 
 
High 
 
 
High 
 
 
Medium 
9 Improved technology 
 
 
 
 
Medium 
 
High 
 
High 
 
Medium 
 
  
CHAPTER 2: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
 
In this section we have analysed various strategic alternatives that Statoil could pursue in its 
quest for further international growth. To begin with, none of the solutions can be considered 
ideal as there are conflicting interests at stake and they all involve tradeoffs. The main conflict 
relates to how Statoil can continue to be partly state-owned and ensure efficient management 
of the natural resources on the NCS, while at the same time gaining more weight 
internationally. Nevertheless, we have evaluated the four alternatives open to Statoil based on 
the five criteria, which we have found to be the most critical factors for success in this 
industry today. We have tried to rate all alternatives against each criterion according to a 
degree of improvement potential from low, to medium to high in order to better compare the 
alternatives. We have however not accounted for that the five criteria might be of more or less 
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importance and hence carry different weights. However, as our main focus and purpose of this 
paper is to determine how Statoil can grow internationally, the criteria that facilitate this are 
of greatest importance.  As the operations on the NCS will continue to be the main production 
base for Statoil also in the years to come, we have decided to include this element into our 
discussion. However, the other four criteria mainly encompass important factors relating to 
increasing international competitiveness. 
 
Firstly, we looked at internal development as a mode of expansion. We have suggested that 
Statoil would be able to continue to grow organically and be profitable through this mode of 
expansion also in the future. According to the above criteria this would be the better choice 
from a perspective of resource management on the NCS, however this alternative scored 
weaker on the four other criteria involving increased international competitiveness. Hence, we 
conclude that this is not the best option to pursue for increased international competitiveness. 
Statoil lacks the size and financial and operational strength to better compete with the largest 
actors in the industry as well as access to international reserves. Nevertheless, if they were to 
choose this alternative, the company might have to take on a new role as a technology partner 
for the NOCs rather than resource holder.  
As the horizontal merger between Statoil and Hydro is the alternative which the companies 
have chosen to pursue, we have put our main emphasis on this. The success of the merger 
with Hydro will partly depend on Statoil´s ability to take effective advantage of growth 
opportunities and to achieve efficiency improvements and other synergies. We have identified 
the complementary technological competences and similar foundation for a good reputation to 
be the most important factors behind the deal. Moreover, the size effect including increased 
operational, human, and financial strength and combined operations internationally will assist 
Statoil to a certain degree in increasing its international competitiveness. Hence, as the merger 
will create a larger organisation with more assets and a broader competence level, the merged 
StatoilHydro can take on larger and more complex projects than what the two companies 
could separately. However we argue whether this size effect is substantial enough to make a 
significant difference on the international arena. Moreover, we question whether the merger 
with Hydro will be the best alternative in Statoil’s ambition of increased internationalisation 
as both companies’ operations are so heavily focused on the NCS, and their competences are 
very similar. There is also broad discussion whether the merger will lead to more efficient 
management of resources on the NCS or if it will limit the domestic competition and 
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diversity. Although the combined entity is expected to stand stronger in the international 
competition, they will have to start more from scratch than if Statoil were to join forces with 
an international partner. This is because both companies international experience are limited 
and today they mainly operate in the same countries internationally. As for the role of the 
state, a merger between Statoil and Hydro would leave the new company far more state 
dominated than by the other strategic alternatives, and as we have discussed this might not be 
so beneficial on the international arena. Nevertheless, according to the criteria above this 
alternative comes out as one the strongest. Moreover, taking into account the various 
constraints on the company being so largely influenced by the state, for the time being this 
might be the best alternative. This is however, not to say that the companies should exclude 
the other alternatives also after the merger.  
The third alternative is a vertical merger with an upstream supplier. For the purpose of this 
analysis, we have considered Aker Kværner to be a potential candidate for Statoil. A vertical 
merger between Statoil and a supplier like Aker Kværner would allow the company to in-
source more of the technology development and use this to become an attractive partner for 
the NOCs. Hence, the increased technological competence together with a reputation of being 
a strong oil engineering-and technology based company, would allow the company to 
compete on different terms and stand out as an attractive partner for host governments and 
NOCs. Nevertheless, it would not provide Statoil with instant access to more resources, as 
suppliers do not have market access.  Moreover, a vertical merger would perhaps not increase 
the size of the company to a large extent as many of the business areas of the two companies 
would be overlapping and hence redundant. Nevertheless, this alternative would definitely be 
a viable option for Statoil to increase its international competitiveness.  
 
The fourth and final alternative is a strategic alliance with a larger international oil and gas 
company. The most outstanding factors in this case are greater size combined with increased 
international presence and access to new reserves. A strategic alliance would also make the 
company better able to deal with host governments and NOCs if the partner has longer 
international experience and more established relationships than Statoil. However, merging 
with a larger international actor would definitely mean loss of certain control and possible 
conflicts with the role of the state. Nevertheless, this alternative obtains the same score as the 
merger with Hydro and should absolutely be worth considering.  
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As a conclusion we do not think that there are any clear cut answers to how Statoil should 
improve its international competitiveness in the best manner. As we can see from the 
summary in figure 26, the strategic alternatives involves trade offs. Moreover, the competitive 
picture and the forces shaping the industry are constantly changing. The role that Statoil aims 
for in the future should also be reflected in their internationalisation strategy. In the way it is 
possible Statoil wishes to continue as operator and owner of recourses as they have done and 
are doing in the North Sea and OECD countries. Clearly, if Statoil aims to become a major 
natural resource holder our findings suggest that engaging in a strategic alliance would be the 
best alternative. However it might not increase its international competitiveness substantially, 
as the traditional IOCs are currently the worst performers of the industry. Consequently 
Statoil might be better off with focusing on niche segments.  With the trend towards further 
resource nationalisation, the company needs to consider revising its business model and move 
in the direction of a provider of project management and technological expertise to the 
national resource owners. In this context a vertical merger with a supplier will be a better way 
for Statoil to improve its competitiveness. Taken Statoil’s current strategic position into 
consideration we believe that the merger with Hydro is the best viable alternative at the time 
being. It might not be the alternative which grants it the largest international presence or 
access to natural resources. Yet, this solution might be the only one that Statoil could actually 
pursue, given the state ownership and interest. It is easier to get public and political support 
and also the only way the government and probably also Statoil could maintain control over 
their operations. Nonetheless, Statoil needs to consider other alternatives even after an 
eventual merger to keep pace with the trends in the industry and properly take advantage of 
the growth opportunities in the market. 
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 GLOSSARY
                                                
 
 
 
Barrel of oil equivalent (Boe): Oil and gas volumes expressed as a common unit of 
measurement. One boe is equal to one barrel of crude, or 159 standard cubic metres of gas310. 
 
IEA: International Energy Agency 
 
IOC: International Oil Company 
 
LNG: Liquified Natural Gas 
 
MNE: Multinational Enterprise 
 
NCS: Norwegian Continental Shelf 
 
NOC: National Oil Company 
 
OECD: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. The OECD is a unique 
forum where the governments of thirty democracies work together to address the economic, 
social and environmental challenges of globalisation. Members include; Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France,  Germany, Greece,  Hungary,  
Iceland,  Ireland, Italy, Japan,  Korea, Luxembourg,  Mexico,  the Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic,  Spain, Sweden,  Switzerland, Turkey, United 
Kingdom, and United States311. 
 
OPEC: Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries. It is an intergovernmental 
organization dedicated to the stability and prosperity of the petroleum market. Member 
 
310Statoil (2006), Annual report, available at 
<http://www.statoil.com/INF/SVG03636.NSF?OpenDatabase&lang=en&app=2006year>, 30.04.07. 
311 OECD’s website, available at 
<http://www.oecd.org/pages/0,3417,en_36734052_36761800_1_1_1_1_1,00.html>, 17.06.07 
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countries:  Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Angola, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Nigeria, Libya, 
Qatar, United Arab Emirates and Venezuela312. 
 
PSA : Production Sharing Agreement 
 
PSC: Project Sharing Contract 
 
Reserve replacement ratio: Additions to proved reserves, including acquisitions and 
disposals, divided by volumes produced313. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
312 OPEC’s website, available at <www.opec.org/home>, 13.05.07 
313 Statoil (2006), Annual report, available at 
<http://www.statoil.com/INF/SVG03636.NSF?OpenDatabase&lang=en&app=2006year>, 30.04.07. 
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